' GHULAM ABBAS SOOMRO (MEMBER).---This appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 7-2-1994 Annexure 'B' passed by the A.I.-G. Crime, Karachi retiring the appellant from service on attaining the age of superannuation.
2. Facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed as Constable on 26-2-1954 in Karachi Police and subsequently promoted upto the rank of A.S.I. At the time of employment his date of birth was entered as 16-2-1934 in the service record. On the basis of medical certificate dated 12-2- 1954 which indicated appellant's age as 20 years. After completion of more than 30 years service appellant suddenly ventured to get his date of birth changed and anti-dated to 20-10-1936 and as such applied to A.I.-G. Police Crimes vide his application dated 3-3-1992 (Annexure 'A') that his date of birth viz. 16-2-1934 having been erroneously entered in the record, the same was required to be corrected and shown as 20-6-1936 which was the correct one. Alongwith that application the applicant also annexed a certificate dated 21-1-1991 of the District Health Officer, Rawalpindi (Annexure 'C'). That fact was got verified by the A.I.-G. Crimes, Karachi from the S.S.P. Rawalpindi who by his letter dated 4-6-1992 (Annexure 'B') forwarded to the A.I.-G. Crimes, Karachi the Birth Certificate of the appellant duly verified. After getting this certificate of D.H.O., Rawalpindi (Annexure 'C') showing his date of birth as 20-10-1936, the appellant remained silent till the issue of the impugned order dated 7-2-1994 whereby appellant was allowed to draw leave salary since he opted not to take LPR. Appellant was retired on 25-2-1994 on attaining the age of superannuation as per his date of birth indicated in the record viz. 16-2-1934. Appellant filed departmental appeal dated 3-3-1994 (Annexure `E') which was rejected vide of the I.-G. Police dated 3-4-1994 (Annexure `E'), hence this appeal.
3. We have heard Mr. Mumtaz Burney, the learned Advocate for appellant and Mr. Abdul Latif Ansari, learned AA.-G. On behalf of the respondents and after having examined the record, we have come to a definite conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal which merits dismissal for the undermentioned reasons:--
(a) The most important point which is fatal to the appellant's case is that this appeal is time- barred. Perusal of record indicated that the impugned order was passed on 3-4-1994 but this appeal was filed on 16-5-1994 i.e, beyond the statutory period of 30 days. There is no explanation of delay of about 13 days.
We asked the learned Advocate for appellant as to whether application for condonation of delay had been made but the reply was in negative. As such, the learned A.A.-G. Had rightly pointed out in his legal objections dated 1-9-1994 in para. 1 that this appeal could not be entertained on account of its being time-barred. Since there is no cogent reason to excuse the delay, we accept the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that this appeal is time-barred.
(b) Despite the above mentioned legal infirmity we thought it fit to go into the merits of this appeal but find that no substance existed on record which could improve the case. Our attention had been drawn by the learned AA.-G. To Proviso II of Rule 9.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 which laid down that a police official could get the date of birth changed on furnishing adequate documentary evidence within two years of his employment which was not done by the appellant for reason best known to him. As a matter of fact the entry of his birth date viz. 16-2-1934 was within his conscious knowledge inasmuch as his service sheet and Attestation of Police Form (annexed with the written statement) indicated that his date of birth at the time of employment was shown as 16-2-1934.
These two documents also bear the appellant's signatures. As such, it does not lie in his mouth to say that he was not aware of that entry. Surely, the cause of action arose to the appellant at that stage but he remained silent for more than 30 years and did nothing to agitate against that entry.
We are, therefore, definitely of the view that the appellant had slept over his rights and as such cannot be allowed to resicarpate the dead issue at this belated stage. In this connection we may refer to a case reported in 1994 SCM R 1633 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held interalia that in case of change of date of birth silence of petitioner over a long portion of service was such that he did not merit a favourable decision. We have been of consistent view that the entertainment of such belated claims for changing the dates of birth seemed to be an undesirable practice which ought to be discouraged in the absence of very reliable documentary evidence and reasonable explanation for delay. Similar view had been taken by this Tribunal in Appeal No, 127/93, decided on 23-6-1994 (Masud Ahmed Khan v. Government of Sindh and others). The above reported cases are on all fours with facts in this appeal.
(c) It is appellant's own application dated 2-2-1994 (attached alongwith written statement filed by the A.A.-G.) wherein he requested "that as his date of birth was 26-2-1934, he would stand retired on 25-2-1994 and as such necessary retirement order be issued and he may be allowed to draw his 180 days leave salary in lieu of the leave admissible under the Rules". It is thereafter that the respondent had issued the impugned order dated 7-2-1994 retiring him from service. This document having been suppressed by the appellant, our attention was drawn by the learned AA.- G. To that important admission on the part of appellant on aceount of which the appellant is estopped from agitating for change of his date of birth from 26-2-1934 to 20-10-1936. As a matter of fact the appellant's case stands demolished completely by his own admission contained in this document.
4. In view of above reasons, we dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.