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1995 CLC 1143

IKHLAQ HUSSAIN and 7 others vs LAHORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through

Citation1995 CLC 1143
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Civil Revision No, 1969 of 1994
Date1994-12-13
Judge(s)Gul Zarin Kiani
ResultRevision dismissed

ORDER

1. ' A piece of land measuring 3 Kanals, 17 Marlas, 1 sq. Foot comprised in Field Nos. 1900, 1910, 1911 at Mauza Bela Basti Ram, Lahore was owned by Province of Punjab. It was possessed by the plaintiffs and, prior to them, by their predecessor-in-interest, ever since the year 1933. It was acquired for Minar-e-Pakistan and construction of a Lake by Lahore Development Authority. An award was made in this behalf. Interests held by the plaintiffs in the land were not accommodated in it in the shape of monetary compensation or allotment of alternate plot/plots in terms of L.D.A.'s Scheme.

2. On 13-2-1985, plaintiffs instituted a suit against the L.D.A., and Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore for declaration of their ownership rights in the land for being compensated by the L.D.A. It was asserted that they were owners in possession of the acquired land and were entitled to be compensated.

3. ' Apart from L.D.A., and Land Acquisition Collector, LDA., Province of Punjab was not made a party to the civil suit, though, it was a necessary party because its ownership rights were sought to be extinguished and correspondingly transferred to the plaintiffs in the act of their adverse possession. An objection was taken on this score but it was not attended to by the plaintiffs for correction of the error in the array of parties. Defendants filed the written statement. They contested the suit and denied title of the plaintiffs to the land and their adverse possession on it.

4. ' Upon an application by the defendants, the trial Court rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, Civil P.C., on 31-5-1965. This decision was reversed in appeal, on 27-5-1990, by learned Additional District Judge, Lahore for re-trial on issues and evidence. Thereupon, necessary issues were settled in the trial Court. These were accurately given in the impugned judgment and need not be repeated here. On taking evidence from the parties and its scrutiny, the trial Court dismissed the suit on 5-1-1993. Material issues were answered against the plaintiffs. In appeal, judgment by the trial Court was maintained and affirmed, on 6-2-1994. Thereupon, instant civil revision was filed in this Court.

5. ' On a notice for pre-admission hearing, Legal-Advisor for the L.D.A. Appeared at the hearing.

6. Record revealed that plaintiffs were not the owners of the land in suit. They merely held its possession. They asserted that their possession was adverse on the land in suit and had upon expiry of statutory period of sixty years prescribed in Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908 matured into full-fledged ownership. The contention was without substance. Firstly, true owner of the land i,e, Province of Punjab was not a party to the suit. In absence of it, declaration of ownership rights on account of adverse possession on the land could not have been made because ownership in the Government land was sought to be extinguished in it and simultaneously transferred to the plaintiffs on account of their hostile title to it. On this score alone, plaintiffs could be non-suited. In absence of necessary party, suit was imperfectly constituted. Even, upon being pointed out, the error was not corrected. Plaintiffs persisted in it. Independent of it, requisite period of sixty years prescribed in Article 149 of the Limitation Act had not run out. In previous suit by Altaf Hussain (plaintiff No, 2), in respect of this piece of land, learned Senior Civil Judge, Lahore had on issue No, 7 found that, "their possession falls short of prescribed period of sixty years and, as such, the question of acquiring title through adverse possession does not arise". Copy of the judgment is Exh. P6. In Exh. P7, the judgment given by a learned Civil Judge of Lahore on 30-9-1978, it was found that plaintiffs' possession shall not be disturbed except through due process of law. Judgment Exh. P6 attained finality. Therefore, on present record, adverse possession asserted by the plaintiffs and not ripened into ownership of the land by the plaintiffs. This ends the matter about claim of ownership of the land by the plaintiffs on account of adverse possession.

