1. M. R. KHAN, J.-The petitioner is both the Waqif and Mutwalli of a waqf estate. A certain building belonging to the waqf estate has been in occupation of a bank. The respondents assessed Urban Immovable Property Tax in respect of the said building. In. a writ petition under Article 98 of the 1962-Consti--tution, the petitioner challenged the validity of the claim for Urban Immovable Property Tax on the ground that the building in question is exempt from such tax under clause (a) of section 6 of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957. The High Court rejected this contention and dismissed the writ petition. The petition for special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court.
2. Mr. Shahabuddin Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the High Court was wrong in not holding that the building is exempt from Urban Immovable Property Tax under clause
(a) of section 6 of the Act. The learned counsel relies on both clauses (a) and (b) to support his contention that the build--ing is exempt from tax. Clauses (a) and (b) of section 6 of the East Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1957, run thus .
3. "6. The Urban Immovable Property Tax shall not be levi--able in :respect of the following
(a) buildings and lands or portions thereof exclusively occupied for religious or charitable purposes ;
(b) buildings and lands used for accommodating an educa--tional institution, a hospital, a nursing home, a maternity home or any other institution which has its object the promotion of public health."
4. Mr. Shahabuddin contends that the word "for" occurring in clause (a) above, means "for the benefit of". This cannot be the plain meaning of the word "for". The meaning sought to bell given by the learned counsel to the word "for" is not possible except by doing violence to the language of clause (a). The learned counsel then compares clause (a) with clause (b) and con--tends that the religious and charitable purposes having been men--tioned in clause (b), clause (a) will be meaningless unless it has a different connotation. We do not find any substance in this contention inasmuch as there may be various religious and charit--able purposes other than the in clause (b), According to the plain meaning of section 6(a) a building is exempt from tax only if it is occupied for religious or charitable purposes. The building in question having been occupied by abank, it cannot be said that it is occupied for religious or charitable purposes, although the income derived from the building by way of rent or otherwise, may be ultimately used for religious charitable purposes. There is no substance in this petition.
5. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.