1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 24-11-1994, whereby accepting the writ petition filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2, the order of the Custodian Evacuee Property dated 24-8-1992 was set aside and that of Deputy Custodian dated 15-3-1992 was restored. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Abdur Rehman, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, was son of one Moni Ram, a Hindu, who died in Dogra Regime leaving behind four sons, namely Tej Ram, Bindra Bin, Roop Lal and Durga Ram. Durga Ram embraced Islam somewhere in 1987-88 Bikrimi and adopted Abdur Rehman as his Muslim name. Moni Ram died in Dogra Regime and the estate left by him was inherited by his three sons, namely, Tej Ram, Bindra Bin and Roop Lal to the exclusion of Durga Ram alias Abdur Rehman because he could not inherit from his father after embracing Islam under the relevant law at that time. The other Hindu brothers of Abdur Rehman left the territory of Azad Kashmir and migrated to Indian Held Kashmir in 1947 as a result of War of Liberation. The Azad Kashmir Government passed an Act known as The Azad Kashmir Removal of Restrictions upon conversion to Islam Act, 1951 (hereinafter shall be called the Removal of Restrictions Act), whereby the restriction on inheriting from a Hindu ancestor after embracing Islam was removed and, thus, Abdur Rehman became entitled to inherit his share from the estate of his father. Consequently, Mutation No,623 was also attested and the share to which he was entitled from the immovable property of his father was mutated in his favour and, thus, he became co-sharer alongwith his three brothers who had migrated to India. Thereafter, on the basis of the said mutation, Abdur Rehman transferred the land comprising Survey No,502 (new No,935) measuring 17 Kanals 18 Marlas through a registered mortgage deed on 29-8-1956 to 11am Din, appellant, herein, for a consideration of Rs, 500. Ilam Din filed a declaratory suit in the Court of Deputy Custodian on 15-12- 1960 to the effect that the land comprising Survey No,502 (new No,935) may be declared as non- evacuee because the same was in the exclusive ownership of Abdur Rehman and the other evacuees had no interest therein. The Deputy Custodian, after trial of the suit, held that except the share out of the land comprising Survey No,502 which Abdur Rehman inherited as a son of Moni Ram, his father, the rest of the land was evacuee. However, the Deputy Custodian observed that as the disputed land was a joint property, Ilam Din could not be dispossessed from excessive share without partition; this judgment of the Deputy Custodian was confirmed by the Custodian vide his order dated 13-1-1968. Thereafter, 11am Din, appellant herein, got the allotment of the aforesaid piece of land from the Rehabilitation Department as a local destitute in his favour and subsequently, also obtained provisional proprietary rights of the land by the Custodian vide his order dated 25-10-1983. Mst. Ruqiya Begum and Mst. Lal Jan, respondents, who are the daughters of Abdur Rehman, deceased, filed an application under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957 in the Court of Deputy Custodian on 5-4-1986 challenging the order of the allotment made in favour of Ilam Din, appellant, in the year 1982 by the Rehabilitation Authorities and the order of transfer of proprietary rights dated 25-10-1983 in his favour on the ground that the disputed land was in the exclusive ownership of their father, Abdur Rehman, and the same was mortgaged with Ilam Din, appellant, but Ilam Din, without their knowledge, got the allotment of the disputed land in violation of law. After the requisite inquiry, the learned Deputy Custodian held that in fact the land in question was in the ownership of Abdur Rehman because he inherited the same in view of the provisions of the Removal of Restrictions Act, 1951 and, thus, the order of the Rehabilitation Authorities, whereby the land in dispute was allotted to Ilam Din and the order of transfer of proprietary rights passed by the Custodian in favour of Ilam Din were null and void against the interests of plaintiffs-respondents. An appeal was preferred by Ilam Din against the aforesaid judgment of the Deputy Custodian. The learned Custodian, vide his judgment dated 24- 8-1992, set aside the judgment of the Deputy Custodian holding that in fact out of various survey numbers, Abdur Rehman was entitled to inherit from the estate left by Moni Ram, his father, to the extent of 9 Kanals, 12 Marlas and 4 1/2 Sersais, but Abdur Rehman and after his death his daughters, transferred land from various survey numbers to the tune of 35 Kanals 12 Marlas. Thus, they transferred the land through different sale-deeds in excess of their legal entitlement to the tune of 26 Kanals. The Custodian accepted the appeal of Ilam Din, appellant, and opined that respondents Nos.1 and 2 had no share left in the land and set aside the judgment of the Deputy Custodian dated 22-3-1992. The learned Custodian also upheld the order of allotment of Ilam Din and the order of the provisional transfer of proprietary rights made in his favour. Mst. Ruqiya Begum and Mst. Lal Jan, respondents, challenged the order of the Custodian through a writ petition in the High Court.
