1. This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution pertaining to property bearing No 159/62-63 situated in Ward No. 15 of Chiniot town. The property belonged to R.I Sahib Lala Basant Lal Kapoor, son of Mala Bhagwan Das Kapoor of Dera Ismail Khan. This property has been taken over by the State as having escheated to the State, because, the propositus allegedly left no heir in Pakistan.
2. The order of the learned Deputy Commissioner (respondent No. 1) in this connection was passed on 3-12-1975 and a copy thereof was endorsed to the learned Assistant Commissioner Chiniot on 26-12-1975 in pursuance whereof he sealed the premises. It appears that after the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner the peti--tioner moved an application which is contained on tae file of the learned Deputy Commissioner at pages 291 to 295 on 5-1-1976 for desealing of the property on the ground teat the propositus had lift some heirs in India including J. L. Kapur, Chairman, Delimitation Commission of India and an ex-Judge of the Supreme Court of India (copy of this application has been filed here in this Court as Annexure 'H'). On this application the learned Deputy Commissioner wrote "please get comments from Assistant Com--missioner and put up on 28-1-1976". A formal letter on 20-1-1976 in this respect was addressed to the Assistant Commissioner with reference to which he wrote a letter bearing No. 250/HC, dated 20-1-1976 submitting that no doubt the property had been sealed by him under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner but "in any case, if the learned Deputy Commissioner reviews his earlier orders the property can be, desealed". The learned Deputy Commissioner on 28-1-1976 appears to have written a simple order "seen, file". No communication of this order was sent to the petitioner who, after making mention of the fact that he had moved the learned Deputy Commissioner for desealing of the property, averred in the petition that no action had been taken an the aforesaid application. In the writ petition a prayer had been made for declaring the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner as to be without lawfuly authority inter alia on the ground that the learned Deputy Commissioner has confined himself simply to the point as to whether the propositus lest any heir in Pakistan whereas according to law of escheat it is essential to establish on the part of the State that the pro--posits left no heir in the world. It was further submitted that the premises locked by the Assistant Commissioner, Chiniot (respondent No. 2) may be ordered to be unlocked and possession of the property be delivered to the petitioner. It appears to me that there has been no judicial determination of the application which had been filed by the petitioner on 5-1-1976 and which is contained at pages 291 to 295 of the file of the learned Deputy Commissioner. He sent that application for comments to the learned Assis--that Commissioner but when it was again put up to the learned Deputy Commissioner he did not apply his mind as to what was contained in the application and nor did he give any reasons in support of his short order read--ing "seen, file". It is well settled that persons performing judicial functions must give reasons in support of their orders.
3. See Ghuhrm Mohi-ud-Din v.Chief Settlement Commissioner (Pakistan), Lahore and others (PLD 1964 SC 829) where the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner passed an order by simply countersigning the report or the note of his subordinate and it was held that it was an order without lawful authority, inasmuch as, it did not show as to whether the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had applied his independent mind to the factual and legal controversy arising in the case. In that case the office report or note was a speaking one whereas in the instant case there did not exist anything of that kind either, and all that the Assistant Commissioner had stated was that he had sealed the property in dispute in pursuance of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner which if reviewed will be given due effect. In these circumstances the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner "seen, file" is no order in the eye of law on the points of fact and law brought to his notice by means of the application under examination. In Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (l) it was held that an order disposing of a matter in a summary manner without giving any reason or resolving points of controversy between the parties by simply observing that "the application is rejected as there is no substance in it" is not a lawful order. The Supreme Court held that "if a summary order of rejection can be made in such terms, there is no reason why a similar order of acceptance saying "there is considerable substance in the petition which is accepted", should not be equally blessed. This will reduce the whole judicial process to authoritarion decree without the need for logic and reasoning which has always been the traditional pillars of judicial pronouncements investing them with their primary excellence of propriety and judicial balance. Litigants who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders. A judicial order must be a speak--ing order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issue involved for their proper adjudication. The ultimate result must be reached by a laborious effort, but if the final order does not bear an imprint of that effort and on the contrary discloses arbitra--riness of thought and action, the feeling with its painful results, that justice has neither been done nor seems to have been done is inescapable. Then the order of a lower Court contains no reasons, the appellate Court is deprived of the benefit of the views of the lower Court and is unable to appreciate the processes by which the decision has been reached". The same view was followed by me in Abdul Qadir v. The Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lyalipur and 2 others (2). It was held in R. v. Sykes (3) that the Court recognised the existence of an implied duty of the licensing justices to give reasons for refusal to grant a licence. In the face of the case law mentioned above, I have no option but to declare the order of the learned Deputy Commissioner dated 28-1-1976 as to be without lawful authority, which I hereby do and remand the case to him for fresh decision B of the application dated 5-I-1976 (copy Annexure 'H'), after duly attending to the facts pleaded and law applicable thereto. The petitioner should appear before the learned Deputy Commissioner on 27-2-1976.' The file of the learned Deputy Commissioner has been returned to the H. V. C. Who was present in Court. There shall be no order as to costs.
(1) P L: D 1970 SC 173 (2) PLD 1975 Lab. 44