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1976 PLC 922

EMPLOYEES UNION vs GRINDLAYS BANK LTD., RAWALPINDI

Citation1976 PLC 922
CourtLabour Court
Case No.Dispute No. 18 of 1976
Date1976-08-28
Judge(s)Rai Abdul Razzaq Khan
ResultN/A

ORDER

1. Petitioner-Union addressed a demand notice raising 7 demands on 2-4-76, to the respondent.

2. Through Exh. R-1, it was replied on 6-4-76, and the respondent-Bank through this letter made it clear to the petitioner-Union that a settlement gas reached at on 29.10-75, between the Grindlay Bank Employees Federation of West Pakistan and according to this settlement Clause No 30 it was settled between the parties that no demand involving financial implication be made during the period of operation of this settlement, which is 18 months from 1-10-75. It was further made clear to the petitioner-Union that it was a member of this federation and had signed that settlement through its General Secretary. After this reply no further bilateral negotiation appears to have been held. The Union gave a strike notice on 26-4-76. Conciliator proceedings were held arid failure certificate by the Conciliator was issued on 14-6-76. During conciliation first 3 demands were withdrawn by the Union as having covered by law.

3. "Instead of going on strike Union proposed to file this dispute on 15-6-76. Notice was issued to the respondent-Bank which has filed its written reply and has raised certain preliminary objections.

4. Parties were given an opportunity to produce evidence on those preliminary objections which they have availed. I have beard the arguments and have gone through the record.

5. In the first place learned counsel for the respondent has objected that this dispute has not been raised in the prescribed manner. Demand notice was addressed on 2-4-76, and strike notice was issued on 26-4-76. 10 days were required for bilateral negotiations after 2-4-76, and on completion of those 10 days a. Strike notice should have been issued within a week, whereas in the instant case strike notice was issued on 26-4-76, i. e. a week later. In this respect learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judicial pronouncement made by the Supreme Court cited as 1976 SCMR 82. This is a decision by a full bench of the Supreme Court and it has been held by their Lordships that a notice of strike given beyond 7 days of the failure of bilateral negotiations can not in principle or on the interpretation which we have placed on section 26 of the Ordinance be said to be illegal. Fixation of period is intended to infuse a sense of urgency among the parties to the industrial dispute. It is nowhere laid down in the Ordinance that if the the schedule is not followed in addressing a demand notice or a strike notice then the entire process laid down under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance shall fall through. It bas been further held that the word "may" used in section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, is directory and not mandatory so this objection is hereby overruled.

6. In the second place it has been contended that according to rule 5 of the Industrial Relations Rules 1973, there should have been 8 office-bearers instead of 10. Number of office-bearers is in violation of the rules, therefore, it can be said that Union is a legally constituted Union and is therefore not competent to raise a dispute. This is the admitted position of the parties that at the the when the demand notice was addressed number of office----bearers was really 10. This number was definitely in violation of Industrial Relations Rules referred to above, but by now this number has been reduced from 10 to 8 to make this number in conformity with the rules. Demand notice was addressed admittedly after resolution of the General Body of the Union and the number has been reduced to 8 to comply with the rules. Petitioner has failed to point out that this fact has caused any prejudice to the bank. Again a reference has been made to the above discussed case law wherein their Lordships have held that rules are also directory and not mandatory, so this objection is also not tenable.

7. In the third place it has been urged that the definition of an industrial dispute as envisaged in section 2 (xiii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, covers only 3 classes of disputes connected with (i) employment, (ii) terms of employment, and (i.e) conditions of work. And the phrase `any matter relating thereto occurring in this definition cannot be extended to any other matter except these 3 classes. Demand relating to bachelors' quarters does not constitute any industrial dispute so any charter of demands containing any demand not covered by law makes the dispute not maintainable.

8. Demand for accommodation is a demand which is, covered by "terms of employment" moreover any demand which in itself is not sustainable cannot render the whole dispute not maintainable.

9. This objection is also not tenable.

10. In the fourth place learned counsel for the respondent has urged that settlement is already in operation and there is a clause that no dispute can be raised during the operation of this settlement, particularly containing demands involving financial implication. It is binding on the parties so petitioner-- Union is estopped to raise this dispute. I have perused the demands and the petition. Neither petitioner-Union has made any mention of any settlement in operation in spite of the fact that employer had made a mention to it if] its written reply and had particularly refused to have bilateral negotiations on that very ground. No statement of reasons is given alongwith the petition and no mention has been made regarding change of the circumstances which has obliged the Union to raise the dispute. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that evidence on this point would be adduced later on when the dispute is heard on merits. This was also one of the preliminary objections and parties had an opportunity for leading evidence ors preliminary objection which they availed. No evidence was led on this issue.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the settlement referred to by the respondent was reached at by the federation on one side and by the Management on the other.

12. Petitioner-Union was not a party. It is C.B.A. And it can raise a dispute independently. Settlement is en file. It is Exh. R-5. It lays down all the conditions of service of employees of Grindlay Bank in Pakistan throughout the country. Union had signed it in token of its recognition and its members are enjoying all the facilities extended to them under this settlement. Petitioner-Union would be well within its rights to raise a dispute independent of the federation for their area and in that ca-a federation would no more be C. B. A. So far the territorial jurisdiction of petitioner-Union is concerned.

13. But at this stage federation is the Collective Bargaining Agent and had rightly made a settlement with the Management.

14. In this view of the matter I find that the dispute is not mai;4ainable. 1t is therefore, dismissed. This award would remain operative till the expiry of the settlement referred to above.

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