AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is an appeal with the leave of this Court against the three concurrent judgments/decrees of the three Courts below granting ejectment to the respondent on the ground of personal requirement. Leave to appeal was granted to consider, whether the respondent, who was minor at the time of filing of rent case, could maintain an ejectment application on the ground of his personal requirement when he could not carry on any business or trade personally.
2. The brief facts are that the respondent filed ejectment application No,60/2 of 1987 in respect of the suit shop on the grounds of his personal need for his personal use and occupation through his father, and default. The above application was resisted and inter alia it was pleaded that the respondent being minor was not properly represented; the application was not maintainable; the property was not properly described. The grounds of personal requirement and default were also denied. It was also pleaded that the application was mala fide. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed seven issues. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the learned Rent Controller through his order dated 28-1-1992 granted the ejectment application on both the above grounds. Against the aforesaid order the appellant filed Civil Appeal No,77 of 1992, which was partly allowed inasmuch as the finding on the question of default was reversed but the finding on the ground of personal requirement was maintained. Then the appellant filed SA.O. No,34 of 1993, which was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court through an order dated 27-4-1993. Thereupon, the appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider the above question.
3. In support of the above appeal, Malik Sher Bahadur, learned A.S.0 appearing for the appellant, has vehemently contended that since at the time of the filing of the above ejectment application the respondent was about six years of age, he could not have filed the same on the ground of personal requirement as he was not physically or mentally competent to carry on the business.
' On the other hand, Syed Najmul Hassan Kazmi, learned A.S.C. Appearing for the respondent, has urged that the three Courts have concurrently held that the respondent required the shop in good faith which he would use through his father. His further submission was that, in any case, the respondent is now nearly 17/18 years of age and, therefore, this Court would not non-suit him when he has already attained majority or is close to attain the same. To reinforce the above submission, the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the following cases:--
(i) Taj Muhammad v. Muhammad Naeem Khan and 2 others (PLD 1983 Peshawar 118);
(ii) Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Arbila Noreen and others (1994 CLC 2099);
(iii) Sabaz Ali and another v. Mst. Saeeda Khatoon and 3 others (1979 CLC 166);
(iv) Rehmat Ali and another v. Seth Muhammad Wajid and another (1984 CLC 1693); and
(v) Abdul Haq v. Mst. Zubaida Khatoon and 10 others (1969 SCM R 222).
4. In the above first case, a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, while construing section 13
(3) (a) (ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, held on the controversy in issue as under:-- "7. Although these contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are very plausible, but it does not seem to be the intention of the Ordinance that a minor landlord of a property should be deprived of the personal use of his property only on the ground that he is a minor. No doubt he cannot run his own business, but the business, which would be run in that shop, by his father, would definitely be for the benefit of the minor. The father being head and bread-earner for the entire family will be running his business in the shops in dispute especially for the benefit of his minor son as well. To lay such a narrow interpretation on the words 'personal use' in the aforesaid section, would tantamount to creating a very harsh situation and a hardship for a minor landlord. We are of the considered opinion that the Legislature did not intend to create such a hardship for a minor landlord."
' In the second case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, while construing section 13
(3) (a) (ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, held that in order to obtain an order of ejectment against a tenant on the ground of personal requirement it was necessary that the landlord should himself physically do business in the premises sought to be ejected and that the landlord could get it done through his servants, agents or attorney and through parents who were guardians of minor landlord.
' In the third case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, while dilating upon section 13 (3)
(a) (ii) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, repelled the contention that the ejectment could not have been granted to the landlord concerned on the ground that he was minor boy of 17 years and held that even otherwise the minor had attained the age of 21 years at the time when the matter was seized of by the High Court.
' In the fourth case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court held that boys of 16/17 years of age can run business independently and can seek ejectment of rented premises on the personal ground.
