' The facts relevant for the decision of this writ petition are that the petitioner filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against he respondents wherein the main prayer was that Auqaf Department be restrained from issuing any notification of taken over and assume the administration, control and management of the property in question. The suit was resisted by the respondents. The respondent No, 1 moved an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaint. The trial Court after calling for reply from the petitioner and hearing him dismissed the application vide order dated 25-7-1991. The respondent No, 1 assailed this.. Order through revision petition, which was accepted by Mr. Muhammad Arif Sial, the then Additional District Judge, Lahore vide order dated 12-6-1993. Hence present Constitutional petition, which was admitted to hearing and notice was issued to the respondents, who have appeared and contested the same.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the suit was properly constituted and the trial Court rightly dismissed the application for rejection of plaint. It is added that the revisional Court failed to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner. It is maintained that since the property has not been taken over, therefore, the petitioner could not maintain application under section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred as Ordinance of 1979) and the remedy available was suit in civil Court.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 argued that the petitioner has clearly admitted in para. 5 of the plaint that the property is Waqf while in para. 6 it was pleaded that cause of action accrued in favour of the petitioner against the respondents a fortnight ago and the main prayer was that Auqaf Department be restrained from issuing any notification of taking over and assuming the administration control and management of the property in pursuance of Waqfnama dated 16-3-1982. The learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 maintained that the suit was clearly barred under section 21 read with section 23 of the Ordinance of 1979. In this behalf, he has referred to cases of Sayyed Muhammad All Shah Bokhari v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf Punjab, Lahore and 3 others (1972 SCM R 297), Chief Administrator of Auqaf v.
Muhammad Ramzan and others (PLD 1991 SC 102), Syed Zakir Hussain Shah v. Administrator, Auqaf (PLD 1981 (Azad J&K 128), Hafiz Syed Ali Hassan v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Lahore and another (PLD 1983 Lahore 677), Abdul Majeed v. Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, Lahore and others (1986 CLC 861), Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab v. Allah Ditta and another (1990 CLC 821) and Ghulam Haider and 19 others v. Chief Administrator, Auqaf, Punjab and another (1990 CLC 1803). It is added that the petitioner's anxiety was only to circumvent the law and to restrain the Auqaf Department from exercising its powers granted under the Ordinance of 1979. While the learned counsel for respondent No, 2 argued that the only requirements of valid Waqf are declaration and appointment of Mutawalli, who could be even the Waqif himself. In this behalf, he has referred to sections 186 and 203 of the Muhammadan Law by Mulla. It is maintained that the suit was pre- mature and the plaint was rightly rejected.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner while summing up the arguments submitted that the precedents referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 are not relevant because those were the cases where the application under section 11 of the Ordinance of 1979 was pending whereas in the present case since the property has not been taken over, therefore, the petitioner cannot seek declaration.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record as well as precedents. It is worthwhile to refer to sections 21 and 23 of the Ordinance of 1979. The same read as under:- "21. Bar of jurisdiction.-- Save as expressly provided in this Ordinance, no civil or Revenue Court or any other authority, shall have jurisdiction:
(a) to question the legality of anything done under this Ordinance by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator; or
(b) in respect of any matter which the Chief Administrator is empowered by or under this Ordinance to determine or settle; or
(c) to grant an injunction or other order in relation to any proceeding before the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance or anything done or intended to be done by or at the instance of the Chief Administrator under this Ordinance.
23. Protection of action taken under this Ordinance.- No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Ordinance or the rules made thereunder."
' It is clear from the section 21 that it deals with two situations, namely --
(a) anything done under the Ordinance or at the instance of Chief Administrator in respect of which he is empowered; and
(b) grant of any injunction or other order in relation to proceedings before the Chief Administrator or anything done or intended to be done by or at his instance under the Ordinance.
It is clear from the above that it not only covers the take over but also proceedings under the Ordinance particularly the last part of section 21. Similarly, under section 23 all actions in good faith done or intended to be done not only under Ordinance 1979 but, also, rules made therein are protected.
6. Now reverting back to the case in hand. The petitioner has clearly admitted the property as Waqf. Para. 3 of his plaint reads as under:- "3. That the mother of the plaintiff executed a Waqf Deed of the Property No, 9 Multan Road, More Samanabad, Lahore for the purposes of making a Mosque, vide Deed No, 3372 dated 15-3-1982. The mother of the plaintiff wrote a letter to the Lahore Development Authorities for the building plans' sanction for construction of a Mosque and shops according to the Waqf Deed. The department refused to accord the sanction for the construction of a Mosque vide Letter No,BA/37/80/7856, dated 18-7-1982 and Letter No, 1065 dated 29-5-1984."
' The learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 explained that the object of the petitioner was to side track the proceedings under the Ordinance 1979 and he is successful in that because the Auqaf Department could not finalize proceedings on account of injunction order secured by the petitioner from Courts including this Court. The learned counsel for the respondent No, 1 has rightly referred to the cases of Sayyed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari, Muhammad Ramzan, Allah Ditta and another (Supra). There is yet another angle from which the matter can be looked, the suit amounts to pre- empting an action under the Ordinance of 1979 and circumventing the law so as to defeat its purpose. The petitioner has statutory remedy through a petition to the District Judge but when notification of take over is issued by the Auqaf under section 7 and not otherwise. The legislature in its own wisdom excluded the jurisdiction of civil Courts in respect of the proceedings and intended action. It is a cardinal principle of dispensation of justice that when legislature desire a thing to be done in a particular manner then it should be done in that manner alone. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary v. Javaid Hashmi and others (PLD 1989 SC 396) and Elahi Bakhsh v. Chief ' Administrator, Waqf Property (1982 SCM R 160). In the case of Javaid Hashmi and others (Supra) it was held that: "In enacting Article 225 in the Constitution the purpose of Legislature is obvious that it did not contemplate two attacks on matters connected with the election proceedings; one while the election process is on and has not reached the stage of its completion by recourse to an extraordinary remedy provided by Article 199, and another when the election has reached the stage of completion by means of an election petition. It is also of utmost consideration that in the case of two attacks on a matter connected with the election proceedings there is likelihood of there being two inconsistent decisions; one given by the High Court and the other by the Election Tribunal which is also an independent Tribunal and this could not be the intention of the Legislature.. "
' The same remarks apply to the case in hand because there is likelihood of contradiction between the decree of the civil Court and District Judge. The suit amounts to frustrating the object of the law and the suit is also clearly barred under section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act. The same reads as under:- "56. Injunction when refused.-- An injunction cannot be granted--
(a) ........................
(b) ........................
(c) ..
(d) to interfere with the public duties of any department of the Central. Government, or any Provincial Government, or with the sovereign acts of a Foreign Government; ' The prayer in the suit of the petitioner reads as under:- "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the Waqfnama deed No, 3372 dated 16-3-1982 may kindly be declared to be null and void, having no force in the eye of law and is ineffective on the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant No, 1 may please be restrained permanently from issuing any notification, take over and assume the administration, control and management as well as maintenance of the property in question. In any manner whatsoever."
The suit was clearly barred not only under sections 21 and 23 of the Ordinance of 1979 but also under section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act. The reference, in this behalf, can be made to case of Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (PLD 1970 SC 139).
7. This is not all. Suppose the decree is granted and thereafter notification of take over is issued by the respondent No, 1 then according to section 7 decree shall be nullity. The question arises what is the purpose of passing such a decree which would be rendered ineffective by take over order of the Chief Administrator Auqaf. This seems to be wisdom behind in barring the jurisdiction of all Courts in the matters within the purview of the Ordinance.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this Constitutional petition. The same is dismissed with costs.