2. The learned Judge in the High Court set aside the judgment of the Custodian dated 24-8-1992 and restored that of the Deputy Custodian dated 22-3-1992 mainly on the ground that in view of section 3 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1957, the property not treated as non-evacuee before 1-1-1957 could not be treated as such after the said date.
3. ' We have heard the arguments and gone through the record. It has been contended by Mr. Abdul Majeed Mallick, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellant, that in view of the judgment of the Deputy Custodian dated 17-4-1967, wherein Mst. Ruqiya Begum and other heirs of Abdur Rehman, deceased, were also parties, it has been held by the Deputy Custodian that the disputed survey number was an evacuee property; the aforesaid judgment of the Deputy Custodian was confirmed by the Custodian, vide his order dated 18-1-1968. Thus, the learned counsel has argued that in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Deputy Custodian, and confirmed by the Custodian, the question that the property in dispute is not an evacuee property, is no more open to any inquiry because it is. Barred by res judicata. The learned counsel has maintained that the principle of res judicata is fully applicable to the proceedings before the Custodian and, thus, the application filed by the respondents, Mst. Ruqiya Begum and others, in the year 1986 was not maintainable and should have been dismissed on this ground. The learned counsel maintained that despite the fact that an objection regarding res judicata was raised before the Deputy Custodian and there was also an issue on the point, that was not properly adverted to by the Deputy Custodian. The learned counsel also maintained that in the writ petition filed by Mst. Ruqiya Begum and others in the High Court, the objections regarding res judicata and lathes were raised by the appellant in the High Court but these points were not adverted to by the learned Judge in the High Court. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that according to the findings of the Custodian the share of Abdur Rehman in whole `Khewat' comes only to the tune of 9 Kanals, 12 Marlas and 4 1/2 Sersais but Abdur Rehman and thereafter the respondents sold land to the tune of 35 Kanals 12 Marlas, thus, 26 Kanals in excess of their share. The learned counsel maintained that Abdur Rehman or his heirs had no share left after the transfer of the land in any of the survey numbers.
4. Therefore, it is preposterous to suggest that Abdur Rehman or his heirs were still owners in the disputed land. The learned counsel has further contended that in the writ petition filed in the High Court, the respondents have admitted that other brothers of Abdur Rehman had left Azad Kashmir and migrated to India meaning thereby that their share in an evacuee property to which neither Abdur Rehman nor his legal heirs are in any way entitled but they sold land to the extent of 26 Kanals out of their shares. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of the provisions contained in the Removal of Restrictions Act, 1951, Abdur Rehman was entitled to inherit one-fourth share of the estate left by Moni Ram and not the share of his three brothers; in fact the mutation in favour of Abdur Rehman was also sanctioned to that extent as is evident from the revenue record.
