1. WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---1. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to an order dated 12-5-1993 passed by one of us (Wajihuddin Ahmad, J.) in F.R.A. No. 526 of 1992 and says that such order has been side-tracked by the learned Controller, while passing the order, which is impugned in this petition. The portion which is claimed to have been bypassed is reproduced hereunder:--- "In determining the above questions it will be open to lead evidence but in case any evidence is to be led of witnesses, who can be made available by a party, summons for their attendance would not be issued and such witnesses would be examined on the basis of affidavits in evidence subject to cross-examination.
2. The proceedings would be concluded expeditiously and the ultimate point of time fixed for that purpose is 31-8-1993."
3. Examining the impugned order we do find that the two witnesses whom the petitioner sought to be summoned were official witnesses and in the ordinary course, it would have been clearly impracticable for the petitioner to procure their uninitiated attendance for the purpose of examining them before the learned Controller. In this view of the matter, probably the permissive implications of the order dated, 12-5-1993 may have escaped attention in declining to issue summons to the official witnesses. However, we cannot interfere with an interlocutory order of the learned Controller in these constitutional proceedings for very good reasons. The rule on the subject, Mr. Iqbal Ahmad rightly urges, is spelled out by the Lahore High Court in Amanullah v. Civil Judge Lahore and others (1982 CLC 535) and by this Court in Habib Alvi Athar v. Hasan (1986 M LD 1656). The first of these precedents directly involved a case of refusal to summoil witnesses by the Controller while the second also dealt with interlocutory orders but of a varies nature. It would be useful to reproduce the relevant portion of the observations which found favour with Naeemuddin, C.J. And A.I Madad Shah, J., in the case of Habib AM and others, which run thus:--- "10. We are of the view that the two impugned orders being of interlocutory nature do not call for any interference in this constitutional jurisdiction, for, firstly in our opinion, no question of want of jurisdiction, or exercise of jurisdiction not vested or any patent illegality is involved. Secondly, even if there is one, the petitioner had alternate remedy of appeal if the final order goes against him and in that appeal he can also attack the interlocutory orders on any grounds available to him. Further, section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, does specifically bar appeal from an interlocutory order and the object seems to avoid delay of the decision of the main application and if Constitutional petition is entertained against interlocutory orders the very object of the Ordinance, would be defeated. Moreover, any order passed in the proceedings which ultimately has effect on the final orders, the same can be attacked on any grounds available to the aggrieved party. It would be advantageous if we here refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rehman v. Haji Mir Ahmad Khan, PLD 1983 SC 21 wherein the Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court have followed their decision in Mian Manzoor Bashir and others v. MA.
4. Asghar and Company, PLD 1978 SC 185. The observation reads as follows:--- Keeping in view the afore-discussed aspects of the question raised before the High Court and the trend of authority regarding exercise of writ jurisdiction in rent matters, it is held that the petition in the High Court, was liable to be dismissed on the short ground of availability of adequate remedy to the petitioner if any adverse final order was passed against him that being so, this petition must fail'."
5. It will thus be seen that even if the order of the learned Controller be assumed to be illegal, not merely that, even if it is assumed to be suffering from a jurisdictional error, the fact remains that an appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, would still lie against the final order and an interlocutory order not being appealable under section 21 afore-said invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court may be nothing more than short-circuiting the mandates of the Ordinance. What is more, an alternative remedy contemplated by the Rent Ordinance being available, the constitutional jurisdiction is, at any event, arguably barred. The counter--argument of Mr. Rasheed Akhtar Qureshi that it is an earlier order of this Court in its Rent jurisdiction, which is sought to be enforced and the proceedings before the Controller were only in execution and not of a regular nature is equally facile. The orders of this Court can be dealt with good time and in due course of law and final orders in execution are as much appealable as orders in the main rent case.
6. It would not be out of place here to point out that even if constitutional jurisdiction could be extended to such matters, it may be counter-productive to do so. Already, there exists a great deal of concern about law's delay and the kind of intervention, which is being sought here can only occasion further avoidable delays. This in no way can be pleasing prospect.
7. Accordingly, leaving the petitioner to pursue to the appropriate remedy of appeal at the relevant time, we see no merit in this petition. Dismissed.
2. This application too is dismissed in view of order at serial No. 1 above. At this stage, Mr. Rashid Akhtar says that since the impugned order and those that may follow upon it have a nexus with execution proceedings under section 22 of the Ordinance, such may leave no time to the petitioner to pursue further remedies and the petitioner may be thrown out before he can take recourse to redress. He, therefore, requests that some protection may be allowed to the petitioner. All that we could say on the subject is that in such B cases of plausible controversies the Controllers functioning under the Rent Laws have ample authority to postpone implementation within reasonable time limits so as to allow recourse to a higher forum, if due request in` that behalf is made and no mala fides are ostensibly involved. Such is the effect of the equitable principle embedded in Order XLI, Rule 5(2), C.P.C. And can, in appropriate cases, be resorted to.