FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.- This judgment shall dispose of Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1969 and Writ Petition No. 7-R of 1969 as they call in question the same orders passed by respondents No. 1 to 3 in respect of the property in dispute.
2. The property in dispute (herein called the property') is an evacuee Liou measuring 6 kanals bearing No. 72-B. Model Town, Lahore. Except for sen-ant quarters and a garage, the main house of the property had not been constructed by the evacuee Late Muhammad Ismail (claimant), late Khushi Muhammad (non-claimant) (predecessor-in-interest of the appellants and writ petitioners respectively), respondent No. 4 (non-claimant and respondent No. 5 (claimant) find their C.H./X.C.H. Forms under Settlement Scheme No. I for the transfer of the property. Late' Muhammad Ismail claimed the transfer of the whole property whereas late Khushi Muhammad, Khurshid Ahmad respondent No. 4 and Muhammad Aslam respondent No. 5 applied for transfer of garage, one quarter with proportionate unbuilt area and two rooms respectively. All the applicants, except respondent No. 5. Were in possession of portions of the property pursuant to allotment orders in then- favour. The possession of respondent No. 5 was based on an allotment in the name of his uncle which itself was cancelled by order dated 25.11.1954 of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner.
3. By order dated 9.12.1959, the claim of respondents No. 4 and 5 . Was rejected by respondent No. 3 by declaring the property as a building site, a non-transferable house and disposable through auction. The appeal and revision of respondent No. 5 were also dismissed vide orders dated 21.7.1960 and 15.8.1961 passed by respondents No. 2 and 1 respectively. The revision petition find by respondent No. 4 and review petition jointly find by him and late Muhammad Ismail were respectively dismissed on 20.3.1962 and 20.4.1962 by respondent No. 1. However. Writ Petitions No. 326-R/63 and No. 2334-R/62 find by respondents No. 4 and 5 were accepted by the High Court vide judgment dated 29.9.1966 with a direction to respondent No. 3 to decide their case afresh.
Thereafter, the appellants find their C.H.' Form on 14.10.1966 under Settlement Scheme No. VIH as their predecessor-in- interest Muhammad Ismail had passed away on 15.6,1966.
4. On remand of the case, respondent No. 3 (Deputy Settlement Commissioner) by order dated 26.5.1967 transferred the whole of the property' to respondent No. 5 treating it to be one-unit. The C.H./N.C.H. Forms of all the other applicants were rejected. The appeals find -by the respondents, the petitioner late Khushi Muhammad and Mst. Rashida Khanum but find by respondent No. 4 was accepted by respondent No. 2 vide order- dated 8.4.1968. Both the respondents No. 4 and 5 were transferred two room each with an area equal to three times the plinth attached to their respective houses. The remaining plot and the garage were to be put to auction. However, vide order dated 31.8.1968, the revision petitions of respondents No. 4 and 5 were accepted but those find by the appellants and the petitioner late Khushi Muhammad were dismissed by respondent No. 1. The remaining open site was transferred to respondents No. 4 and 5 in equal shares and garage to respondent No: 4 alone. Feeling dissatisfied by the aforesaid orders passed by respondents No. 1 and 2. Respondent No. 5 find Writ Petition No. 1200-R of 1967, L.P.A. No. 86 of 1969 in the High Court and C.P.S.L.A. No. 116 of 1969 in the Supreme Court which were dismissed. A Writ Petition No. 1174-R of 1968 of the appellants against the above orders of respondents No. 1 to 3 was dismissed vide impugned order dated 9.12.1968 passed by the learned Single Judge from which the present appeal was find. Late Khushi Muhammad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners also find the present writ petition against the above impugned orders passed by respondents No. 1 to 3.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants and the writ petitioners have contended that in the earlier round of litigation, the Settlement Authorities were oblivious to consider and dispose of C.H./N.C.H.