5. It has been also contended on behalf of the appellant that the case of the respondents in the writ petition is that disputed survey number had fallen to the share of respondents as a result of any private partition is incorrect on the very face of it, because Abdur Rehman did not get any share from the estate left by his father due to conversion to Islam and, thus, his claim of so-called private partition is nothing but a fabrication, especially so when Abdur Rehman and the respondents sold the land out of other survey numbers in excess of their legal entitlement. The learned counsel maintained that the verdict of the Deputy Custodian vide his judgment dated 17-4-1967, which was also confirmed by the Custodian, was that the disputed land was an evacuee property, and Ilam Din, appellant, got the allotment of the same as a local destitute; thereafter, on 25-10-1983, provisional transfer of proprietary rights order was also made in his favour by the Custodian on payment of requisite dues. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents brought the application under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act on 15-4-1986 whereby they challenged the allotment of the appellant and transfer of proprietary rights order but they did not mention as to when they got knowledge of transfer of proprietary rights order. It has also not been alleged by the respondents in their writ petition that they were unaware of the entitlement certificate issued in favour of Ilam Din, appellant, or the order of the transfer of proprietary rights earlier. Evidently, it is not conceivable that the respondents remained unaware of the aforesaid order for about nine years. It would mean that the writ petition was filed about 9 or 10 years after the issuance of the entitlement certificate and provisional proprietary rights certificate to Ilam Din, appellant and, thus, suffered from laches. After the order of the transfer of proprietary rights in favour of the appellant there remained no separate entity left so far as the order of the allotment was concerned; because that had been merged into the order of transfer of proprietary rights. But the learned Judge in the High Court only set aside the order of allotment of Ilam Din and did not deal either with the question of issuance of entitlement certificate or the order of transfer of proprietary rights to Ilam Din, appellant, meaning thereby that the said orders are still intact. It has been also argued that the learned Judge in the High Court also fell in error in restoring the judgment of the Deputy Custodian dated 22-3-1992, despite the fact that there is no question of restoring the judgment of the Deputy Custodian because until and unless the judgment of the Deputy Custodian was confirmed by the Custodian, it had no legal value and it could not be regarded as a judgment in the eye of law at all, especially so when the Custodian had set aside the order of the Deputy Custodian vide his judgment dated 24-8-1992. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the Deputy Custodian and the High Court were not competent under the provisions of Administration of Evacuee Property Act or any other law for the time being in force to set aside the allotment of the appellant on the basis of which the proprietary rights had already been granted to him. The learned counsel has cited following authorities in support of his contention.
6. ' In case reported as Muhammad Subhan v. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 1994 SC (AJ&K) 41, it was held that as the question of genuineness of an allotment is exclusively vested in the Rehabilitation Authorities and the allotment was not challenged by the party concerned in proper forum, despite the fact that they had the knowledge since some years, they were not entitled to get any relief in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. It was further observed that as the Custodian had the exclusive jurisdiction to declare a property as an evacuee or non-evacuee, the respondents' belated review application before the Custodian was rightly dismissed on the ground that the land was validly declared as an evacuee property.
7. ' In case reported as Shaikh Abdul Aziz v. Mirza PLD 1989 SC (AJ&K) 78, a Full Bench of this Court, after reviewing the case-law, has held that the principle of res judicata is fully applicable to the proceedings other than civil suit such as proceedings before the Rehabilitation Authorities or the Custodian.
8. ' In Muhammad Rafiq v. Haji Muhammad Shari Khan (PLD 1991 SC (AJ&K) 47, it was observed that before the amendment in the law under subsection (5) of section 18-A of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, the entitlement certificate issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner could not be modified by the Custodian and he was bound by it but after the amendment, whereby the powers of review were taken away from the Rehabilitation Commissioner, the Custodian was given wide powers under section 18-B read with subsection (6) of section 43 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act to deal with the question of legality of an allotment and can amend, vary or set aside the entitlement certificate issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner.
