This is an appeal against the order dated 28-10-1974 of the Junior Labour Court, Rawalpindi, whereby the said learned Court dismissed the petition filed by Faiz Muhammad appellant an employee of the respondent under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. The appellant was employed as workman by the respondent Associated Cement Works, Wah Cantt, Wah on 23-7-1974. He was terminated on 18-8-1974 on the ground that his brother Niaz Ahmad was already in the respondent's employment and that according to a decision taken in consultation with the workers' Union to or more members of the same family could not be employed. The appellant filed an application under section 25-A of the 1. R. O. 1969 before the learned lower Court seeking his re-instatement and challenging the validity of the order of his termination on the ground that no written order stating reasons for his termination was made by the respondent and that persons junior t :) him were still in the respondent's employment and further that his termination was based on mala fides.
3. The respondent resisted the appellant---s petition and pleaded that the appellant was a temporary employee. He was recruited on the condition that in case it was found that his other brother was already employed then he would be terminated. In the appellant's case it transpired that his brother Niaz Ahmad was already employed with the respondent and therefore the appellant was terminated in accordance with the condition of his employment.
4. Faiz Mohammad appellant appeared as his own witness before the learned trial Court while Zakauddin Ishrat Personnel Officer of the respondent testified on behalf of the respondent.
5. The learned trial Court after considering the parties' evidence found that the appellant was terminated due to the fact that his brother was already employed with the respondent and that this was one of the conditions of employment of the appellant. Thus the appellant's petition was dismissed.
6. I have gone through the records of the learned lower Court. Parties have been heard at some length. This is true that according to the employ--ment order Exh. R. A. The appellant was required to produce before the Personnel Department a declaration to the effect that he did not have any other brother already employed with the respondent. This is also a common ground between the parties that Niaz Ahmad brother of the appellant was/is already employed in this respondent's employment. This to is not denied that the appellant was a temporary employee but according to Standing Order 12(3) of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employ-- ment (Standing Orders), Ordinance, 1968 the services of a workman whether permanent or temporary could not be terminated except by an order in writing in which reasons for the action taken were explicitly stated. In the case under consideration an office order No. 156 dated 13-1-1974 was made that the name of the appellant was immediately deleted from the list as his brother Niaz Ahmad was already employed. This office note is Exh. R. B. It is, however, noteworthy that this office note which may, by some stretch of imagination, be deemed to be an order of termination was not communicated to the appellant at all. The appellant already stated before the learned lower Court that no letter of termination was given to him. He was simply told that he was discharged henceforth. Mr. Zakauddin, Personnel Officer of the respondent, stated that no written order of termination was communicated to the appellant as it was not necessary to do so. In Guftar Shah v.
Sind Labour Court (1974 P C 210), it has been held by the Sind Baluchistan High Court that clause 3 of Standing Order 12 which provides that order of dismissal from service shall be in writing and will state the reasons for the action taken, necessarily implies that this order will be communicated to the employee
7. This is very essential, because unless an order in writing as envisaged in Standing order 12(3) is communicated to the employee concerned the possibility of fabricating such an order afterwards cannot be excluded. In the instant case the termination order was admittedly not communicated to the E appellant, his termination is therefore held to be violative of Standing Order 12(3).
8. In view of the above, I accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the learned Court below and direct the re-instatement of the appellant with back benefits.