Forms in accordance with law by treating the property as a non-transferable building site. They argued that the order dated 29.9.1966 passed by the High Court on the writ petitions of respondents No. 4 and 5 could not be construed as having determined or adversely affected the rights of the appellants and petitioners in any manner whatsoever particularly when they were not party to the proceedings nor any notice or hearing provided. The learned counsel submitted that the property had been finally found by respondents No. 1 to 3 to be a divisible and transferable house. All the C.H./N.C.H. Forms Were required to be considered afresh on their own merit in accordance with the relevant Settlement Schemes. The hands of respondents No. 1 to 3 were not tied by the order of remand of the High Court to exclude from consideration the claim of the appellants and the petitioners. The learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondents No. 1 to 3 were under a legal obligation to consider and dispose of their C.H. Form find by them on 14.10.1966 under Settlement Scheme No. VIII after the judgment dated 29.9.1966 of the High Court on the introduction of the Scheme. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned Chief Justice of the High Court had not taken the view that rights of respondents No. 4 and 5 and of no other person would be considered under the remand order or that the appellants could not take advantage of the remand order. The learned counsel further stated that there was no question of laches in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the writ petitioners added that respondents No. 4 and 5 were transferred an area more than three times of the plinth in disregard of the provisions of section 2(4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Both the learned counsel relied on the cases of Sikandar Jehan Begum v. Abdul Hameed (PLD 1963 Karachi 219) and Syed Muhammad Saqlain v.
Muhammad Amir and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 157) in support of their contentions.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents have argued that the orders of respondents No. 1 to 3 as well as the one passed by the learned Single Judge impugned by the appellants and the petitioners were validly passed which did not call for any interference by this Court in appeal or wait. He further submitted that the appellants and the wait petitioners had acquiesced in the impugned orders passed by the Settlement Authorities and did not agitate the matter further in appropriate proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, argued that by their conduct, the appellants and the petitioners were estopped from raising any grievance with regard to the transfer of the property' in favour of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 which had become a past and closed transaction and the same could not be re-opened. The learned counsel also pressed the dismissal of the appeal and the writ petition on the ground of laches.
Dialing the course of arguments, Sh. Muhammad Naseem, Advocate/the learned counsel for respondent No. 4 made an offer to the learned counsel for the appellants, the wait petitioners as well as to respondent No. 5 present in Court and his learned counsel that it would be fair and equitable if the entire property in dispute was transferred to all the for claimants (who are litigating in these proceedings) in equal shares which could be. Partitioned accordingly. The learned counsel further stated that respondent No. 4 was prepared to part with half of the property transferred to him by the Settlement Authorities if the entire property in dispute was divided to all the for claimants in equal proportion. To this proposal, respondent No. 5 and his learned counsel did not agree although it was acceptable to all the other learned counsel for the parties including that of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department.
7. We have heard and considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties.
We do not find any embargo or restriction in the judgment dated 29.9.1966 passed by High Court in Writ Petitions No. 2334-R/62 and 326-R/63 prohibiting respondents No. 1 to 3 from considering the claims of the present appellants and the writ petitioners nor any such inhibition can be construed in terms of the said judgment. It is collect that only respondents No. 4 and 5 had find Writ Petitions Nos. 326-R/63 and 2334/R/62 in the erstwhile West Pakistan High Court calling in question the validity of orders dated 9.12.1959, 21.7.1960, 15.8.1961, 20.3.1962 and 20.4.1962 passed by respondents No. 1 to 3. It was in that context that the High Court remanded the case for a fresh decision by setting aside the orders passed by respondents No. 1 to 3 with a direction to consider their claims afresh in accordance with law. It may be pertinent to mention that in the earlier round of litigation, the dominant question decided by the Settlement Authorities was the non-transferability of the property in dispute to respondents No. 4 and 5 by treating it to be a building site which was disposable by auction only. The basic order dated 9.12.1959 passed by respondent No. 3 would clearly show that the same was passed in relation to the claims of respondents No. 4 and 5. The claim of the predecessors of the appellants and the petitioners was not before respondent No. 3 or the High Court nor the same was considered by him at all. Therefore, the order dated 29.9.1966 passed by the High Court cannot be construed as having foreclosed the claim of the appellants or the writ petitioners after the orders passed by respondents No. 1 to 3 treating the whole property in dispute as a non- transferable had been set aside. It was obligator}' upon respondents No. 1 to 3 to have considered the claim of the appellants and the writ petitioners on their merits in juxta- position with respondents No. 4 and 5 particularly when their claim forms had not been earlier considered and disposed of by respondent No. 3. See the cases of Sikandar Jehan Begum v. Mian Abdul Hameed and others (PLD 1963 (W.P.) Karachi 219) and Syed Muhammad Saqlain v.