9. ' In reply, Kh. Abdul Basit, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents, has vehemently controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. He has contended that the principle of res judicata cannot he pressed into service in the proceedings before the Custodian. He has maintained that this is a sort of an inquiry and thus, strict application of the principle of res judicata in the proceedings before the Custodian is not legally justified. He has also argued that although the respondents were party in the application dated 4-1-1961 which culminated in Deputy Custodian's judgment dated 14-4-1967 which was also subsequently confirmed by the Custodian, yet as no relief was claimed against the respondents by 11am Din, appellant, it cannot be said that the findings in that application would operated as res judicata against the respondents. Thus, he has maintained that subsequent application filed by the respondents on 15-4-1986 was competent. The learned counsel maintained that Deputy Custodian has rightly held that the property in dispute was not an evacuee property in view of the enforcement of the Removal of Restriction Act, 1951, on the basis of which a mutation was also sanctioned in favour of Abdur Rehman, deceased. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the High Court has rightly held that the Custodian was not justified in setting aside the judgment of the Deputy Custodian and holding that after the transfer of the land through sale- deeds first by Abdur Rehman and thereafter by the respondents, no share belonging to them was left in the disputed land. The learned counsel has also submitted that the land in disputed survey number was in possession of Abdur Rehman as a result of private partition and on the basis of the same it was mortgaged with Ilam Din, appellant, through a registered mortgage deed. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent Ilam Din, appellant, is estopped to challenge the character of the property because he has got the mortgage from Abdur Rehman, deceased, but subsequently, he turned round and got the allotment of the land in his favour, in the year 1982 and thereafter he obtained proprietary rights in his favour in the year 1983. According to the learned counsel all these proceedings were initiated without the knowledge of the respondents and they came to know about the allotment of Ilam Din only in the year 1986 after which they filed an application under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act before the Deputy Custodian who upheld their claim. The learned counsel has maintained that the Custodian went beyond his jurisdiction declaring that the land in dispute was evacuee property and the respondents had no concern with the same. The learned counsel has submitted following authorities to substantiate his view:- ' In case reported as Mehr Dad v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore (PLD 1974 SC 193), it was held that the Settlement Authorities without applying their minds to the question whether the property was evacuee or not, proceeded with matter and, thus, fell in error. Under these circumstances, the High Court had the Constitutional jurisdiction to probe into the matter. It was further observed that a co-sharer in 'Shamlat Deb' land in possession of excess of his legal entitlement, cannot be dispossessed without partition of the land.
10. ' In Abdul Kahliq-Abdul Razzaq v. Kishanchand (PLD 1964 SC 74), it was held that merely an entry in the Revenue Record that property belonged to an evacuee would not make it so. The property should be treated as `evacuee' by the Custodian or Rehabilitation Authorities by some overt act.
11. ' In case reported as Muhammad Lal v. Mohko (PLD 1979 SC (AJ&K) 15), it was observed that if a party does not raise a point in the trial Court or at appellate stage, such party cannot be allowed to raise such point for the first time before the Supreme Court. This was a pre-emption case in 'which right of prior purchase was not denied by the vendees specifically in the written statement.
12. ' In case reported as Muhammad Khan v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 284), it was observed that in view of section 4 of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, a mortgagee was entitled to retain possession until the mortgage was redeemed either by the Government or the allottee of the land. It was further opined that such a mortgage need not have safeguarded his rights by getting declaration under section 22 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act and Rules framed thereunder.
13. ' In Abdul Ghani Talukadar v. Rushan (PLD 1960 Dacca 359), it was held that permanent tenant inducted on land by co-sharer in exclusive possession of joint estate cannot be dispossessed by non-consenting co-sharer except by partition of land.
14. ' We have considered the arguments raised at the Bar and also perused the record. Before dealing with the points involved in the case, it may be stated at the very outset that there is no denial of the fact that Abdur Rehman who was a Hindu by religion with the name of Durga Das embraced Islam somewhere in 1987-88 Bk. Moni Ram, his father, died some time before the War of Liberation of the year 1947 and his property was mutated in favour of his three sons, namely, Tej Ram, Bindra Bin and Roop Lal; Durga Das, alias Abdur Rchman was excluded from inheriting any share due to his conversion to Islam in pursuance of law on the subject. It is admitted even in the writ petition filed in the High Court that three brothers of Abdur Rehman, namely, Tej Ram, Bindra Bin and Roop Lal migrated from the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir due to War of Liberation in the year 1947.
15. Thus, Abdur Rehman inherited from the estate left by his father in view of the provision contained in the Removal of Restrictions Act, 1951. A mutation in pursuance of the aforesaid Act was sanctioned in the name of Abdur Rehman. Sections 3 and 5 of the Removal of. Restrictions Act are reproduced as under:- Section 3:- ' Notwithstanding anything contained in the Law of Inheritance Pertaining to Apostate or any other law for the time being in force a person who was deprived of his property or his right of inheritance to property in consequence of his having embraced Islam or any one claiming through such a person shall be deemed to have been entitled to such property or to such right. Section 5:- "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that a landowner was deprived of his land or of his right to inherit such land in consequence of his having embraced Islam in the old Regime before 24th October, 1947 under the orders of any authority or under the decree of any Court or otherwise he may direct that the land be mutated in the name of such person or any one claiming through him."
