' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 28-2-1993 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No, 483 of 1983 filed by the respondents against the judgment/decree dated 3-11-1980 of the learned Additional District Judge, Jhang, whereby he reversed the judgment/decree of the learned Civil Judge, Jhang, and decreed the respondents' suit for pre-emption, dismissing the same by maintaining the above appellate judgment/decree.
2. The brief facts are that the petitioners entered into an agreement to purchase the suit land on 21-9-1971 for a sum of Rs,31,000. The respondents filed above pre-emption suit against the vendee and the vendor. The aforesaid suit was resisted inasmuch as it was pleaded that the plaintiffs were estopped to bring the suit by their own conduct. The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of the parties, framed seven issues. Issue No, 4 reads as follows:- "4. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to bring the present suit by their own conduct."
' The learned trial Court, after recording evidence and hearing the parties, recorded its finding on above Issue No, 4 in the affirmative and consequently dismissed the suit. Against the above judgment/decree, the respondents filed appeal, which was upheld for the following reason:- "The plaintiffs had to purchase the land given in Mutation No, 142 at the rate of Rs,1500 per acre but the defendants purchased the suit land at the rate of Rs,2,000 per acre. Ghulam Haider Bharawana might have refused to sell the land to the plaintiffs at the rate of Rs,1,500 per acre because the defendants were prepared to pay Rs,2,000 per acre. The version of D.Ws. Nos. 1 to 3 that the suit land was offered to the plaintiffs but they refused to purchase the same is not acceptable."
' Against the above judgment/decree, the petitioners filed aforesaid civil revision, which has been dismissed through the impugned judgment. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
3. In support of the above petition, Ch. Khurshid Ahmad, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that the respondents had entered into an agreement to purchase on 14-10-1970 with the vendor as is reflected in the photostat copy/extract from the transfer register (Exh. D.5 at page 45 of the paper book) but the above transaction was cancelled for the reason that the respondents failed to arrange the price. He, therefore, further contended that the learned appellate Court was not justified in reversing the finding on above Issue No, 4.
4. The appellate Court has recorded the above quoted finding on the above question, according to which it was the vendor who might have backed out from the transaction and not the respondents.
Even if we were to hold that factually the respondents failed to finalise the above transaction for want of money, it would not affect the above finding of the learned Additional District Judge. The right of action to file pre-emption suit accrued to the respondents when the above sale transaction was entered into between the petitioners and the vendor and, therefore, the petitioners were obliged to bring on record material to prove the factum that in September, 1971, when the petitioners were negotiating for the above sale transaction, the respondents were offered the suit land by the vendor or by them and that by his words or conduct, he waived his right to claim pre- emption. The act or conduct on which plea of waiver or estoppel is to be founded should have direct nexus with the sale transaction of which right of preemption is claimed and should have taken place at the time of such sale transaction. The transaction of 14-10-1970 is independent from the right of pre-emption and, therefore, the same cannot be pressed into service to defeat the respondents' right of pre-emption which accrued to them on 25-9-1971 and not in October, 1970.
The finding of the learned appellate Court on the above question, which has been maintained by the learned Judge in Chambers, appears to be in consonance with the material on record and law.
No exception can be taken to the above finding. Leave is, therefore, refused.