This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated the 29th of April 1993, of the learned Judge Family Court, Bahawalpur, whereby he decreed the plaintiff's suit for dissolution of marriage.
2. The plaintiff Mst. Riaz Bibi brought a suit for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner- defendant Khalil Ahmed on the grounds of exercising her right of option of puberty and alternatively Khula`. The petitioner contested the suit.
3. Both the parties adduced their respective evidence. The trial Court was impressed with the evidence brought on the record by the respondent. Consequently, it separated the marriage tie between the parties.
4. The petitioner has assailed the decree in this Constitutional petition.
5. I have gone through tile pleadings as also the evidence of the parties with the assistance of learned counsel for them. The respondent-wife was successful in proving her case by producing irrefutable testimony of natural witnesses who deposed that the respondent was married to the petitioner forcibly; that---s she did never accept the Nikah; that the petitioner was quite an old man; and that he had levelled false charge of adultery against her. In this milieu it was but natural for the respondent to develop aversion against the petitioner in her mind.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent has not returned the benefits extended by him. There is no evidence or for that matter any plea having been taken in the pleading of the petitioner that he had afforded any benefit to her. In fact, he had given a sum of about thirty thousand of rupees to her father and grandfather with a view to having her hand in marriage. The respondent was .Not a party to this bargain and she cannot be held responsible for its return to him. As regards consideration for Khula`, it may be stated that the marriage was not consummated between the parties and,, therefore, no question of Iddat arose at the incidence of the separation. Further, the respondent has since contracted a second marriage and that too before the institution of the present writ petition. Hence, the claim of the petitioner to set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court seems absurd which by no canons of justice be acceded to.
7. For what has been discussed above, the writ petition is dismissed having no merit at all.