' In the last case this Court, while dismissing an appeal, held as follows as regards the construction of the provision of sections (3) (a) (i) and 3(a)(ii):-- 'The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the language of clause (a) of section 3 (a)
(ii) of the Ordinance clearly points to the conclusion that a female owner of a non-residential building cannot claim ejectment of her tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for her own use. According to the learned counsel this follows from a comparison of the language of clause (a) of section (3) (a) (ii) with clause (a) of section (3) (a) (i). It is pointed out that while in clause (a) of section (3) (a) (i) the words are 'of any of his children' in clause (a) of section (3) (a) (ii), the words used are 'of any of his male children'. The argument appears to be that in respect of a nonresidential building that is to say a building which is being used solely for the purpose of business or trade, no order of ejectment can be passed for bona fide requirement of the owner if the owner happens to be a female. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the Legislature intended a total exclusion of female owners from claiming possession of a non-residential building. It is true that ejectment from such a building cannot be claimed on the ground of requirement of a female child of the owner but from that it does not follow that if the owner is a female she cannot claim ejectment on the ground that she herself wants to set up a business. We cannot give to the language of the section the extended meaning contended for by the learned counsel for the appellant."
5. At this juncture we may reproduce the above provision, namely, section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, without its provisos which are not relevant for the purpose of the present controversy, which reads as under:- "(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession-- (i).
(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or a scheduled or rented land, if--
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his children;
(b) he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area."
' A perusal of the abovequoted provision indicates that in the case of a nonresidential building or a scheduled or rented land, a landlord can seek ejectment if he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his children subject to the conditions contained in sub-clauses (b) and (c), namely, that he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which the building is situated for the purpose of his business any other building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time, and that he has not vacated such building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Ordinance in the urban area in question.
6. It may be observed that the above provision does not make any difference between a male and a female child. It may further be noticed that a landlord may apply for ejectment in respect of a non-residential building for his own use or for the use of any of his children but a child, who is a landlord, cannot apply for ejectment under the aforesaid provision for the use of his father or mother. The above distinction has been pointed out by this Court in the case of Abdul Haq v. Mst.
Zubaida Khatoon and 10 others (supra). In our view, as a minor can be a landlord within the ambit of the definition given in section 2(c) of the Ordinance, it will be unreasonable to hold that a minor landlord cannot apply for ejectment under section 13(3) (a) (ii) of the Ordinance in respect of a non-residential building on the ground of his personal requirement for the reason that he cannot carry on business himself physically. If we were to take the above view, it will amount to reading into the aforesaid provision of the Ordinance some additional words disqualifying a minor landlord from applying for ejectment on the ground of his personal requirement in respect of a non- residential building.
7. In the present case, the learned Rent Controller has recorded the following fmdings of fact on the question of personal requirement of the minor:-- "It is also proved on record that father of the petitioner is jobless and he can safely work for gain in the disputed shop for the benefit and welfare of the minor/petitioner and also on his behalf."
The above finding of fact has been concurred with by the learned District Judge and by the High Court. The same does not suffer from any legal infirmity as there seems to be nothing wrong or illegal in running the business by a father on behalf of his minor son. A natural guardian can even employ a servant for running the business for the benefit of the minor. A minor can be equated with a widow or a female who may be incapable of running business herself but is entitled to seek ejectment in respect of a non-residential building as landlady on the ground of her personal requirement.
8. Additionally, as per statement of A.W.1, Mian Muhammad Iqbal, the respondent was about 8 years old in May, 1984, and, therefore, by now he is sufficiently old to take interest in his own business. It will not be just and proper to non-suit him at this stage on the above ground. The appeal has no merit and, hence, it is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
9. At the request of Mr. Mukhtar A. Chaudhry, the proprietor of the appellant, the appellant is allowed six month's time today to hand over the vacant possession of the disputed shop subject to payment of rent regularly on the undertaking that upon the expiry of aforesaid period of six months, the appellant shall hand over the vacant possession to the respondent through the Court by filing an application for handing over of the possession. The breach of the above undertaking will amount to contempt of Court.