1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 19-1-1994, whereby the High Court issued a writ of mandamus to the appellants directing them to pay 20% Secretariat Allowance as has been done in the case of the employees of the other Secretariats mentioned in the Notification No, FD/R/13672-13772/88, dated 30-8-1988.
2. ' The brief facts of the case are that the respondents-petitioners brought a writ petition challenging the Notification No,FD/R/13672-13772/88, dated 30-8-1988, whereby the allowance of 20% of their basic pay was allowed to the employees of the Secretariats enumerated in the said notification.
3. The grievance of the respondents-petitioners was that the impugned notification was violative of the Fundamental Right No, 15 which envisages that all citizens are entitled to equal protection of law. Their case was that as the nature and circumstances of the duties of the employees of the High Court were indentical to the employees of the said Secretariats which have been granted the aforesaid allowance, they should have been also granted the same. Thus, the respondents prayed for a writ of mandamus to the effect that the appellants, herein, may be directed to pay the said Secretariat Allowance to them from 1-7-1988, the date from which the employees of the Secretariats mentioned in the notification were allowed the same. The High Court accepted the writ petition and directed the appellants-respondents to make the payment of the said allowance to the respondents-petitioners from 1-7-1988 onwards. The present appeal, by leave, has been preferred against the judgment of the High Court.
4. ' We have heard the arguments and perused the file. It has been contended by Mr. Sardar Khan, Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the appellants that the impugned judgment of the High Court is not sustainable because the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition because in view of the provisions contained in section 47 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the matter relates to the terms and conditions of their service and, thus, if at all they were aggrieved by the impugned notification they could only seek the redressal of their grievance from the Service Tribunal and not from the High Court. The learned counsel, while dealing with the point, referred to the definition of the word 'pay' as given under section 2(g) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976 to substantiate his contention that the matter falls within the ambit of the `terms and conditions' of the service of respondents as envisaged under section 47 of the Interim Constitution Act read with the provisions contained in Civil Servants Act, 1976 and, thus, the writ petition was not competent. The learned counsel has also submitted that the High Court has committed an error in law in ignoring the fact that the allowance in question would be deemed a part of pay of the respondents, as such, it would be deemed included in the terms and conditions of their service. He has also assailed the finding of the High court on the point of 'jurisdiction' of the High Court and submitted that the impugned notification is covered by section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act and remedy to the respondents was available only by way of appeal to the Service Tribunal. The learned counsel cited the following authorities and treatises in support of his contentions on the point of jurisdiction of the High Court:-- ' In Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Dr. Safdar Mahmood (PLD 1983 SC 100), it was observed that in view of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, read with Articles 212 and 240 of the Pakistan Constitution, the disputes relating to the service matters were held to be in exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and, thus, the Supreme Court refused .To interfere in the findings recorded by the Service Tribunal.
5. ' In Niaz Ahmad Chaudhry v. Secretary, Establishment Division (1985 PLC (C.S.) 530, the facts were that the appellant was entitled to use a car under rule 2(x) of the Rules known as Use of Staff Cars Rules, 1980 but he was not provided with a car when he was serving as O.S.D. The order of refusal to provide a car was held to be violative of terms and conditions of the Service of the appellant and his appeal was accepted; the concerned authority was directed to provide car to the aggrieved civil servant.
6. ' In Razi Begum v. Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad 1986 PLC (C.S.) 754, the matter pertained to the accommodation to the spouses. The wife was a Government servant and the husband was an employee of a statutory body. The matter was held within the ambit of the terms and conditions of their service. The appeal was accepted directing the authority concerned to allow house rent to the concerned employee and to refund the amount already deducted as per office memorandum.
7. ' In LA. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), the matter related to the allowance and pension of the civil servants. The writ petition was allowed in exercise of powers under section- 184 of the Constitution of Pakistan. However, it was held that the matter of pension pertained to the terms and conditions of service of the civil servants and even if the question of violation of Fundamental Right No 25 guaranteed by the Constitution was involved, the Service Tribunal had the jurisdiction in the matter. However, it was found that the case was founded solely on the ground of discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and not because of any breach of any provision of the Civil Servants Act or any other service rule.
