' There was a dispute between members of Makhdoom family on possession of a house at Gulberg in Lahore known as Makhdoom-ul-Mulk House. Respondents claimed its possession and alleged that its lower portion was given to the petitioner to reside in it as a guest or a licence. Upon his coming into possession of the lower portion of the house, respondents shifted their residence to the upper portion of the house. On 26-3-1990, petitioner was alleged to have dispossessed the respondents from the upper portion of the house, except in due process of law. They brought a civil suit against him under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act to regain possession of upper portion of the house from which they were illegally dispossessed by him., Petitioner contested the suit and denied averments in the plaint. He asserted his possession on the house in his own right. The trial Court framed necessary issues. Upon application by the petitioner, issues were recast. Petitioner submitted a list of witnesses. On 25-7-199Z petitioner submitted an application under Order XIII, Rule 2, Civil P.C. For production of some documents. Respondents resisted the application. By an order dated 29-9-1992, the trial Court dismissed the application and refused permission for late production of the documents. Its order was impuned in civil revision at the instance of defendant in the suit.
2. Learned counsel for the rival parties have been heard. Documents sought to be produced in evidence, permission whereof was sought under Order XIII, Rule 2, Civil P.C. Have also been looked at. Without adverting to admissibility of documents, their relevance to the point at issue and their probative force, as also their genuineness, learned trial Court had kept them out of its consi eration, on score of mere delay. In my opinion, it did not appear to be a udicious exercise of judicial power.
Rules of procedure are intended to advance and subserve the cause of justice, rather than to obstruct it. Ground of mere delay was in-sufficient to deny production of documentary evidence which otherwise appeared to be relevant and free from taint of suspicion. In taking this view, I derived strength from the cases reported as PLD 1956 Lah. 252 PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lah. 803, PLD 1977 AJK 78, PLD 1992 SC 822,4992 SCMR 1778. Above few cases were merely referred to support structuring of exercise of discretion under Order XIII, Rule 2, Civil P.C. By the Court. Otherwise, there was a long line of cases to support liberal exercise of jurisdiction under the above rule of the Code. Exercise of discretion was always regulated by taking cognizance of relevant considerations bearing upon it.
Learned trial Court was oblivious of the aforequoted considerations. Therefore, its order shutting out documentary evidence on account of mere delay in its production was defective and not tenable. I would, therefore, set it aside and direct reconsideration of the matter for its decision afresh in accordance with law.