' M. A. RASHID, J.-The simple question involved in this petition is whether increase allowed to the workers by respondent R. B. Industries vide settlement between the workers Union and the Management dated 15th May 1974, is by way of cost of living allowance or a normal increase in wages. There is no regular scale of wages in R. B. Industries, whereby the workers could get automatic increase at regular intervals. As a result, every two years the Management and the employees enter into settlement to determine the+ conditions of service of workers, including wages. The settlement dated 15th May 1974, is the latest of its kind.
2. According to the list of demands preferred by the petitioners, the first demand was that those workers who have put in 5 years or more of service should be allowed an increase of Rs. 60 per month in their wages and those having service of less than 5 years should be given Rs. 50 per month as such increase. This demand was accepted in the following terms:- "It is agreed between the Company and the Union that with effect from 1st April 1974 the salaries of all permanent workmen employed in the Factory as on 1st April 1974, will be increased at the following rates:-
(i) All entitled workmen as fully detailed in the attached Schedule 'A' who have completed more than five years of permanent service in the Company as on 31st March, 1974, will get an increase of Rs. 55 in the basic monthly salary drawn by them as on 31st March 1974.
(ii) All entitled workmen as fully detailed in the attached Schedule 'B' who have not yet completed five years of permanent service in the company as on 31st March 1974, will get an increase of Rs. 55 inthe basic monthly salary drawn by them as on 31st March,, 1974."
' Subsequently, by Employees Cost of Living (Relief) (Amendment) Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as 'Amending Act'), an additional cost of living allowance equal to Rs. 50 per month was allowed to those workers whose wages did not exceed Rs. 1,000. This increase is termed 'additional' because originally such cost of living allowance was allowed at lesser rates by the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973. This increase was allowed by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973, so added by the Amending Act. The same is reproduced below for the sake of facility: "(2) In addition to the cost of living allowance admissible under subsection (1), if any, every employee shall, in respect of his employment, on or after the eighth day of June 1974, whether on time-work or piece-work basis, be paid by his employer a cost of living allowance-
(a) equal to fifty rupees per months or ten per cent. Of his monthly wages, whichever is more, if his wages do not exceed one thousand rupees ; or
(b) at such rate as, together with his wages makes a total of one thousand one hundred rupees per month, if his wages exceed one thousand rupees."
2-A. When the petitioners approached the employers for increase in the cost of living allowance in accordance with the Amending Act they took refuge behind the proviso, claiming that the increase vide settlement dated 15th May 1974, in response to demand No. 1 was 'due to a rise in the cost of living'. As the dispute arose about the interpretation of the provisions of the settlement the matter was referred to the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, under section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that because the increase as a result of 1974 settlement was of a very high order namely 38. 6 % in the case of lower grade and 21.6 % in the case of higher grade and as against that in 1972 settlement such increase was only 10% therefore, this increase was intended to povide relief due to rise in the cost of living. The result was that the application on behalf of the workers' Union was dismissed and that of the respondent Industry was allowed.
3. Mr. Saeed Malik, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the increase allowed by way of settlement of 1974 is an increase in the basic salary and has nothing to do with the cost of living allowance. This-argument is mainly based on the wordings of the settlement with respect to demand No. 1 (a) reproduced above. Learned counsel also states that the settlement read in conjunction with the demand which talk of increase in wages, would clearly indicate that the increase agreed upon was not by way of an increase due to rise in the cost of living. Mr. Fazle Ghani Khan, in addition to the ground that prevailed with the learned Tribunal, contends that the unconditional withdrawal of Demand No. 12 (2) supports the view that the increase in wages was due to rise in cost of living. This demand stated that any settlement arrived at would not be affected by any benefit conferred by the Central or Provincial Government, which benefit the Management shall have to provide. Learned counsel contends that with the withdrawal of this demand the benefit conferred by the Amending Act would not be available to the petitioners. The argument on the face of it is not tenable because the withdrawal of this demand did not have any effect on the statutory benefit which the Legislature had chosen to confer.