8. ' In Muhammad Ilyas Suleri v. Muhammad Naseem Khan (1994 SCR 90), it has been observed that in case the matter pertains to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, the appeal is only competent to the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act, 1975 and the High Court has no jurisdiction to redress the grievance of concerned civil servants in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
9. ' Controverting the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has supported the findings of the High Court and argued that as the allowance in question has not been declared as 'pay' and, thus, it is not covered by the phrase 'terms and conditions' of service as envisaged under section 47 of the Interim Constitution Act read with section 2(g) of Civil Servants Act, 1976. He has maintained that an identical question regarding the grant of allowance in favour of the employees of the High Court of Pakistan came up for consideration before the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein it has been held that the employees of the High Court were entitled to the said allowance and the relevant notification was held discriminatory within the meaning of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 which is corresponding to the provisions contained in section 4(4) of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 wherein Fundamental Right No, 15 guarantees equal protection of law to all the citizens of the state. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondents it is not correct to suggest that the High Court in instant case was debarred from entertaining the writ petition and issue a writ of mandamus. The learned counsel has relied upon following authorities in support of his contentions on the question of jurisdiction of the High Court:-- ' In Dr. Abdul Majeed Memon v. Civil Surgeon, Hyderabad (1980 PLC (C.S.) 560), it was held that provision of Rule 26 of West Pakistan Travelling Allowance Rules, 1960 was not a condition of service which could be agitated before the Service Tribunal and, thus, the appeal was held incompetent and was dismissed under section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973 read with relevant rules.
10. ' In Province of East Pakistan v. Golam Jahandar Sharif (PLD 1967 Dacca 14), the dispute in a civil suit was as to whether a Government servant under suspension was entitled to subsistence allowance and dearness allowance during the period of suspension. The question of the scope of terms and conditions of service of a civil servant within the meaning of Constitutional provisions or any other law was not in dispute.
11. ' In Government of the Punjab v. Mubarik Ali Khan (PLD 1993 SC 375), the question involved was as to whether the High Court employees in Pakistan, as in the instant case, were entitled to 20% of their pay as Secretariat Allowance. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, had allowed the petition. On appeal by the Government to the Supreme Court, the view taken by the High Court was affirmed and the employees of the Lahore High Court were held entitled to the Secretariat Allowance; the relevant notification was held to be violative of Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan which guarantees equal protection before law.
12. ' It is evident from the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the parties that it is now settled law that if matter relates to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, it is essentially cognizable by the Service Tribunal and no relief can be sought by resorting to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In the instant case the High Court has expressed the view that the jurisdiction of High Court was not barred under section 47 of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 because the impugned notification could not be regarded to be an 'order' passed by 'departmental authority' regarding the terms and conditions of service of the civil servants. According to the High Court, as the notification was issued by the Government, it cannot be regarded that it was passed by a 'departmental authority' within the meaning of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act. The view taken by the High Court while assuming the jurisdiction is not sustainable because the expression 'departmental authority' has been defined in explanation to section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1975 wherein it has been stipulated that the expression includes an `authority' other than Service Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of terms and conditions of a civil servant.
13. Thus, the Government notification does fall within the ambit of the expression 'departmental authority' as defined in explanation to section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act; such a notification would be deemed to be an 'order' of the departmental authority within the meaning of section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act. The matter also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as IA. Sharwani v, Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), wherein it was observed as under:-- "10. From the above-cited cases, it is evident that it has been consistently held inter alia by this Court that a civil servant if is aggrieved by a final order, whether original or appellate, passed by a departmental authority in respect of his terms and conditions, his remedy, if any, is by way of an appeal before the Service Tribunal even where the case involves vires of a particular Service Rule or a notification or the question, whether an accused civil servant can claim the right to be represented by a counsel before the Enquiry Officer. We are inclined to hold that if a statutory rule or a notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of a civil servant, the same can be treated as an order in terms of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act in order to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal. However, in the present case, the petitioners' case is founded solely on the ground of discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and not because'of any breach of any provision of the Civil Servants Act or any service rule. Furthermore, the question involved is of public importance as it affects all the present and future pensioners and, therefore, falls within the compass of clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution. However, we may clarify that a civil servant cannot bypass the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by adding a ground of violation of the Fundamental Rights. The Service Tribunal will have jurisdiction in a case which is founded on the terms and conditions of the service even if it involves the question of violation of the Fundamental Rights."
14. ' It is evident that the view taken by the High Court so far as the same relates to the interpretation of the scope of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act in context of expression 'departmental authority' and 'notification' is incorrect and is not tenable.