7. ' As an alternative defence in support of the plea for compensation for acquired land, learned counsel submitted that plaintiffs were 'interested persons' and were entitled to a share in it on account of their disturbance of possession on the land acquired. As held above, hostile possession had not ripened into ownership, therefore, they could not be compensated on this basis. This made all the distinction. In' Rajbans Sahay v. Rai Mahabir Prasad - Vol.XXXVII of Indian Cases, 1917, A Division Bench of Patna High Court held that: "Where the question was, whether compensation for land compulsorily acquired by Government should be awarded to the collateral heir of the last male owner, or to a person who had been in possession of the land for more than twelve years prior to the acquisition proceedings without payment of rent; the latter was the person entitled to receive the compensation". It was the correct proposition of law. Upon efflux of twelve years period of adverse possession in respect of a private property, title of a true owner was extinguished in it which then vested in the adverse possessor of it. In case of Government-owned property, period prescribed was sixty years. Therefore, the point here before the Court was different and that was, whether a person in the currency of his hostile/adverse possession before its maturity in ownership rights was a 'person interested' entitled to share compensation of the acquired land. In my opinion, not. In case of Tulsiram Tukaram v. K.L. Pande and others AIR 1956 Nagpur 11 (at page 14 of the Report), Hidayatullah, J. Observed: "(19) That, however, does not end the matter. Though my Lord the Chief Justice has traced adverse possession only up to 3-7-1952 (vide paragraphs 10 and 12), the Tribunal traces it to 1953 when possession of the property was actually taken. It is clear that by 3-7-1952 adverse possession begun in December 1940 had not ripened into ownership.

8. ' Thus, the vital question which arises in this case is whether a person in possession as a trespasser on the day he puts in this statement of claim and on the date of reference under section 30 of the Act can as to be compensated as owner on the sole ground that he was not dispossessed and the necessary period of prescription expired while the proceedings on the reference were going on.

9. (20), Now, under the Land Acquisition Act, compensation is paid for such interest as the claimant possesses. The relevant consideration for the determination of the interest is the right disturbed and acquired and not anything else.

10. ' Indeed, the acquisition officer merely determines the market value of the total interest acquired and, together with certain additions and subtractions in consonance with the principles laid down in sections 23 and 24, arrives at the figure of compensation. He then apportions the compensation between the various persons interested. If any dispute arises as to the apportionment or as to the persons to whom the same is payable, the Collector refers such dispute to the decision of the Court (S. 30):

(21) In the present case, long before possession was taken, the Land Acquisition Officer gave the award on 3-7-1952 and referred the. Dispute to the Tribunal for deciding the title of the parties and for making due apportionment. The authority of the Tribunal was limited to this question only and on 3-7-1952 no question of extinction of the title of the petitioner had arisen.

11. ' The dispute referred, if decided as it was referred, could only end in one way. Once the Tribunal had found that the adverse possession did not commence in 1923, the Tribunal was bound to hold, that it commenced on 26-12-1940. The tribunal was further bound to decide that on the date of reference the title of the petitioner was intact and between the rival claimants, one was entitled to be compensated as owner and the other for disturbed possession".

12. ' KAUSHALENDRA RAO, J., in para. 39 of the judgment observed: "In presence of the true owner, which fact clearly distinguishes the instant case from that of 1907 AC 73(F), even a licensee was held to be not entitled to be compensated. See - `Shankar Govind v. Kishan, AIR 1917 Nag. 23(T). A trespasser cannot claim greater recognition than a licensee. In competition with true ownership, the possession of the non-applicant even if adverse on the date of the reference could not, before it ripened into title, be considered as an interest entitled to be compensated under the Land Acquisition Act'.

13. Therefore, a person merely in adverse possession before its maturity into ownership was not a 'person interested' for compensation of the acquired land. In competition with him only true owner was entitled to the compensation of the acquired land.

14. ' At the end, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that since they were in actual possession of the land and had raised constructions on it and let out the constructed shops to the lessees, instead of their lessees, they were entitled to exemption or allotment of commercial plots by the L.DA., in terms of a Scheme framed by it. No case on this premises was built up in the pleading by the plaintiffs. Furthermore, alleged lessees were not parties to the suit. There was no issue on the point between the parties nor sufficient evidence existed for its determination in revision by this Court. In this view, this contention could not be entertained by this Court. If advised and in case, it was a permissible course, plaintiffs could take recourse to the L.D.A. For redress on this score or agitate their grievance in the Civil Court against the alleged lessees benefited by the L.DA. In form of exemption or allotment of plots.

15. ' As a result of the above, civil revision had little force in it and is dismissed in limine.

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