1. ' This is a Constitution petition challenging an order dated 19-6-1989 passed by the Labour Court, Sukkur and the order dated 22-2-1990 passed by the Sindh Appellate Tribunal (hereafter mentioned as the Tribunal).
2. ' Respondents 1 to 8 are employees of Pakistan Railways. They filed grievance Application No, 2 of 1988 in the Labour Court at Sukkur under section 25-A of IRO, seeking certain reliefs. The grievance application was disposed of by the Labour Court under an order dated 19-6-1989. Said order was challenged by the petitioners before the Tribunal in Appeal No, SUK-334 of 1989. Said appeal was dismissed under the impugned order dated. 22-2-1990 on a technical ground viz. That the appeal had not been properly presented. Hence this Constitution petition.
3. ' The main point to be considered in this case is, as to, whether Appeal No, SUK-334 of 1989 was properly filed. Such appeal is filed, under subsection (3) of section 37 of IRO which reads as below: "Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) or a decision given under section 25- A or section 34 or a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 may prefer an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the delivery or passing thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final."
4. ' The opening words of subsection (3) are "any party". These words have nexus with the words "may prefer an appeal". The plain meaning of the said words picked up from subsection (3) would be, that only the aggrieved party can file appeal. These provisions are in contrast to the provisions contained in section 25-A of IRO, where it is laid down under subsection (4) that the worker may take the matter to his CBA or that a worker may bring his grievance in the Labour Court either himself or through his Shop Steward or his collective bargaining agent. In spite of this it was held in the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain v. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. And another (PLD 1980 SC 80) that word `himself appearing in section 25-A(1) of IRO, does not involve concept of agency.
5. For taking such view Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan referred to section 49 of the IRO and observed that the legislative intent in IRO seems to be to avoid interference by any other outside agency, and that even appearance through legal practitioners is restricted. It was further held that while construing the -word "himself' appearing in section 25-A(1) of IRO, it would be inapt to introduce the consideration of illiteracy or the existence or non-existence of the alternatives.
6. Learned Tribunal relied on the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain in arriving at the conclusion that Appeal No, SUK-334 of 1989 was presented by an Advocate without obtaining the permission under section 49(3) of IRO.
7. ' The provisions contained in section 37(3) of IRO are to be interpreted in light of the observations made in the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain. In said case it has been observed in relation to Industrial Ordinance that scheme of the legislation showed that appearance through legal practitioners is restricted and wherever he is eligible to appear it has been so enacted and section 49 of said Ordinance makes such intention obvious. In the present case there is no scope for adding anything to the words "any party" appearing in section 37(3) of the Ordinance. There is no scope to add to subsection (3) of section 37 of IRO the words that any party may prefer an appeal through his Advocate.
8. ' In the present case the memo. Of appeal was filed not by the petitioners but by their Advocate.
9. This is in deviation from the scheme of said Ordinance which has restricted the agency of Advocates except where specifically permitted. In this view of the matter we agree with learned Tribunal that appeal filed by the petitioners before the Tribunal had not been properly presented.
10. We therefore decline to interfere with the impugned order passed by learned Tribunal.