1. ' Respondents Messrs Glimmer Textile and Printing Industries, became tenant of Shop No, 6 in the Super Market Building on Victoria Road, Karachi with effect from 4th September, 1968 on a monthly rental of Rs, 1,125 as per lease-deed dated 3-9-60. Subsequently the respondent brought an application under section 4 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) claiming that the amount of Rs, 1,125 per month was very exorbitant and that the fair rent should be at Rs, 200 per month. The appellant/landlord, apart from other pleas taken in the written statement, challenged the maintainability of the application. The learned Rent Controller framed for issues. However, the finding on the issue regarding maintainability was decided against the applicant. The grout d for such a decision was that as the respondent-firm was an unregistered one and, therefore, was barred from bringing any proceeding in view of the provisions of section 69, clause (3) of the Partnership Act. Result was that the rent application for fixation of fair rent was dismissed. In appeal, however, the learned District Judge reversed this finding and remanded the case back for decision on the issue of determination of fair rent. The arguments finding favour with the learned first appellate Court were that the proceedings before the Rent Controller are of quasi-judicial nature and that the provisions of C. P. C. Do not apply, therefore, section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act is not attracted to such proceedings. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that by virtue of subsection (3) of section 69 of the Partnership Act the bar contained in its subsections (1) and (2) is extended to all proceedings. In order to appreciate the argument it would be necessary to go through the relevant part of section 69: "(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.
(3) The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceedings to enforce a right arising from a contract.
2. ' The main emphasis laid down by the learned counsel is that the phrase `other proceeding' as used in subsection (3) would cover proceeding under the rent law as well. In this regard he placed reliance upon Ali Mohd. v. .Mohd. Hussain (1). In this case a declaration and permanent injunction was sought regarding the ownership of a motor tank. The respondents in the suit had brought an application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act. The question raised was whether the provisions of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act, 1932 extended to the proceedings under section 8 of the Arbitration Act, i940. Their Lordships of the Lahore High Court were of the view that the rule of ejusdem generic would nut be attracted while interpreting the words 'other proceedings' as used in subsection (3) of section 69 of the Partnership Act, because the phrase 'a claim of 'set-off' occurring in this subsection and preceding the words 'other proceedings', being neither a genus nor a category, the rule that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind, would not apply, They, therefore, held that the proceedings under section 8 of the Arbitration Act are covered by the phrase 'other proceeding' appearing in section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act. The learned counsel contends that the principle contained in this judgment should be extended to the proceedings under the Ordinance. But the difficulty for the learned counsel is that the provisions of section 69 as a whole relate to suits for the enforcement of a right firstly arising from a contract and secondly that such suit should be instituted in a Court of civil jurisdiction. Here proceedings instituted before the learned Rent Controller are not the proceedings for the enforcement of right arising out of any contract. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that these proceedings have arisen out of the lease-deed which is a contract. Unfortunately, that is not the position. The right to claim the fixation of fair rent is a right conferred by section 4 of the Ordinance, and does not arise out of the lease deed, which had fixed rent at the rate of Rs, 1,125 p.m. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1968 Lab. 712 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' So the enforcement of this right does not arise out of the contract if the lease-deed is deemed to be a contract. The second difficulty for the learned D counsel for the appellant is that the learned Rent Controller is not a Court as has been repeatedly held. The prominent authority in this regard is that of Khadim Mohiuddhi v. Rehmat All (I) The relevant observations which were arrived at after a thorough analysis of the powers of the Rent Controller under the Ordinance, are as follows: "We, therefore, conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character, but yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances it will be difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under this Ordinance acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
3. ' The second leg of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that a firm which is not registered, is not a legal entity distinct and separate from partners and, therefore, one of the partners could not file an application under section 4 of the Ordinance. In this regard he relies upon Moral Bai v. Abdul Aziz (2). In this case the case that the firm was not a legal entity had been made in the context of the fact where the tenant had entered into partnership with others and had allowed such firm to carry on business in the demised premises. The question whether a firm taking up tenancy as such firm would fall within the definition of tenant as given in section 2 (1) of the Ordinance was not expressly examined in this authority and, therefore, this authority does not help the learned counsel in this case. The definition of 'tenant' as given in the Ordinance is very comprehensive and is in the following terms : " 'tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes (a) a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour and (b) the wife and children of a deceased tenant, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant.
4. ' The basic requirement for a person to be a tenant is that rent should have been payable on his behalf. A person is not defined in the Ordinance. General Clauses Act states that a person includes any company . Or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. This definition would extend even to the body of persons who act as firm, whether they are registered or not. It is not denied that the rent payable for the premises in dispute is on behalf of this unregistered firm.
5. As such there is nothing in law or on facts which could suggest that the respondents do not fall under the definition of tenant as given in the Ordinance. So long as a person falls within the definition of a tenant, as given in section 2 (i) of the Ordinance, he or it is always competent to bring an application for fixation of fair rent, under section 4 of the Ordinance.
6. ' In view of the above discussion I find that the application as preferred under section 4 of the Ordinance is maintainable. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. Parties are left to bear their costs in this appeal. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1965 SC 459 (2) PLD 1968 Kar. 635 {{FOOT NOTE}}