DECISION ' These are six connected Revision Applications by the Applicant Management of Habib Sugar Mills against its different employees involving common question of law and fact. They will therefore be disposed off by this common decision.
2. The employees had filed grievance petitions before the Labour Court Sukkur challenging their termination of service on various grounds.
3. Respondent Sartaj Hussain Rizvi filed his grievance petition that he was an Accounts Clerk appointed in the year 1963 in the Habib Sugar Mills. That his son was Vice-President of the union.
That he and his son have both been removed from service for union activities.
4. Respondent Matloob Hussain filed his grievance petition before the same Labour Court that he was Clerk and Construction Supervisor of Habib Sugar Mills, but his services were terminated on September 25, 1993 without assigning any reason for the termination..
5. Respondent Syed Meraj Haider represented in his grievance application that he was appointed as Fitter on 26-6-1986. That he was elected Vice-President of the union. The Management of Habib Sugar Mills were therefore annoyed with him and also because the workers came in a body from Nawabshah to Karachi to ventilate their grievances before the Head Office. The Management got annoyed and dismissed them from service on August 1, 1993 on the ground of disorderly behaviour etc.
6. The case of Inam Muhammad respondent was that he was appointed in,, the Habib Sugar Mills on 25-8-1983 as Fieldman. That he was active participant in the trade union activities. The union submitted Charter of Demands to the Management. The Management threatened the workers to withdraw the Charter of Demands and after nominal enquiry he was dismissed from service, the order being illegal and mala fide. That he was dismissed pending the Industrial Dispute raised by the union.
7. Respondent Muhammad Nasim was appointed as Depether Plant Operator on 1-1-1983. He became member of the Workers Union. This annoyed the Management. That he accompanied the General Secretary of the Union to Karachi alongwith 300 other workers to protest. For this he was charge-sheeted and without proper enquiry was dismissed on 1st August, 1993.
8. Respondent Muhammad Nafees had filed his petition that he was appointed as helper in the year 1970. That he was elected as General Secretary of Habib Sugar Mills Workers Union Nawabshah. This annoyed the Management. He submitted a Charter of Demands for which Management threatened him and during the Industrial Dispute he 'was charge-sheeted on false pretext and dismissed him from service.
9. In all the above six matters before any evidence could be recorded, the learned Advocate for Habib Sugar Mills Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani filed applications under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.
(rejection of plaint) stating that the grievance petitions under section 25-A of the I.R.O. 1969 were not maintainable since the termination from service or dismissal of the workmen was not in consequence of any Industrial Dispute. The learned Advocate called for dismissal of the petitions of the workers on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem reported in 1994 SCM R 2213 and prayed thit all the grievance petitions be dismissed.
10 Thus, on the one hand the learned counsel for the Management has termed his application as being under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. For rejection of the plaints and on the other hand he has asked for the dismissal of the plaints. The grounds for rejection of plaint are specific grounds namely;
(i) Absence of cause of action;
(ii) Under evaluation of the plaint;
(iii) Insufficient stamp; and
(iv) Suit being barred by any law;
11. None of these requirements have been shown to be applicable to the grievance petitions of these workers. The learned counsel has asked for dismissal of the grievance petitions without recording evidence but dismissal is not the same thing as rejection of the plaint. In the case of rejection the plaint the suit can be re-filed, but dismissal operates as a decree. It, therefore, appears that the applications before the Labour Court were moved by the learned counsel under some misconception.
12. The learned counsel has argued that the order of the Labour Court dismissing his applications may be set aside in the course of this Revision' Petitions as the grievance petitions are not maintainable, since it has nowhere been pleaded that the removal or dismissal of the applicant was in connection with an Industrial Dispute. For consideration of this contention the scope of section 25-A of the I.R.O.
Has to be examined in detail.
13. It is true that grievance petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 does not amount to a common law right for the labourers to seek redress in respect of every wrong, by moving the Labour Court. This remedy is a special remedy for deciding the disputes between the Management and the workers for smooth running of the industry and its scope is very much restricted and limited by this Ordinance. The section mentions the heading as "Redress of individual grievances". It reads as under:- "A worker may bring his grievance in respect of--
(i) any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law;
(ii) or any award;
(iii) or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing either himself or through his shop as towards or Collective Bargaining Agent, within three months of the day of which cause of such grievance arises
(iv) A worker may take the matter to the Labour Court and the Court shall give a decision in the matter brought before it as if such matter were in any industrial dispute.
