The petitioner was working in BS-15 and was posted as Secretary, Market Committee, Kot Lakhpat, Lahore, when respondent No.1 vide Resolution No. 20 dated 4-10-1988 granted him BS-i7 with effect from 1-7-1988. However, respondent No.2 vide order dated 29-11-1988 suspended this resolution of respondent No.1. The petitioner has challenged this order of respondent No.2 through the ' present Constitutional petition, which was admitted to regular hearing and notices were issued to the respondents.
2. The arguments .Were heard at some length on 25-1-1994. The matter was adjourned to 26-1-1994 when the learned Additional Advocate-General and the counsel for respondent No.1 raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this petition has become infructuous, in view of Resolution No.2 dated 6-2-1989 subsequently passed by respondent No.1 whereby Resolution No.20, dated 4- 10-1988 was withdrawn. The petitioner thereafter moved an application for amendment of the writ petition in order to take up the plea that since Resolution No.20 was acted upon, therefore, the same could not be withdrawn. In this behalf reference is made to Pakistan "v. Muhammad Himayatullah PLD 1969 SC 407. It is added that respondent No.1 was not competent to pass the subsequent resolution during the pendency of the proceedings before respondent No.2; in respect of earlier resolution and lastly that the Secretary of a `A' Class Committee is entitled to BS-17 and the Committee is fully competent to grant the same.
3. The respondents have resisted this petition as well as the main writ petition. The learned Additional Advocate-General argued that the present writ petition has become infructuous for all intents and purposes and the petitioner cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent events through an amendment. It is added that the petitioner has remedy by way of representation to the Government against Resolution No.2 dated 6-2-1989, therefore, this petition is incompetent. The arguments are summed up with the submission that this Court will not exercise jurisdiction to preserve ill-gotten benefit because it would perpetuate the illegal act of` respondent No.1. In this behalf, the learned Additional Advocate-General referred to the cases reported as Negina Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 4 others 1990 CLC 1337 and Ghulam Sarwar Awan v. Government of Sindh through Home Secretary PLD 1988 Kar. 414.
The learned counsel for respondent No.2 argued that the Government is competent to grant BS 17 to the employees of the Market Committee and not the committee itself. It is added that the name of the petitioner appeared at Serial No.36 of the seniority list of `C' Class Secretaries and according to Schedule `B' of Rule 17(ii)(iv) a Secretary, Market Committee in BS-17 can be promoted from Secretary `B' Class Market Committee, who is in BS-16 and has five years service to his credit. The petitioner was never promoted to BS-16, therefore, the question of allowing him BS-16 did not arise.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments addressed on behalf of the parties. The application for amendment of the writ petition is misconceived. It not only changes the-whole complexion of the relief prayed for but also the cause of action. The policy of the law is that subsequent causes of action should be dealt, with separately instead of confusing the whole issue.
The policy of the law, as is clear from Order 1, Rule 2, C.P.C. Is that causes should not be allowed to be tagged when it would cause delay in the adjudication and embarrass the respondents.
Therefore, the application for permission to amend the writ petition is dismissed.
5. Now coming to the main writ petition the same has become infructuous for all intents and purposes because Resolution No. 20 dated 4-10-1988 has been withdrawn by respondent No.1 through subsequent Resolution No.2 dated 6-2-1989. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 explained that this fact was brought on the record by respondent No.2 through letter, dated 14-6- 1989 written to the learned Advocate-General, Punjab and appended as Annexure `D/4' with the reply to the application for amendment of the writ petition but the petitioner took no notice of the same. Be that as it may. The writ petition has become infructuous after the withdrawal of Resolution No.20. Moreover, there is force in the argument of the learned Additional Advocate- General that assuming that the impugned order is void but since the conduct of the petitioner is not fair and whole effort is to perpetuate ill-gotten benefit, therefore, he can be refused relief in Constitutional jurisdiction in view of judgments in the cases of `Nagina Cotton Mills Ltd.' and `Ghulam Sarwar Awan' (supra).
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that the application for amendment as well as the writ petition are dismissed with costs.