4. Apart from the fact that the demand of the petitioners and the settlement arrived at between the employers and employees clearly indicate that the increase contained in the settlement is by way of addition to the basic monthly salary, there is another important factor which seems to have been overlooked by the learned Tribunal while interpreting the settlement, The explanation to section 8, as substituted by the amending Ordinance, has set at rest any controversy which could be raised as to the character of an increase. Before proceeding to examine the effect of the explanation and the proviso to section 8 as substituted by the amending Act, it would be worthwhile to reproduce the same:- "8. Saving of certain rights and privileges.-Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or privilege to which an employee was entitled,..."(a) in the case of the cost of living allowance payable under subsection (1) of section 3, immediately before the commencement of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Ordinance, 1973 (XXII of 1973), or "(b) in the case of the cost of living allowance payable under subsection (2) of section 3, immediately before the commencement of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) (Amendment) Act, 1974, under any law for the time being in force or under any award, decision, agreement, settlement, contract, custom or usage in force immediately before such commencement: ' Provided that, if at any time commencing on or after the first day of August 1973, but preceding the commencement of the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) (Amendment) Act, 1974, any employer has paid, or become liable to pay, whether by virtue of an award, decision, agree-merit settlement, contract, custom or usage, to an employee, in respect of any period, any sum of money, which is intended to provide relief due to a rise in the cost of living, such employer shall not be required to pay to such employee in respect of such period any amount in excess of the difference, if any, between the amount so paid by him or the amount which he has so become liable to pay, and the cost of living allowance payable to such employee."
"Explanation.-For the purposes of this proviso, any increase in wages accruing by virtue of the usual annual increment or promotion to a higher grade or an allowance not specifically given to provide relief due to a rise in the cost of living, shall not be deemed to be an increase intended to provide relief due to a rise in the cost of living."
5. It declares that any increase in wages by way of usual annual increment or due to promotion or any allowance which is not specifically given-from provide relief due to a rise in the cost of living, shall not be deemed to be an increase intended to provide relief due to such rise in the cost of living. This explanation evidently seems to have been ignored at the time of interpretation of the settlement.
6. The proviso, immediately preceding the explanation has barred the liability of Employers to pay the difference between the cost of living allowance allowed by the amending Act, and the amount paid, or which such employer had become liable to pay between 1st August 1973 and the commencement of the amending Act, i.e. 10th September 1974. Respondents had successfully contended before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, that their case fell within this proviso, claiming, by a process of reasoning that the increase allowed by the settlement dated 15th May 1974, was due to rise in the cost of living. The Legislature by adding the explanation clearly wanted to set at rest any controversy as to what is, and what is not an increase due to rise in the cost of living and hence its specific and unambiguous language.
7. The relevant clause in the settlement, as reproduced above, clearly states that the increase of Rs.
55 and Rs. 45 respectively is by way of increase in the basic salary. It nowhere specifically declares that it is an increase occasioned due to rise in the cost of living. The provision of the law on the A subject is quite clear and is not ambiguous. Any effort to prove through extraneous circumstances that the increase was due to rise in the cost of living is not called for. In view of the clear language used by the Legislature there is no room for any controversy in the matter.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, raised the question that in its constitutional jurisdiction this Court, while supervising the Administrative Tribunals, can only go into the question of jurisdiction i.e. If the administrative tribunal has acted within jurisdiction conferred upon it under the statute or has exceeded it. He has also pressed into service the well established principle that when there is jurisdiction to decide a thing there is also the jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly; that the appreciation of the administrative Tribunal of a given set of facts can not be substituted by that of the appreciation of the supervising Court. He has particularly relied upon Muhammad Hussain v. Sikandar (1). It has been held that the terms ,without lawful authority and of no legal effect are expressions of art and refer to jurisdictional defects as distinct from a mere erroneous decision whether on a question of fact or even a law. This is a statement of the principle of law as contained in Article 199 of the Constitution. But this is not the whole law. There are certain exceptions to this principle. If a {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1974 SC 139 {{FOOT NOTE}} finding of fact or of a law goes to the root of jurisdiction and such finding is erroneous on the face of it, the revising Court can go into the question of finding of fact and such errors of law. This view is amply supported by B R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw (1) and R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Gilmore (2). In the second ruling, Denning L. J., observed that where statute gives finality to the findings of an administrative Tribunal even then an error on the face of record can be corrected through certiorari. Full Court authority of or own Supreme Court on the subject is contained in Rahimshah's case (3). The pertinent observation in this case is as follows : "High Court will interfere if the act done or the proceedings undertaken is in violation of law or any established principle of law. The term 'law' is not confined to 'statute' and in holding the inquiry the superior Courts are not restricted to an examination of record of the case. The Court may even record evidence to determine the legality of the act done or the proceedings undertaken."
' The law on the subject is that if an error of law is patent on record the ,,superior Courts always have the authority to correct it. In the present case the learned Tribunal evidently did not take into consideration the effect of explanation to section 8. This omission on its part would amount to an error of law. We would, therefore, hold that the decision of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal is without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and would hold that increase allowed through the settlement dated 15-5-1974 not due to increase in the cost of living. The parties are however left to ben their respective costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) (1952) 1 K B 338 (2) (1957) 1 All E R 796
(3) PLD 1973 SC 24