14. A worker in section 25-A of the I.R.O. Has been defined under section 2(xxviii) as under:- "Worker and workman means any person not falling within the defmition of employer who is employed in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute, includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off or removal has led to that dispute."
15. Thus, a worker no longer employed in an industry or establishment can still be regarded to be a worker if he has been dismissed etc. As a consequence of an industrial dispute or whose dismissal etc. Has led to an industrial dispute. An industrial dispute is therefore the material factor attracting jurisdiction of the Labour Court. We have therefore to see what is meant by the phrase "Industrial Dispute". This is defined in the I.R.O. Under section 2(xiii) as under:-- "Industrial Dispute means any dispute or difference between:- (i) Employees and employers;
(ii) Employers and workmen; or
(iii) Workman and workmen; The dispute should be concerning:-
(a) Employment or non-employment;
(b) Terms of employment; or
(c) Conditions of work, in respect of any right guaranteed or secured not under any law but only under this Ordinance, or any award or settlement for the time being in force.
Thus, The Court can only entertain the petitions when the injury complained of relates to the difference between the Management and the D workers in respect of employment or conditions of work secured under the I.R.O.
16. Industrial Dispute in common parlance is a dispute of general nature between Management and the workers in an establishment or industry. An impression is created that for the purpose of Industrial Dispute it is necessary requirement that a Workers Union or a number of workers on the one hand a E and the employers on the other hand should be involved. This has however been clarified under section 25-A(4) keeping in view the possibility that only a single worker out of the class of workers may desire to take the matter to the Labour Court. It has been explained that the Labour Court may consider the grievance of the dissatisfied worker as if such matter were in an Industrial Dispute.
17. Thus the broad restriction may be enumerated as under:--"The petitioner should be a worker as defined under the I.R.O.
(i) The grievance should be in respect of any right guaranteed or secured under the I.R.O.
(ii) The grievance should relate to a difference between the Management and the workers within the meaning of an Industrial Dispute."
Therefore, for-the purpose of deciding any petition under section 25-A it has to be seen whether the above requirements of section 25-A apply to the F particular facts proved by evidence of the parties. The recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1994 SCM R 2213 has also emphasised this aspect of the matter that "every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expression which may be found there, are not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but gowned and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found (Queen v. Leathem). It has also been observed relying on the same judgment that "a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it." The precedents are deciding questions of law, which enunciate a principle of law, and they are binding if the decision is by the Supreme Court or High Court, on all subordinate Courts. But if their application enunciates principle of law merely as illustrations of their application then it becomes necessary for the subordinate Courts to first investigate the facts to see whether they attract the application of the principles of law as enunciated. For instance the Labour Courts must always decide on facts whether the petitioner is a workman or not, within the meaning of the I.R.O.
And whether the facts of the case show the existence of any Industrial Dispute within the meaning attached to this phrase by the I.R.O. Thus, the criteria laid down by the above decision of the Supreme Court are that the person who claims the right under section 25-A must be a worker under section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance and the grievance is in relation to an Industrial Dispute within the meaning of section 2(xiii). The dismissal or G discharge etc. Should be result of an Industrial Dispute, or lead to such dispute, on the evidence produced before the Court. If the grievance is individual and personal to the petitioner unrelated to any difference between the Management and the workers or an Industrial Dispute, it would be considered to be a personal problem for which any remedy under section 25-A of the Ordinance would not be available to him.
18. Thus, for deciding a case under section 25-A of the Ordinance all the above points have to be considered, on evidence recorded. As determination of these questions have to be regarded as mixed questions of law and fact, the proper course in such cases is to resolve the questions in a regular trial, as they cannot be disposed of in a Revision Petition. In Revisional Jurisdiction the findings of fact cannot be gone into. The Tribunal cannot stop such decision of law or fact by the Trial Court and impose its own decision in Revision, on supposition of existence of these facts, for the application of law proposed by I the Applicant in Revision petitions.
19. These Revision Applications are therefore premature impeding the course of smooth trials to determine the facts of each case. It is only the facts proved that it can be decided as to what law should be applicable in such cases. The Revision Applications are accordingly dismissed. The R & P of the cases may be returned to the Labour Court, Sukkur for completing the proceedings without further delay.