15. ' The next question which needs resolution is as to whether the matter of grant of Secretariat Allowance would fall within the ambit of expression `terms and conditions' of service of the respondents within the meanings of section 4 of the Civil Servants Act. Under section 3 of the Civil Servants Act, 1976, the terms and conditions of a civil servant would be as determined under the said Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Section 3 of the Civil Servants Act is reproduced below:-- "Terms and Conditions.--- The terms and conditions of service of a civil servant shall be as provided in this Act and the rules."
16. ' It is evident from the above provision that if a matter is not covered by the Act or rules framed thereunder, that cannot be regarded a term or condition of the service of a civil servant within the meaning of the Act. The perusal of the provisions contained in Civil Servants Act, 1976 and the rules framed thereunder are indicative of the fact that no such allowance as Secretariat Allowance has been envisaged as a term and condition of service of a civil servant. The learned counsel for the appellants maintained that the allowance in question is a part of pay as defined under section 2(g) of the Civil Servants Act, 1976 and, thus, would be a term and condition of the respondents within the meaning of section 3 of the Civil Servants Act. For the sake of convenience, the definition of word 'pay' as given in section 2(g) is as under:- "'pay' means the amount drawn monthly by a civil servant as pay, and includes technical pay, special pay, personal pay and any other emoluments declared as pay by the prescribed authority."
17. ' The learned counsel for the appellants maintained that as `emoluments' are part of pay, the allowance in question, being an emolument, would form part of pay. However, the bare reading of the definition of word `pay' reproduced above makes it clear that only those emoluments would be part of pay which have been declared by the prescribed authority as such and not otherwise. In the instant case as the Secretariat Allowance has not been declared as 'pay' by a prescribed authority, it cannot be regarded that it is 'pay' and, thus, is covered by the phrase 'terms and conditions' within the meanings of Civil Servants Act. The dictionary meaning of the word 'emolument' which includes any profit or compensation received for services would not bring the allowance in question within the ambit of 'pay' because where law itself gives special meaning to a particular expression or phrase, the dictionary meaning , cannot be looked into. The authorities cited at Bar, referred to above, are distinguishable and not helpful to resolve the point in question. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Secretariat Allowance relates to the terms and conditions of service of the respondents and, thus, the matter was in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal is not correct and is hereby repelled.
18. ' The question as to whether the respondents, in the instant case, were civil servants within the meaning of Service Tribunal Act, 1976 is also relevant to the proposition in hand because the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal under section 4 of the Civil Servants Act is confined only to the terms and conditions of service of 'civil servants' and not otherwise. In case reported as Government of the Punjab v. Mubarik All Khan (PLD 1993 SC 375), the employees of the Lahore High Court were held to be not 'civil servant' in view of Article 208 of the Constitution of Pakistan. In para. 12 of the judgment, while affirming the view taken by the High Court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the High Court employees were not civil servants and, as such, the jurisdiction of the High Court to give relief to them in exercise of writ jurisdiction was not barred. For the sake of convenience, observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced as under:-- "12. The view taken by the Lahore High Court that the employees of ,the High Court are not civil servants is based on the decision given by a Division Bench in the case of Manzoor Hussain and 37 others (supra) who were serving as Private Secretaries in the Lahore High Court and had by a Constitution petition claimed upgradation of their post from BPS-16 to 17 with effect from 1-7-1983 on the basis of a Memorandum of the Government of the Punjab, dated 18th of March, 1986. A similar objection with regard to the jurisdiction was taken. It was indeed rejected and the employees of the High Courr Establishment were held to be not civil servants. The reasoning given appears as hereunder:-- ' The expression 'civil servant' has been defined in section 2(b) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974). According to this definition, a civil servant means a person who is a member of a civil service of the Province or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Province. The Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974) has been enacted to regulate the appointment to, and the terms and conditions of service in respect of the service of the Province of the Punjab. This law has been enacted pursuant to Article 240 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which empowers the Provincial Legislature to make law to determine the conditions regarding appointment and other terms and conditions of service in case of services of the province. It is, however, noteworthy that the law thus to be made by the Provincial Legislature is subject to the Constitution as provided in the opening words of Article 240 supra. Article 208 ibid speaks of officers and ,servants of the Supreme Court and of a High Court. This article empowers a High Court to make rules providing for the appointment by the Court of officers and servants of the Court and for their terms and conditions of employment. Such rules are, of course, to be made with the approval of the Governor concerned. In case of this High Court, such rules have already been framed in the form of the High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules.
