1. ' This judgment will dispose of F.R.As. Nos.357, 358 and 359 of 1987, which are directed against three separate Orders, all dated 23-2-1987, passed by the then Rent Controller Karachi, South, whereby the appellant's Eviction Applications were dismissed. The facts relevant for decision of these Appeals are as follows:-- ' In all these matters the parties are the same. M/s. Forward Traders are the appellants and M/s. M.F.M.Y. Industries Ltd. Are the respondents. The appellants are the owners and the respondents are the tenants in respect of three go downs, known as Sadiq Traders Siding in T.P.X. Area Kemari, Karachi, which are the subject-matters of these appeals. In Go down Premises No,2-B (Rent Case No,506/78, F.RA No,359/87) the respondents are tenants since 1-1-1973 at monthly rent of Rs,4,000.
2. In Go down Premises Nos.2/1-D (Rent Case No,507/78, F.R.A No,357/87) they are tenants since 26-11- 1971 at monthly rent of Rs,1,000 and in Go down premises No,2-A (Rent Case No,508/78 F.R.A.
3. No,358/87 they are tenarits since 19-10-1971 at monthly rent of Rs,1,250. It is the case of the appellants that in Rent Cases Nos. 506 and 508 the respondents had not paid rent for December, 1976 and in Rent Case No,507 they committed default in payment of rent for the month of November, 1976. Accordingly on the ground of default in payment of rent these three cases were filed on 25-8-1977, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. By virtue of subsection (3) of section 27 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, these cases are to be disposed in accordance with the provision of the latter Ordinance.
4. ' The respondents have denied the allegations of default and maintained that they had deposited the rent in time in the Court through a miscellaneous application. It is also their case that the appellants had demanded increase in rent and on their refusal to do so these applications were filed.
5. ' The appellants examined their Managing Director Abdul Wahid, while on behalf of the respondents Asad Sher had filed his affidavit-in-evidence as their attorney and was cross-examined.
6. ' From the pleading of the parties, learned Rent Controller had settled the following issues:-
(1) Whether opponent is wilful defaulter in payment of rent as alleged in the application?
(2) What should the Order be?
7. ' On assessm ent of the evidence brought on record, learned Rent Controller held that though default was committed by the respondents, but it was not wilful. Consequently, he exercised discretion in favour of the respondents and dismissed these three eviction applications by three separate Orders dated 23-2-1987, which have been impugned in these appeals.
8. ' Mr. Nasrullah Awan, learned counsel for the appellants contended that respondent's witness Syed Asad Sher, in cross-examination, clearly admitted that the Managing Director of the respondents Company was not authorised by the Board of the Directors to appoint and nominate him (Syed Asad Sher) as an attorney, and it being so the evidence of said witness was that of an unauthorised person, as such, should have been completely discarded by the Rent Controller. In this connection learned counsel relied upon Order 29, Rule 1, C.P.C, which speaks about suit by or against corporation. Learned counsel also relied on the cases, reported in (1) Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. M/s. Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550 and (2) Government of Pakistan v. Premier Sugar Mills and others PLD 1991 Lahore 381. In Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan's case, it was held that suit on behalf of the company by a person is not competent, unless he is so authorised by a resolution passed by Company's Board of Directors. In Government of Pakistan's case, it was held that when a company institutes a suit, it has to establish that the suit has been competently and authorisedly instituted on its behalf. Above contention has no merits. Suffice it to say that Order 29, C.P.C. And above-cited two cases speak about the suit and not the proceedings before the Rent Controller, which are quasi-judicial in nature, and it being so, the technicalities of law cannot be over-stretched as to defeat the very purpose of administering substantial justice to the parties. In the case of Abdul Majeed v. Syed Azhar Ali Shah and others reported in PLD 1985 SC
191. It was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that neither the Civil Procedure Code nor the Evidence Act are in terms applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller. Further, it was observed that these proceedings are not to be frustrated by mere formalism and in such cases the only requirement is to ensure that no party should be prejudiced by the procedure adopted by the Controller and each party shall be given a fair opportunity to present its point of view. Both the parties in these cases were given full opportunity to present their case, which they availed. In these cases, the written statements were signed by the Managing Director of the respondents. Syed Asad Sher appeared as duly constituted attorney of the respondents. Even otherwise, as an employee of the respondents and being aware of the facts he was competent to depose about those facts.
9. Section 19 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which is applicable to this case, lays down the procedure which is to be followed by the Rent Controller for the disposal of the such cases.
10. Since in the matter of production of evidence, the Rent Controller acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and not as a Court, the Controller was competent to look into the evidence of said witness.
11. ' Learned counsel for appellants next argued that, in spite of the fact that the respondents had committed default, yet, their eviction was not ordered by learned Rent Controller, which according to learned counsel was contrary to law. He also argued that since the default was wilful, as such, the Controller was not justified in exercising discretion in favour of the respondents. It is not disputed nor it could be disputed that Rent Controller has discretion to refuse eviction of the tenant in spite of the default, if the circumstances so warrant. In these cases, I think the discretion was rightly exercised in favour of the respondents. In all these cases, admittedly there is no written tenancy agreement between the parties and the respondents are tenants of the appellants on monthly basis. In Rent Case No,506 of 1978 (Appeal No,359 of 1987) the default in payment of rent was of December, 1976, which the respondents in view of clause (ii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance, 1979 could pay the rent of December up to 2-3-1977, while they offered it on 4-3- 1977. Thus, there was a default of only two days. In Rent Case No,507 of 1978 (Appeal No,357 of 1987) on the above basis the default was of only 9 days. In this case, the default was for the month of November, 1976 and the tenancy month was from 26th November to 25th December, 1976. In Rent Case No,508 of 1978 (Appeal No,358 of 1987) although the Rent Controller observed that default was of 42 days, but actually, there was no default at all. According to the appellants, the respondents had committed default for the month of December, 1976 the tenancy period was from 19th December, 1976 to 18-1-1977. Thus, the rent for the month of December could be paid up to 18th March, 1977, and admittedly it was offered on 4-3-1977.
12. Now the only question remains if the Controller was justified in exercising discretion in favour of the respondents or not. The appellants in all these cases have claimed that the respondents are habitual defaulters. Neither they furnished the details of alleged previous default nor laid stress on this point during the course of arguments. The respondents' said witness, in his affidavit-in- evidence, in these cases clearly stated that at no point of time the respondents committed any default in payment of rent in respect of the premises in question and this assertion was not challenged in cross-examination. In fact, on this point no question was put to him. The respondents are tenants in these premises for. Over 22 years and it appears that during this period they paid rent to the satisfaction of the appellants. Under these circumstances, there was justification for exercising discretion in favour of the respondents.
13. ' Mr. HA. Rehmani learned counsel for the respondents cited (1) Mirza Abdul Aziz Baig v. Mushtaq Ahmed Shaikh 1980 SCMR 834, (2) Muhammad Younas and another v. Mst. Hajira Bi 1989 SCMR 1670, (3) Mst. Saeeda Khatoon v. Muhammad Ahmed Latifi PLD 1990 SC 389 to contend that in case of one month default or even over a month, the discretion be exercised in favour of the tenant.
14. Ratio of these cases is not that where there is a default of one month or slightly over a month the discretion shall always be exercised in favour of the tenant. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court is if the circumstances so warrant such discretion can be exercised in favour of the tenant.
15. Looking to the circumstances, of these cases, I am of the view that discretion was rightly exercised in favour of the respondents.
16. ' Accordingly, I do not find any merit in these appeals and they are dismissed with no order as to costs.