1. Under this judgment following civil revision applications filed by applicant Ghee Corporation of Pakistan are proposed to be disposed of: Civil Revision Application Filed against Arising out of Suit No. Challenging the order of No.1 of 1.994 M/s. Ashraf & Sons Suit No.926 of 1993 IIIrd Senior Civil Judge, Karachi West No.2 of 1994 M/s. Rahat Marwat Cartage Contractors Suit No.927 of 1993 -do--- No.3 of 1994 M/s. Mussarat Enterprises Suit No.928 of 1993 -do--- No.4 of 1994 M/s.Malikzada Group of Companies Suit No.929 of 1993 -do--- No.5 of 1994 M/s. Pak New Merwat Enterprises Suit No.930 of 1993 -do--- No.6 of 1994 M/s. A.R. Oil Carrier Suit No.931 of 1993 -do--- No.7 of 1994 M/s. Haji Muhammad Karim and Brothers Suit No. 932 of 1994 -do--- Each of the respondents mentioned above filed suit mentioned opposite his name against applicant Ghee Corporation of Pakistan with following prayers, common in each case: "A. That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to declare that the action of defendant inviting new tenders opened on 14-10-1993 containing conditions of deposit of Rs.5,00,000 as security and enhanced rates is mala fide, collusive and fraudulent and as such void and of no legal effect, and that all contracts entered by the defendants with any tenderers/contractors with security of Rs. 2,50,000 and reduced rates are also mala fides, collusive, fraudulent, void and of no legal effect.
2. B. A further declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to continue transporting the edible oil/ghee and other allied products of defendants under the existing contract deemed to be extended till 30-11- 1994 or till the defendants invite fresh tenders containing conditions of deposit of Rs.2,50,000 as security and the existing rates and allow chance to plaintiff to participate in the same.
3. C. Permanent injunction against the defendant restraining its employees, representatives, agents or any other persons on their behalf from acting on the contracts on the basis of said new tenders with attended conditions and allowing transporters to operate on the basis of the new contracts."
4. Case of the respondents was that each one of them entered into an agreement with applicant Ghee Corporation of Pakistan on 10-1-1991 for carriage of edible oils by tank lorries which lorries were not to be used for carrying anything else like petrol or any petrol product. Initially life of each agreement was for one year from 1-12-1990 to 30-11-1991 but it could be extended or renewed with mutual consent of the parties. Under identical letters, dated 11-12-1991 (copy Annexure A/2 in Revision No.1 of 1994) the term of the contract dated 10-1-1991 was mutually extended for a further period of one year viz. 1-12-1991 to 30-11-1992 but right to terminate the same was given only to the applicant Corporation: Under subsequent letters, dated 22-11-1992 (copy Annexure A/3 in Revision No.1 of 1994) the term of the contract was further extended from 1-12-1992 to 30-11-1993 with applicant Corporation retaining right to terminate the contracts. Respondents averred in their plaints that as per clause 27 of the Agreements of Transportation, the contracts could be terminated after three months of notice by either of the contracting parties. That the applicant could terminate any of the contracts only by way of notice of three months or in case of default or breach of the agreement. According to the plaints, the respondents were aggrieved due to inviting of new tenders receivable by 14-10-1993, under a press release issued in September 1993 on behalf of the applicant. The respondents took exception to fresh condition of depositing Rs.5,00,000 as security deposit instead of Rs.2,50,000 and to the enhancement of the rates. For said reasons respondents did not file any tender under protest. It was added that the applicant accepted the tender of new comers who were allowed to deposit Rs.2,50,000 as security instead of Rs.5,00,000 mentioned in the press release. The rates were also reduced in the cases of new comers. All these actions of the applicant, were challenged to be mala fide and in violation of the terms and conditions of the new tender. The respondents claimed to have sent letter of protest on 13-11-1993 to the applicant. For said reasons each of the respondents filed the suits mentioned against his name in para. 1 above.
5. All the suits were contested by the applicant who filed in each case an application for rejection of the plaint. Each of respondents moved in his suit an application for issue of interim injunction enabling them to continue on an transporters of the goods of the applicant. Besides this, there were also applications for taking action under Contempt of Courts Act against the applicant. All these applications were dealt with under the identically worded impugned orders, dated 19-12- 1993.
6. Each of the respondents opposed in his suit respondent's application for rejection of the plaint and filed objection controverting the grounds urged in support of the application.
7. Under the impugned orders, dated 19-12-1993 learned trial Court inter alia dismissed the applications for rejection of the plaints. Hence these Revision Applications.
8. Mr. M.S. Qureshi, learned counsel for the applicant in Revision Applications Nos.1 to 7 of 1994, argued that the contract proceedings were finalized on 11-11-1993 and that each of the new contractors had to furnish two personal sureties of the value of Rs.2,50,000 each as per Para. 3 of the letter, dated 11-11-1993 from the Deputy General Manager (Commercial) Ghee Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi to each of the new Contractors containing terms and conditions for Transportation of edible oil from Karachi to upcountry Ghee units. He further argued that after conclusion of tender proceedings on 11-11-1993 the respondents had no cause of action. Learned counsel further argued that the suits filed by the respondents are not maintainable and are barred by sections 21, 42 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act. It was contended that a party cannot be forced to enter into a contract or to extend period of the contract after expiry of its period. Learned counsel also argued that since period of the contracts was over, it was not necessary for the applicant to issue notices about termination of the contracts to the different respondents.
9. Exception was taken to the fact that the persons whom new contracts had been awarded, had not been impleaded as parties. It was lastly argued that the respondents had no cause of action or vested right for award of contracts, because they never participated in the tender proceedings. It was added that the respondents had no locus standi to file the suits. In support learned counsel for the applicant cited the case of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited and others v.
