SYED ZAHID HUSAIN BOKHARI, J.- Haji Muhammad Yousaf appellant filed this appeal under Section 417(2)-A Cr.P.C, against the judgment dated 13.12.1995 passed by Mr. Sarfaraz Arshad Khan, Special Judge Anti-Corruption Dera Ghazi Division, camp at Multan, whereby he acquitted Muhammad Arshad respondent in case FIR No. 2 dated 11.1.1995 under Section 161 PPC read with Section 5(2)-47 PCA registered at P.S.A.C.E. Lodhran. Section 417(2)-A Cr.P.C, has conferred right of appeal to an aggrieved person to be filed within 30 days of the pronouncement of the judgment. In this case the judgment was announced on 13.12.1995 and appellant applied for the copy of judgment on 9.1.1996 and on the same day the copy of the judgment was delivered to the appellant. He filed the appeal on 11.2.96 and in this way the appeal is barred by time. The delay of 28 days in filing the appeal is of much importance.
2. Every accused person is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The acquittal of an accused in a criminal case strengthens the presumption of -his innocence. The impugned order of acquittal is set aside only if it is against the law and facts, without reasons fanciful or arbitrary. The Courts are supposed to entertain the appeal which is filed, within the period prescribed by law. The appeal against acquittal cannot be dealt with leniency.
The law favours vigilants and not the indolents.
3. The applicant explained the delay in filing the appeal by submitting that the applicant left for Karachi and fell ill. There, hence could not file the appeal within 30 days, as provided under Section 417(2)-A Cr.P.C. The appellant has not annexed proof of his sickness nor any medical certificate is produced. He has produced no document which would strengthen the presumption that he in fact proceeded to Karachi, even in the application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is no where stated that on what date the appellant left Multan for Karachi and on what date he returned to Multan. Each and eveiy day of delay is to be explained by the appellant. The explanation furnished by the appellant is vague which cannot be accepted.
The appeal being time barred and for what has been stated above, the appeal is dismissed in limine.