19. ' Prospects of promotion and upgradation of a post have never been considered a term and condition of service for which the Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. In this behalf reference may be made to the case of Dr. Ehsan-ul-Haq v. The Province of Punjab and others (1980 SCMR 972).
20. ' In the light of the above discussion, it is concluded that the petitioners, being officers and servants of the High Court, do not fall within ambit of expression 'civil servant' as occurring in section 2(b) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974) and, therefore, according to their terms and conditions of service, the jurisdiction of the High Court is not excluded.
21. ' This judgment did come up to this Court, twice, once by means of a petition for leave to appeal and next by way of Civil Review Petition No, 6-R/1989 alongwith other connected matters (C.R.P. 34- R and 35-R of 1989 and C.P.L.As. Nos. 10 and 11 of 1989) but at no stage this question was attended to directly or indirectly. The petitions for leave to appeal as well as the review petitions arising out of them were disposed of on the question of limitation and not considered on merits at all. Th view taken by the High Court that the employees of the Provincial High Courts are not civil servants for the purpose of Civil Servants Act and the Service Tribunals Act is correct."
22. In Azad Kashmir, the legal position is somewhat different because the provisions corresponding to Article 208 of the Constitution of Pakistan were incorporated in the Interim Constitution Act by way of an amendment through amending Act known as Act XX of 1993 on 30-3-1993, whereas the writ petition in the instant case was filed on 3-1-1993, i.e,, before the introduction of section 47-E of the Interim Constitution Act. Besides, no Rules have yet been framed by the High Court. Thus, it can be safely said that the respondents were civil servants at the time of filing of the writ petition.
23. Consequently, the legal position is that although the respondents were civil servants within the meaning of Civil Servants Act, 1976 at the time of filing of the writ petition but all the same the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter was not barred because the question relating to Secretariat Allowance was not a 'term and condition' of their service and was cognisable by the High Court. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court was debarred from entertaining the writ petition in the instant case is not tenable and is hereby repelled.
24. ' The next question in the instant case is as to whether the respondents are entitled to 20% Secretariat allowance because such an allowance has been awarded to various other Secretariats mentioned in the impugned notification. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Sardar Khan, Advocate-General, has contended that the grant of such a compensatory allowance is a discretion and does not cast duty upon the Government to grant the same to the respondents merely because some other Secretariats were allowed the allowance in question. He has argued that such an administrative order granting compensatory allowance is a discretionary matter and cannot be enforced by resorting to writ jurisdiction under section 44 of the Interim Constitution Act; because there is no law entitling respondents to claim such an allowance on the basis of a legal right. The learned counsel for the appellants maintained that a writ of mandamus can only be issued if an authority fails to perform duty which such authority is bound under law to perform or performs an act which is prohibited by law to be performed. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon The State of Madhya Pradesh v. C. Mandawar (AIR 1954 SC 493), Unikat Sankunni Menon v. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1968 SC 81) and Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (AIR 1981 SC 1829) in support of his contentions and has argued that if a group of service is given different pay scale, or for that matter any compensatory allowance, the other groups are not entitled to claim the same as of legal right. The learned Advocate-General has stated that the Secretariat Allowance allowed to the employees of other Secretariats in the relevant notification is a discretionary matter of the Government and cannot be claimed by the respondents as a vested right. The learned Advocate-General has further maintained that the nature of the duties is not sole criterion to determine the question as to whether the respondents have been discriminated and, thus, Fundamental Right No, 15 has been violated.
25. ' It may be stated that the authorities from Indian jurisdiction relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are not fully applicable to the facts of the case in hand and are distinguishable. One of the cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, is to the effect that as the Government had been given discretion to grant compensatory allowance to a certain group of service, the matter was discretionary and writ was not competent. In the instant case there is no question of exercising discretion in pursuance of the rules. The sole question in the instant case is as to whether in view of the nature of the duties and the terms and conditions of their service, grant of Secretariat Allowance to the employees mentioned in Notification No,FD/R/13672-13772/88, dated 30-8-1988, is discriminatory to the respondents or it is a reasonable classification and, thus, is not violative of Fundamental Right No,
15. The learned counsel for the appellants could not persuade us as to why the respondents-petitioners were not granted the allowance in question while it was allowed to the employees of the Secretariats mentioned in the aforesaid notification. If the classification made in the instant case does not appeal to reason and is arbitrary, it cannot be said that the respondents were not discriminated against in violation of Fundamental Right No, 15 guaranteed by the Interim Constitution Act.