Muhammad Amir and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 157). In our opinion, the whole matter had become re-opened entitling all the claimants to have their claims considered in accordance with law' after the property had been declared to be a transferable house. It is now well-settled that ordinarily consequent upon an order of remand by this Court the whole -matter ( becomes re-opened liable to a fresh decision unless some specific limitation or restriction is clearly spelt out which we have not been able to find out in the present case. Reliance can be placed on the judgment in the cases of Ahmad Din and 7 others v. Abdul Khalik and others (PLD 1979 Lahore 898 >, Chengalraya Chetty and others v. Raghava Ramanuja Doss and others (AIR 1919 Madras 150), Koonj Beharee Awustee v.
Tarinee Kant Lahore (1867) Sutherland Weekly Reporter (Volume VIH) Page 285), Kisto Churn Chukerbutty v. Muggun Chuckerbutty and others (1868) Sutherland Weekly Reporter (Volume X)
Page 491) and Gudadhur Dutt and another v. Sushee Monee Dossia (1874) Sutherland Weekly Reporter (Volume XXI) Page 7i. Even otherwise, the earlier orders of the Settlement Authorities having been finally set aside in the writ petitions, the same could not have been treated to be still operative qua the present appellants and the writ petitioners. In the circumstances, the property in dispute could no longer remain as non- transferable building site qua the present appellants or the writ petitioners but transferable, as a house, to respondents No. 4 and 5. There is another reason for taking the view that the whole matter had become re-opened on remand of the case.
Respondents No. 1 to 3 on re consideration of the case came to the conclusion that the property in dispute was, in fact, a transferable house under Settlement Scheme No. I. In the presence of such a finding, the present appellants and the writ petitioners had the right to have their claims considered in accordance with law. The earlier erroneous and illegal view taken by respondents No. 1 to 3 could not operate to the prejudice of the rights of the appellants and the petitioners. It is now well- settled that on account of an act or omission by a Court, a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even an Administrative Authority, no party could be made to suffer in any manner. See the cases of Imtiaz.
Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali (PLD 1963 SC 382), Mian Irshad Ali v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Minisry of Rehabilitation, Islamabad and 13 others (PLD 1975 Lahore 7) and Ghulam Haider and others v. Mst. Raj Bharri and others (PLD 1988 SC 20).
In the case of Imtiaz Ahmad (supra), late Mr. Justice B.Z. Kaikais made the following observations at page 400 of the report: - "I am unable to place the mistakes committed by the Administration on the same footing as mere accidents. The difference is that in one case the harm caused to a party being the result of a mistake committed by the Administration there is an obligation on our part to undo it as far as that is possible. There is no such obligation in the case of an accident. In relation to Courts there is a well-known saying that the act of Court will not prejudice anybody. I do not see why the principle of this maxim does not apply to the whole machinery of the Administration of which the Courts are only a part. No mistake committed by this machinery, should prejudice any person as far as that can be helped. If the mistake of the election authorities is like a misfortune why are elections set aside on the ground of irregularities committed by the officers who conduct the elections? Why does not the law regard these irregularities like events which have happened and cannot be helped? It cannot be the intention of the law that rights of persons should be affected by the mistakes committed by public officers. I would not allow the respondent to be deprived of his right to be elected Chairman because of a slip by some person in the Officer of the District Election Officer or by the refusal of the Chairman to see even the records of the Office of the District Election Officer. We must put the parties in the same position as they would have been if no mistake had been committed by the administration as long as we can do that. Let them be prejudiced by their own misfortunes by all means but not by our acts. I say "our' because we too are a part of this administration." - We, therefore, do not agree with the findings of respondents No. 1 to 3 and the view expressed by the learned Judge in Chamber that the earlier order dated 29.9.1966 passed by the High Court w^as limited to the consideration of the claim of respondents No. 4 and 5 only to the exclusion of the present appellants and the writ petitioners.
