1. K. HOSSAIN, J.--The petitioner Miss Nilufferullah, an officer of the East Pakistan Forest Indu9ties Corporation has-in this writ petition challenged her order of discharge from the service of the Corporation.
2. The facts leading to her discharge are that the petitioner was appointed at first on 2nd July 1963 Secretary to the Chairman of the Corporation and later she was appointed in the post of Public Relation Officer on 6 October 1964 of the Corporation. The appointment was temporary and on probation: On 27-4-66. Dr. Saboor the Secretary of the Corporation found certain irregularities committed by the petitioner in connection with the Printing Accounts Manual of the Corporation, and so he put up notes regarding the irregularities to the Chairman, who ordered the investigation into the matter and for drawing upof proceedings against the petitioner on 27-6-66. The petitioner was asked to show cause by 4-7-66 regarding five charges by notice dated 29-6-66 issued by the Secretary. The petitioner gave a written explanation to all the charges by her reply dated 4-7-66.
3. On 7-7-66 the petitioner was suspended and proceedings under section 16(a) of the Rules of the Corporation were drawn up appointing the Secretary as the Investigating Officer. On the Secretary's report and discussions with the Chairman, a formal charge was drawn up and sent to the petitioner by a notice dated 20-7-66. The petitioner also gave a reply on 31-7-66 to the said charge-sheet. On 18-10-66 the Chairman-on consideration of the charge report of the Investigation Officer and the reply of the petitioner found her guilty of two charges and decided to discharge her. A second show-cause notice of discharge was served on the petitioner and she replied to it on 28-10-66 and the reply having disclosed nothing new, the petitioner was finallyth discharged on 4-11-66. She filed an appeal to the Appellate Authority of the Corporation and it was also dismissed on 25-2-67. Thereafter she obtained the above Rule on 7th-August 1967.
4. The petitioner asserted that she did not commit any of the alleged irregularities and what she did she did on the verbal instruction of the Chairman. She also alleged male fide in that the brother of the Chairman was a candidate of the post of Public Relations Officer she was holding and he was actually appointed but since the Corporation did not pay the advance travelling allowance, he did not join his post and thereafter the petitioner was appointed. It is further alleged that the Chairman and the Secretary were or the look out to get-rid of her by any device or contrivance.
5. The Corporation in their affidavit in-opposition have denied the allegation of male fide and have asserted that the petitioner had been discharged to accordance with the-'rules of- the Corporation upon the charge of misconduct and irregulatttit5 committed by her and found proved upon due inquiry.
6. Mr. Moinul Huq, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has raised several grounds of which three are relevant. They are (1) The petitioner was appointed in 1963 and the Corporation had its own Rules framed in 1960 as amended in 1961 which are applicable to her whereas Rules framed on 25- 6-65 have been applied to he7r illegally; (2) that the order of discharge passed against her is male fide; (3) that 'the order ofthe Chairman finding the petitioner guilty on two counts is so contradictory on the face of it that it cannot be sustained.
7. With regard to the first contention Mr. Serajul Huq learned Advocate for the Corporation stated that the rules prevailing up to 25-6-65 draft Rules framed by the Corporation but were not accepted by the Provincial Government and those of 25-2-65 were framed by the Provincial Government and so the latter Rules are operative. On this point we refrain from giving any opinion in view of our finding on the third point raised by Mr. Moinul Huq.
8. The question of mala fide raised by Mr. Moinul Huq is not sustainable as the materials on record are not sufficient and they relate to disputed facts and possible to decide on affidavits.
9. The third contention of Mr. Moinul Huq is that the findings of the Chairman dated 18-10-66 is so contradictory that charges found against the petitioner cannot stand. Mr. Serajul Huq, tried to defend the order, though unsuccess--fully.
10. Let us consider the finding of the Chairman. He has first found petitioner guilty of manufacturing tender paper which was never sent to the party but only to make a show of it. The case of the Corporation is that the petitioner as Public Relation Officer was in charge of printing of Accounts Manual of the Corporation and she placed a bill for Rs. 4,600 dated 17-3-66 from Messrs Pioneer Press for printing 250 copies of Accounts Manual to the Chairman for passing. The Chairman enquired whether any tender had been called for the work, and the petitioner falsely stated that tender quotations were called for and the work was done by the said Press who quoted lowest. The petitioner produced a paper purported to be tender notice but in fact no such tender notice was sent and it was created later by ante-dating it with the help of the Typist Mr. Jane Alam Khan. She was therefore guilty of misconduct.
11. The Chairman in his order dated 18-10-66 has found the petitioner guilty of manufacturing tender paper as aforesaid and also for not accepting the lowest tender which, according to the Chairman, is an irregularity. The Chairman has stated with regard to the first charge that "in her defence dated 31-7-66 Miss Ullah says that the Accounts Manual had to be printed in extreme haste with less regard for formalities. It is difficult to understand what she means by this. Probably the implica--tion is that it was not possible to call for tenders and that is what the prosecution is trying to make out I.e. that no tender was called for . . . . ." He also found ante-dating and publication of tender papers from the evidence of Jane Alam, an accomplice. All work was done by him but he stated that they were done at the instance of the petitioner. The Chairman also found that the tender submitted by the Pioneer Press stated that it was with reference to verbal request. With regard to the second charge the Chairman found that "she accepted a much higher tender of Pioneer Press neglecting two tenders which were lower. Incidentally one of the lower tender was that of the Co-operative Book Society who have reputation of very high standard.
12. If the finding of the Chairman on the two charges are compared it is difficult to reconcile them. On the first charge the finding is no tender was at all called for but was later manufactured and if that is so then the other two tenders that were alleged to be submitted by other parties cannot be explained.If therefore there were in fact tenders submitted by some of the parties, then it becomes difficult to hold that no tender was called for by the petitioner, who only manufactured them later.
13. The two findings therefore are contradictory and the proceedings for discharge being of a quasi- criminal nature, the petitioner cannot be penalised on this defective and inconsistent finding and the benefit of inconsistency must go to the petitioner. The order of discharge dated 4-11-66 is based on this inconsistent finding dated 18-i0-66 of the Chairman and as such it cannot be sustained. This contention on behalf of the petitioner is upheld.
14. The Rule is made absolute and we declare that the order dated 18-10-66 finding the petitioner guilty of two charges and the order dated 4-11-66 discharging the petitioner by the Chairman, East Pakistan Forest Industries Development Corporation are without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Therewill be no order as to cost in this petition.
15. SIDDIKY, C. J.-I agree.