16. ' The combined reading of , the above sections shows that Abdur Rehman would inherit on one- forth share out of the estate left by Mom Ram, his father. In other words, the estate which was first inherited by his three Hindu sons was, after the promulgation of Removal of Restrictions Act, 1951 to be equally inherited by his four sons. Obviously, Abdur Rehman became a co-sharer in the suit land after the year 1951 when the Removal of Restrictions Act was enforced. According to the findings of the Custodian which are based upon detailed inquiry, the mutation was effected out of various `Khata', one of the same was 'Khata' No,500/754 which comprised disputed Survey No,502 (new Survey No,935). According to the mutation effected in favour of Abdur Rehman in pursuance of the Removal of Restrications Act, entitlement in all the survey numbers including Survey No,502 (new 935) comes to 9 Kanals, 12 Marlas and 4-1/2 Sersais, whereas Abdur Rehman, in his life time and after his death the respondents, sold land through different sale-deeds, measuring 35 Kanals 12 Marlas; obviously, they have already transferred the land in excess of the legal share to the extent of 26 Kanals. So far as Survey No,502 (new 935) is concerned, as already stated, that was mortgaged by Abdur Rehman through a registered mortgage deed with Ilam Din, appellant, on 29- 8-1956. It may be pointed out that according to the Revenue Record, apart from Moni Ram, the father of Abdur Rehman, some other evacuees have also been entered as occupancy tenants besides evacuee sons of Moni Ram which implies that Moth Ram or his sons were not the only occupancy tenants in the aforesaid survey numbers. Thus, the share of Moni Ram or for that matter his sons, Abdur Rehman and his brothers, is small. The case of the respondents that Abdur Rehman mortgaged the disputed piece of land on the basis of private partition is preposterous because no private partition could have been effected between Abdur Rehman and the other occupancy tenants who had left the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and Abdur Rehman became co-sharer with evacuees only after the year 1951 as a result of the promulgation of Removal of Restrictions Act. Thus, Abdur Rehman who had a very small share in the survey number in dispute, could not mortgage whole of survey number measuring 17 Kanals, 18 Marlas with the appellant.
17. Consequently, Ilam Din, appellant, apprehending danger of being evicted from the land filed a suit in the Court of Deputy Custodian seeking a declaration that the land in dispute was not an evacuee property. The Deputy Custodian opined that Abdur Rehman was entitled only to the fractional share in the disputed survey number and thus the property in dispute cannot be declared as non-evacuee property, rather it was evacuee property, except the share of Abdur Rehman. However, Ham Din, appellant, was given relief only to the extent that he would not be dispossessed from the disputed survey number, except, by partition. The heirs of Abdur Rehman were party to the aforesaid judgment which was subsequently also confirmed by the Custodian.
18. So, the matter that except to the extent of share of Abdur Rehman which is very small, the disputed piece of the land was declared by the Custodian as evacuee property as early as in the year 1967, it does not mean that it was treated as evacuee property in 1967; to get a declaration that property was not an evacuee is different matter from treating a property as an evacuee property. In fact there has been no dispute between the parties either in application under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act or subsequent application which was instituted by the respondents before the Deputy Custodian in the year 1986 that as the disputed property was not treated as evacuee property before 1-1-1957, the same cannot be treated as such afterwards. Even in the writ petition filed by the respondents in the High Court, there is no such averment that as the property in dispute was not treated as evacuee before 1-1-1957, the same cannot be treated as non-evacuee afterwards. It would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the order of the High Court whereby the writ petition filed by the respondents was admitted for regular hearing:- "(i) That respondent No,2 was estopped from securing allotment, provisional proprietary rights and mutation in his name, after the execution of the mortgage of the land by the father of the petitioners, in favour of respondent No,2, on August 28, 1956;
(ii) that the land in dispute was evacuee, as such, the finding of the learned Custodian and Rehabilitation authorities was capricious and arbitrary, on the basis of non-reading; misreading and misconstruing of evidence; and
(iii) that the impugned order was passed without holding a legal inquiry, into the question of title of the land."
