' The facts of this case, concisely stated, leading up to this Constitutional petition are that Muhammad Haneef respondent No, 2, herein was Driver in the Office of the House Building Finance Corporation, Zonal Office, Multan, petitioner herein, and was reverted to the post of Naib-Qasid vide order dated the 14th of November, 1991 after disciplinary action. Respondent No, 2 consequently filed a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (to be referred as Ordinance). The petition was referred to the Presiding Officer of the Punjab Labour Court No, 8, Bahawalpur for disposal. Before that, however, the Member of the National Industrial Relations, had suspended the operation of the order 'dated the 14th of November, 1991. The petitioner presented the written reply before the Labour Court and the case was fixed for arguments on the petition on the 18th of February, 1992. Thereafter the case was adjourned for couple of dates. Respondent No, 2, however, did not turn up on the 29th of November, 1992 and the case was dismissed for want of prosecution but followed by the petition for its restoration. The petitioner, however, opposed the said petition. In the meantime respondent No, 2 presented another application for suspension of the operation of the order dated the 14th of November, 1991 and the learned Judge, Labour Court issued the notice to the petitioner for the 23rd of January, 1993 but in the meantime suspended the operation of the order which mean temporary relief was restored to respondent No, 2 and he was to work in its original posting. The petitioner, however, in the interregnum period had already implemented the order of reversion and struck him off from the cadre of driver and placed him as peon. Anyhow on the 2nd of January, 1993 the petitioner resisted the petition for -restoration. The learned Labour Court, however, vide impugned order dated the 25th of January, 1993 put off the case for evidence for the 23rd of February, 1993 and extended the temporary injunction he had already granted on the 19th of January, 1993. The petitioner has challenged both these orders mainly on the following premises:--
(1) The case could not be transferred to the Labour Court.
(2) The Labour Court was not competent to grant interim injunction as all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable.
(3) The petitioner had already implemented the order after the petition of respondent No, 2 had been dismissed in default.
(4) The petition of respondent No, 2 filed under section 22-A(8)(g) of the Ordinance was not sustainable on merits.
(5) The Commission could refer the case to the Labour Court within whose jurisdiction the case had occurred, either for report or for disposal under section 22-A(9)(e) of the Ordinance and under subsection (10-a) the Labour Court to whom the case was referred was supposed to dispose it of.
The objection as to transfer of the case, therefore, fails.
2. Second objection is also devoid of merits. Section 36 of the Ordinance deals with the law applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court and reads:-- Section 36: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, (while trying an offence) a Labour Court shall follow as nearly as possible summary procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
(2) A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), including the powers of:
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath.
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents.
(d) The Labour Court thus was competent to grant ad interim relief under Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even otherwise rule of law is that an authority which can administer ultimate relief can also give interim relief. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred me to couple of decisions out of which more appropriate to the facts of the in-hand is the case Re: Messrs Ahmed Food Industries Ltd., Karachi v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and 2 others (1974 PLC 225 Karachi). It was observed that provisions of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance IV of 1968 do not place Industrial Court at par with Civil Court respecting substantive provisions of Civil Procedure Code and the said law only allows Industrial Court to follow procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code. Further held that power of review was not a matter of mere procedure but was a substantive rights and could not be invoked under the said Ordinance. The said case-law arises out of different facts. Moreover, grant of temporary injunction is a procedural law and not a substantive law like right of appeal or review. Since the Labour Court is fully empowered under the Ordinance to grant full and final relief to respondent No, 2, therefore, it was also competent to grant ad interim relief to him under its inherent powers and also under provisions of section 36 of the Ordinance.
(e) The objection that the petitioner had already implemented the order after respondent's petition was dismissed in default, has also no force. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court could revive and resuscitate the order which once had been granted by the learned Member of the Commission and also extended by the Labour Court till the petition was dismissed for want of prosecution followed by the prayer in writing for its restoration.
4. The last contention touches the merits of the petition of the contesting respondent and can be dealt with by the Labour Court at appropriate time as the matter is pending there.
5. In view of what I have stated above, the petitioner has failed to prove that the impugned orders were passed without lawful authority. The petition is, therefore dismissed.