1. ABDUL RAHIM KAZI, J.---This High Court Appeal is directed against the order passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers on 12-9-1994 whereby the application moved under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. By the present appellant was dismissed.
2. Briefly the facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that the present appellant had filed a suit for recovery of Rs.26,61,022 on account of a contract relating to laying of main Sewerage Group-II, Volume I for Lyari. In the said suit, it is said that on 7-2-1993 Mr. Abdul Baqi Siddiqi the Managing Director of respondent had appeared in the Court and made a statement before the learned Single Judge to the effect that the defendants are not opposing the claim of the plaintiff in suit. It is also urged that the said Mr. Abdul Baqi Siddiqi was directed to file a statement in writing which he filed on the same day wherein he has stated that Chief Engineer (Sewerage) and Deputy Managing Director Technical (Services) recommended that since the Award has been given by the Sole Arbitrator, the same may be allowed by the audit as Board on similar cases had authorised the Managing Director to make payment of the Award in anticipation of Board's formal approval. It is also in the same statement that these recommendations were agreed by the Managing Director and accordingly the Assistant Director Audit was requested to carry out a pre-audit claim by the plaintiff may be allowed in terms of Award. The defendant No.1 had further stated in that said statement that the bill was not passed by the Audit and, therefore, the bill/claim cannot be paid unless it is cleared by the. Audit. This statement shows that there was unconditional admission on the part of the defendants but the same was conditional subject to clearance by the audit and there being no clearance, it was the case of the defendants that the same was not paid.
3. The learned counsel for appellant has pointed out that the matter was adjourned on next date i.e. 8-2-1993 when it was recorded in the order sheet that on the previous date the defendants'
4. Managing Director hid conceded to the plaintiff's claim but subsequently at the time of filing the statement in writing he had improvised and made a clarification with regard to the said concession. From this the learned counsel submitted that this amounts to admission and, therefore, the suit ought to have been decreed under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. He has further pointed out that the present appellant has placed on record the office notings which are in the form of comments within the department of the respondent and show that XEN (SEW) DIV:LYARI, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board had conceded to the claim of the appellant which concession was also agreed by one Abdul Rasheed Khan, the Chief Engineer, and Managing Director. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. It may be observed that the provisions of Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. Reads as under: "6. Judgment on admission.---Any party, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties; and the Court may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the Court may think just."
5. The above provisions lay down that a party can seek decree on admission made either in the pleadings or otherwise without waiting for determination of any other question between the parties. In the present case the whole contention of the learned counsel is dependant on the said oral admission of the Managing Director of respondent and the office notings. In the first instance the office notings is an inter-departmental communications and would not form the basis of concession. Secondly, such office notings by itself would of amount to conceding the claim of the plaintiff. An officer of the defendants may have made the noting but the same is subjected to final orders of the mal authority who may or may not agree with such notings. It is further observed that it is the written statement which is on record which is to be considered or any other document or statement, which may be oral, brought on record, which can be taken as an admission for the purposes of provisions of Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. In the present case, of course, the order of 8-2- 1993 would show that an oral statement was made by the respondent but the same is a, qualified statement as is apparent from the written statement filed on the very same day. As regards the admission as contemplated in the above provision the same has to be an unequivocal admission which means it should be such admission which can amount to estoppel against the party making the admission. The defendants in the present suit were allowed to file their written statement on payment of a cost of Rs.2,000 which was received by the plaintiff as is apparent from the above order, whereas, the present application under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. Is made before the defendants were allowed to file their written statement.
6. Learned counsel for appellant has placed reliance on the case of M/s. Bisvil Spinners (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
7. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1992 SC 96 and has submitted that a piece of evidence is relevant and pertinent for the decision of an issue and, therefore, reliance should be placed on the said notings and the oral statement made by the Managing Director of the defendants. He has also placed reliance on the case of Mian Tajamul Hussain and 3 others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan 1993 SCM R 1137. In this case the parties had agree that they would not lead any evidence but rely on documents placed on record: and that subsequently another document was brought on record which was also relied upon by the Court. However, the pertinent point in this Supreme Court judgment was that the said document which was subsequently relied upon was admitted by the concerned party, whereas in the present case the statement in writing does not straightaway admit the claim but it shows that the said admission was qualified. As already observed the office nothings by itself would not amount to admission unless brought on record and proved in law.
8. The learned counsel for appellant has then contended that in the present case the applications were heard on 12-9-1994 bust the order was not announced which amounts to reservation of the order. He has further submitted that in such circumstances this order does not amount to a valid order in law. He has placed reliance on a number of judgments of the superior Courts wherein it has been held that a judgment is no judgment unless signed and delivered in open Court. The contention of the learned counsel is that this order is written in Chambers by the learned Single Judge which was never announced or delivered in Court. There is nothing on the record to show that this order was written on a day other than the date on which the application was heard.