19. ' The contents of the memorandum of writ petition would make it further clear that no point was raised in the writ petition with regard to the treatment of the property as evacuee before 1-1-1957.
20. However, the learned Judge of the High Court set aside the judgment of the Custodian only on the ground that as the property was not treated as evacuee before 1-1-1957, the same cannot be treated so afterwards. Thus, the High Court set aside the order of allotment of the appellant which was made in his favour in the year 1982, after a period of almost ten years. The Nigh Court gave no findings about the entitlement certificate issued in favour of Ilam Din, appellant, by the Rehabilitation Commissioner or the order of the Custodian dated 25-10-1983 whereby the proprietary rights were transferred in favour of the appellant. Obviously, the allotment of the appellant made in the year 1982 stood merged in the order of transfer of proprietary rights made on 25-10-1983. It may also he stated here that the order of transfer of proprietary rights of the Custodian was challenged by the respondent before the Deputy Custodian in the application filed in the year 1986, but nothing was said about the entitlement certificate by which the Custodian was bound at that time. The order of the transfer of proprietary rights has also been challenged in the High Court in writ petition which was filed in the year 1992 but there is no mention that the respondents were unaware of the said order previously or that they came to know about the said order at a date subsequent to 25-10-1983. In other words, the writ petition so far as the same pertains to the order of transfer of proprietary rights was made after 9 or 10 years of the order and suffered from laches. The objections with regard to the laches and res judicata were raised by the appellant in written statement but no finding has been given on the same by the High Court. The High Court simply declared the allotment of the appellant made in the year 1982 as unsustainable because the property was not treated as an evacuee property before 1-1-1957 and, thus, the same could not be treated as much afterwards. No such point was raised by the respondents in the writ petition and even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the High Court could set aside the allotment of the appellant, it did not advert to the grounds on which the same was sought to be cancelled by the respondents; rather the same was cancelled on a ground which is extraneous to the point raised in the writ petition and which finds no mention even in the order of the High Court whereby the writ petition was admitted for regular hearing. The order of the transfer of proprietary rights made by the Custodian is intact but the allotment of the appellant which had no separate entity was cancelled by the High Court. Even if it is assumed that such an allotment can be cancelled without adverting to the legality of an order of transfer of proprietary rights, how the same could be declared so in exercise of writ jurisdiction after 9 or 10 years without satisfactory explanation of delay in filing the writ and showing the allotment having been made in flagrant disregard of the law. It is our considered view that as the respondents were party to the proceedings before the Custodian in the application made in the year 1961 by the appellant, the question as to whether the property was evacuee or not is barred by the principle of res judicata and it was not open for the Deputy Custodian or the High Court to hold that the property was not an evacuee property and to declare the allotment of the appellant as illegal. Besides, the question whether the property was treated as evacuee or not is a mixed question of law and fact that could be resolved in exercise of writ jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances and that too after giving an opportunity to produce proof in favour and against this claim.
21. Now the next question arises as to whether the judgment of the Deputy Custodian dated 22-3-1992 set aside by the Custodian on 24-8-1992 could be restored by the High Court. Under law until and unless the judgment of the Deputy Custodian is confirmed by the Custodian that has no legal value. Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court, whereby the judgment of the Custodian has been set aside and that of Deputy Custodian has been restored is clearly violative of law. Even otherwise, as has already been stated, first Abdur Rchman and after his death the respondents transferred evacuee property to different persons to the extent of 26 Kanals. Therefore, the respondents are not entitled to any relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction because they have not come in the Court with clean hands. A reference may be made to Abid Hussain Jafri v. Azad Government (1993 SCR 105) and Bashir Ahmed v. Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (1993 SCR 159) in support of the proposition that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands cannot be given relief in exercise of the writ jurisdiction even if he is found entitled to it.
22. In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, Consequently, the C judgment of the Custodian dated 24-8-1992 is hereby restored.