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1995 CLC 206

Dr. (Mrs.) SHAMIM DADI vs MASOOD SHAIKH and 3 others

Citation1995 CLC 206
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Civil Miscellaneous Application No, 3151 of 1994 Suit No, 396 of 1994
Date1994-09-15
Judge(s)Kamal Mansur Alam
ResultApplication dismissed

ORDER

1. ' This application on behalf of defendant No,4 has been filed under Order 7, Rule 10, C.P.C. Read with section 7(xi)(e) of the Court Fees Act and section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. However, on the objection of the plaintiff's counsel that by virtue of Order 49, rule 3, C.P.C. The provisions of rule 10 and clauses (b) and (c) of rule 11 of Order 7 were not applicable to the High Court, the defendant's counsel requested that this application may alternatively be considered as under clause (d) of rule 11 of Order 7, C.P.C.

2. ' In support of his application it was contended by Mr. Faisal Arab, the learned counsel for defendant No,4, that the present suit had been deliberately overvalued so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that the suit in fact being one for recovery of possession of the disputed shop from the landlord, fell under sub-clause (e) of clause (xi) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act providing for computation of court-fee on the basis of annual/one year rent which in this case was admittedly Rs,3,000. As such, it was submitted that, by virtue of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction would also be the same and not rupees six lacs as estimated by the plaintiff. His argument was that in the present case merely by impleading several other persons, alongwith the landlord, as defendants the basic nature of the suit did not change which continued to be a suit for recovery of occupancy of the shop from which the tenant had been illegally ejected by the landlord. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the case of Secretary of State v. Dinshaw Navroji and another reported in AIR 1925 Sindh

275. The facts of that case were that the Police Department used to give free accommodation to certain Police Officers and for that purpose had taken on rent, from the first defendant, in that case, the property in question which was given for use to a Sub-Inspector of C.I. Department. The last sub-inspector vacated the premises on 24-12-1919 and when his successor want to occupy the same on 27-12-1919 he found that the first defendant (landlord) had taken possession thereof and rented out the same to the second defendant who was in occupation. Before the final hearing of the said case, it appears that the second defendant (tenant) had given up possession of the premises to the first defendant and was absent on the hearing. It was on these facts that the Court found that "This suit being suit for possession by a tenant against his landlord it would on the face of it appear to fall within clause (xi) sub-clause (e) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act which refers specifically to a suit to recover the occupancy of a property by a tenant against, his landlord."

3. ' At another place it has been observed that: "There is, therefore, no reason why clause (xi) should be limited to suits where the landlord and tenant alone are parties and should not apply to a suit of this nature where in order to avoid unnecessary delay in execution proceedings the second defendant was joined as a proper party to the suit. This suit would have been equally efficacious if he had not been joined as a party. As a matter of fact, he has given up possession before the date of the decree."

4. ' Mr. Akhtar Mahmud, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had been evicted from the disputed premises by the defendants in collusion with each other and not by the landlord alone. He pointed out that the defendant No,4 on his own showing was in possession of the premises on the date the suit was filed claiming possession through defendant No,2 whose title to the property itself is in dispute. It was contended that this was not a suit 'between landlord and tenant' "to recover the occupancy of immovable property from which a tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord" as contemplated by subclause (e) of clause (xi) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act but was a case where the plaintiff was seeking possession of the premises from trespassers who had illegally occupied the same and therefore was covered under sub-clause (e) of clause (v) of section 7 of the said Act, as such, court-fee had to be computed on the market value which the plaintiff estimated at rupees six Lacs.

5. It would appear that clause (xi) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act relates to suits between the landlord and tenant and would have no application where rights, interests and liabilities of others are also involved. As regards sub-clause (e) of that clause, it obviously applies to those cases only where the A "tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord" and would not be relevant where the tenant has not been so ejected by the landlord or where the question as to who ejected the tenant is in dispute. Now, in order to determine the nature of the suit so as to consider the question of court-fee, reference has to be made to the allegations in the plaint.

6. ' A reading of the plaint would show that not only there is controversy, about the ownership of the premises but also with regard to the persons involved in the ejectment of the plaintiff. It appears from the plaint that the first defendant claims to have sold the premises to the second defendant, but the plaintiff denies such sale and insists on the first defendant's continued ownership of the premises. As regards her ejectment, the plaintiff attributes the same to defendants 1 to 3 and others. In her narration of the event in para. 9.03 of the plaint reference is made to strangers in connection with occupation of the premises.

7. She states:-- "9.03. On 15-4-1994, which was a Friday, the husband of the plaintiff Mr. Abdul Rahim Dadi, passed by the clinic of the plaintiff situated in the suit property and was surprised to see the frontage of the suit property, namely, "Shamim Clinic", had been repainted in bright green colour and the name of the plaintiff had been wiped out and the name of Chowdhry and Associates' was repainted over her name. Mr. Dadi heard voices of some people inside the clinic, the door and windows were closed and the lock on the front door had been removed and a Court notice was pasted on the front door. When Mr. Dadi went to the back side of the clinic, he found several strange people working inside the clinic and some of them were standing/sitting outside. All the furniture, articles, medical apparatus, books, medicines and equipment of the clinic had been removed from the clinic. In order to avoid a law and order situation, Mr. Dadi left the place."

8. ' She alleges that, "The plaintiff has been dispossessed/thrown out from her clinic (the suit property) forcibly and illegally by the defendants Nos.1 to 3 herein".

9. ' It is thus apparent that the present case is not just a suit between landlord and tenant for recovery of possession of immovable property from which the tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord, as contemplated by sub-clause (e) of clause (xi) of section 7 of the said Act, but has a wider scope involving determination of title to the property as also rights, interests and liabilities of the parties. As such, the 1925 Sindh case relied upon by defendant's counsel is clearly distinguishable. In that case there was no dispute either about the ownership of the property or about the landlord having taken over possession of the disputed house. Even the tenant who had subsequently been inducted in the house by the landlord had given up possession during the pendency of that case.

10. Having regard to the facts of the instant suit, it would, in my view, be covered by sub-clauses (e) of clause (v) of section 7 of the Court Fees Act providing for computation of court-fee on the basis of market value. As for the market value of the premises. Defendant's counsel agreed with the plaintiffs estimation of rupees six lacs. In the result, the suit has rightly been filed in this Court.

11. ' For the reasons discussed above, I find no merit in the application (CMA 3151/94) and dismiss the same.

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