8. The record also show's that the present appellants and the writ petitioners, their predecessors- in-interest as also respondent No. 4 were in possession of the respective portions of the property pursuant to valid orders of allotment in their favour but respondent No. 5 had not been found to be in possession of any portion of the property in dispute on the basis of any allotment order in his favour. The record further indicates that respondent No. 5 had occupied a portion of the property in dispute on the basis of allotment by the authorities made in favour of his uncle which was cancelled by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 25.11.1954. It is,- therefore, highly doubtful as to whether respondent No! 5 could at all be transferred the whole or a part of the property in dispute. The "possession" as visualised by law and defined by sub-section (6) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read with the Central Government notifications dated 13.10.1959 and 7.3.1960 would mean only the possession which was obtained in pursuance of an allotment order issued by a competent authority. It would not cover a possession of a person which was not in his own right but being a relative of some other person who was an allottee of the property. See the' cases of Mst. Madina Begum v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 945) (D.B.), Abdul Jabbar and others v. Abdul Waheed Khan and others (PLD 1974 SC 331), Atta Muhammad v. Taj Muhammad and another .(1974 SCMR 346) and Salim Akhtar and 6 others v. Dr. Naeem Rathore and others (1983 SCMR 304). We, however, do not warnt to give our findings on this issue as the learned counsel for the appellants did not render much assistance on this aspect of the case.
9. By virtue of sub-section (2) of the section 2 read with Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, in the absence of special order and determination by the competent Settlement Authorities, the validity of transfer of more than three times the plinth area to respondents No. 4 and 5 was doubtful. It is a matter of some significance that respondents No. 1 to 3 never adverted to this aspect erf the case while transferring the entire property in dispute to respondent No. 5 or later to both respondents No. 4 and 5 in equal shares. Respondents No. 1 to 3 were required to decide the matter keeping in view the legal position in that regard. This view finds support from the judgment in the case of Muhammad Aslam Khan and 3 others v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and 4 others (1972 SCMR 545). It is also observed that respondents No. 1 to 3 by their impugned orders proceeded to transfer the property in dispute to respondents No. 4 and 5 in proportions much more than what they had claimed. Respondent No. 4 through his N.C.H. Form had sought the transfer of Garage (quarter) and proportionate unbuilt area whereas respondent No. 5 through his C.H. Form had claimed the transfer of only two rooms.
Therefore, the transfer of the entire property to respondents No.4 and 5 by respondents No. 1 to 3 was open to serious exception. In the cases of Amir Din and others v. Muhammad Siddiq and others (PLD 1966 Lahore 416), Ms. Madina Begum (supra) and Sardar Abdul Aleem v. Ch'. Abdur Rahim and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 1398), it has been clearly held that a person applying only for a part of house cannot claim the transfer of the entire house. *10. From the perusal of the impugned orders, the claims of the appellants and the petitioners as submitted by them on C.H. Forms/N.C.H. Forms have not been found to be unsustainable on their .Merits. There is no disability or disengagement of the appellants or the writ petitioners to the transfer of the property in dispute. Their claim has to be accepted as valid. The predecessors of the appellants and the writ petitioners were claimant and non-claimant refugees who had duly submitted their claims on the prescribed Forms which apart from the technicalities, if any, were not found to be suffering from any infirmity. We, therefore, hold that the appellants and the petitioners were entitled to the transfer of the property' in dispute. We have also to keep in view the object and scope of the relevant law which is of an extremely special character. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has already, held in the cases of Mian Rafi-ud-Din and 6 others v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 others (PLD 1971 S.C. 252) and Sh. Ahmad Sadiq v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1974 SC 368) that "the evacuee and rehabilitation legislations are of an extremely special character which are, from the nature of things, to be construed not so much, on considerations that would weigh with Courts of law, but also on considerations of policy. They are designed for meeting an extraordinary situation of a complex and confusing nature created by influx of a large number of refugees, who had to be settled and were intended to be so adaptable as to meet the changes in the situation that developed from time to time. They could not, therefore, be construed upon strict legal principles and certainly not in such a manner as to defeat the very object for which such a special legislation was designed." We have to find out a workable and equitable solution of the dispute haring its own specularities keeping in view the fact that the parties have been litigating for the last about 38 years. We, therefore, declare the impugned orders passed by respondents No. 1 to 3 as without lawful authority and of no legal effect and also set aside the impugned order dated 9.12.1968 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. We, consequently, direct that the present appellants, the writ petitioners and respondents No. 4 and 5 are entitled to the transfer of the whole property in for equal shares as shown in the site plan Mark 'A' and 'A /I" annexed to this judgment and signed by us which shall form a part of this judgment. All the appellants shall be treated as one claimant and the writ petitioners to be another.
11. The appeal and the writ petition are accepted with no order as to costs.