10. Muhammad Shabir Shaikh 1993 CLC 330.
11. Mr. M. Ilyas, learned counsel for the respondent in each of the said revision applications argued that although the contracts, dated 10-1-1991 had expired on 30-11-1991, but they were extended up to 30-11-1992. Learned counsel referred to clauses 26 and 27 of the agreements and argued that a notice in terms of the agreements was not issued to each of the respondents before calling of the new tenders. Learned counsel emphasised on the point that second extension granted by the applicant to the respondents was up to 30-11-1993 and since tender's were invited before expiry of the said period, hence this amounted to termination of the contracts, for which prior notice to the respondents was necessary. In respect of non-joinder of new contractors, learned counsel for the respondents was of the view that the persons given contracts can come and join the proceedings if they so like. In support learned counsel of the respondents cited the cases of:
(1) Muhammad Aref Effandi v. Egypt Air 1980 SCMR 588.
(2) Khawaja Imran Ahmad v. Noor Ahmed and another 1992 SCMR 1152.
(3) Mian Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan through D.C., Khairpur and another PLD 1970 SC 180.
(4) Pakistan Automobile Corporation Limited and another v. General Motors Overseas Distribution Corporation and others PLD 1982 Kar. 796.
(5) Syed Rahim Shah v. Kassim and another 1992 MLD 1751.
12. According to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, declaration can be granted only in respect of a legal character or in respect of right to any property. The expression "legal character" or "status" denotes a character or status conferred by law on an individual. Or a number of individuals and it is a "status" or "character" conferred by law and is not a creature of contract but of law, as observed in the case of Burmah Eastern Ltd. v. Burmah Eastern Employees' Union and others PLD 1967 Dacca 190. In the case of MA. Naser v. Chairman, Pakistan Eastern Railways and others PLD 1965 SC 83 it was held that section 42 of Specific Relief Act, does not contemplate a suit for declaration that a catering contract between a contractor and a Railway Administration to supply refreshment and to run buffet cars was still subsisting. In the case of Alavi Sons Ltd. v. The Government of East Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1968 Karachi 222 the view taken was that a declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs have not committed any breach whatsoever of any of the terms and conditions of a contract between them and the defendants, cannot be granted in a suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and for that reason such a suit is incompetent and not maintainable being primarily with respect to the pecuniary relationship between the parties. In the same case it was observed that a declaration cannot be granted to the effect that the plaintiff has not committed any breach whatsoever of any of the terms and conditions of a contract. In the case of Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works Limited and others v. Muhammad Shakir Sheikh 1993 CLC 330 a learned Single Judge of this Court borrowed the observation made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of M/s. Malik and Haq and another v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury and others PLD 1961 SC 531 to the effect that a breach of a contract would give rise only to two reliefs for declaration or specific performance. Learned Single Judge took view that where relief for specific performance is barred, the only relief available with the plaintiff is to file a suit for damages. In the case of Gul Muhammad and another v. Mir Zaman and another PLD 1954 Lahore 406 cited on behalf of the applicant the view taken was that necessary party means a party in whose absence no effective decree can be granted in a suit at all.
13. Before arriving at the conclusion, it is necessary to consider the cases cited on behalf of the respondents. In the case of Muhammad Aref Effendi v. Egypt Air 1980 SCMR 588 principles governing issue of interim injunction have been laid down. In the case of Khawaja Imran Ahmed v.
14. Noor Ahmed and another 1992 SCMR 1152 there is observation about the ground of personal requirement for eviction of a tenant. In the cases of Mian Muhammad Latif v. Province of West Pakistan and others PLD 1970 SC 180, Pakistan Automobile Corporation Limited and another v.
15. General Motors Overseas Distribution Corporation and others PLD 1982 Karachi 796 and Syed Rahim Shah v. Kassim and another 1992 MLD 1751, the principles governing grant of temporary injunction have been given. None of the authorities cited on behalf of the respondents meets objection raised about non-maintainability of the suits filed by the respondents.
16. No doubt, the respondents were given contracts on 10-1-1991 for transportation of certain goods during an initial period of one year from 1-12-1990 to 30-11-1991. The life of such contracts was extended up to 30-11-1992 as per the letter, dated 11-12-1991 copy Annexure A/2 and up to 30-11-1993 as -per the letter dated 22-11-1992 copy Annexure A/3 and as per para. 2 of the plaint. Learned counsel for the applicant did not deny this. Mere fact that the respondents entered into agreements with the applicant for transportation of edible oil for an initial period of one year up to 30-11-1991 and extension of such period up to 30-11-1992 and then up to 30-11-1993 did not give vested right to the respondents to claim continuation of the same agreements for ever. In their plaints, the respondents did not pray for specific performance of any agreement and they could not have done so, as no agreement subsisted between the parties after 30-11-1993. Instead of coming for specific performance of any contract duly completed between them and the applicant, the respondents sought declaration that they were entitled to continue transporting edible oil/Ghee and other products of the applicant under the existing contracts deemed to have been extended till 30-11-1994. Admittedly the Civil Courts have not been empowered by any law to extend the period of any contract, while granting relief of declaration or granting an injunction.
17. Main relief of declaration sought by the respondents is not in terms of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, as none of the respondents has a vested E right to continue on as transporter under a previously concluded contract the period of which is over. A declaration that action of the applicant in inviting new tenders opened on 14-10-1993, is void and of no legal effect, is not covered by four corners of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Reference was made to section 21 of Specific Relief Act which would not apply because it speaks about the contracts not specifically enforceable. Such question does not arise in the suits, where the plaintiffs did not come for enforcement of any contract.
18. Learned counsel for the applicant referred to clause (f) of section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, which says that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. As already stated, the respondents have not come for specific performance of any contract. The contracts to which the respondents were party, had already been over and their extended period is also over.