26. ' The learned counsel for the appellants has stressed that there are no rules in Azad Jammu and Kashmir as was in case of the employees of the Lahore High Court casting a duty on the Government to give Secretariat Allowance to the respondents. The learned counsel has tried to distinguish the principle laid down in case reported as Government of the Punjab v. Mubarik Ali Khan (PLD 1993 SC 375) on the ground that the employees of the Punjab High Court were ordered to be paid Secretariat Allowance because the Rules known as High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules have been framed by the Lahore High Court whereas no such rules have been made in case of the respondents. It may be stated that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants is not tenable in view of the fact that in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court of Pakistan while dealing with the identical question involved, basically upheld the impugned judgments which also pertained to employees of other High Courts and not only of the Lahore High Court which had framed relevant Rules. Besides, the said Rules have been relied upon as an additional ground in support of the finding of discrimination and not a sole ground for upholding the impugned judgments. Thus, we are of the view that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the aforesaid authority is fully applicable to the case in hand and the efforts of the learned counsel for the appellants to distinguish the facts of the cases, referred to above, is an exercise in futility. For elucidating the matter further, we may reproduce first paragraph of the impugned notification which is as under:-- "I am directed to refer to the subject noted above and to say that the President, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, has been pleased to decide that Secretariat Allowance @ 20% of basic pay to all employees in Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Secretariat , President's Secretariat, Prime Minister's Secretariat and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Secretariat shall be granted with effect from 1-7-1988."
27. It is evident from the above paragraph of the notification that it does not indicate as to why the employees of the Civil Secretariat, President's Secretariat, Prime Minister's Secretariat and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Secretariat have been given preference over the respondents who, as, has been held by the High Court, have to perform, if not more, at least, equally onerous duties as civil servants. There appears to be no rationale whatsoever to give a preferential treatment to the employees of Secretariats mentioned in the notification and, thus, the classification made cannot be regarded as reasonable. While dealing with the question, this Court in a recent case entitled Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and others v. Muhammad Younas Tahir and others (Civil Appeal No, 39 of 1994, decided on 26-7-1994) (1994 CLC 2339) has observed at pages 60 and 61 of the judgment as under:-- "These principles spell out with clarity that legislation for a particular class is only recognised if the classification is reasonable which means fair and meant to achieve some useful purpose. It must, however, be kept in mind that in order to qualify for valid class legislation it has to be shown that it is such that the principle of equality before law and equal protection of law is not violated ' A reference may be made to the following treatises which deal with the question of equality before law:-- ' In 'Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies by V.G. Ramachandran, Second Edition at p.
28. 19, it has been observed as under:-- "If an executive order discriminates in favour of a certain class, it becomes arbitrary, if it is not founded upon reasonable ground, some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification which must be germane and satisfy the following tests. Firstly, that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligent differentia which distinguished the persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group. Secondly, that differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the order.
29. Thirdly, there must be some nexus between the basis of the classification and the object intended to be achieved by the order."
30. ' In the book entitled 'Law of Fundamental Rights' by Dr. R.G. Chaturvedi, 3rd Edition at page 85 it has been observed as under:-- "Article 14 which provides for equality before the law or equal protection of laws extends to matters of public contracts, wherein the State is a contracting party. It is not competent for the State to deal with or exclude any person by discrimination, though such equality of opportunity is, however, confined to the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons, though executive functions of the State under the authority of law, free from discrimination and having reasonable nexus with their objects are, however, exceptions to the principle."
31. ' The principle of equality before law has been applied by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to matters of pay and pension in Mubarik Ali Khan's case and LA. Sharwani's case, referred to earlier. In Mubarik Ali Khan's case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, while dealing with the question of Secretariat Allowance, recorded the following conclusions in paras. 19 and 20 of the judgment:-- "19. In spite of the direction given no material has been placed before this Court or was placed before any of the High Courts showing any reason whatsoever for the re-emergence of categories of Secretariat and non-Secretariat employees and for assimilating certain non-Secretariat Offices as Secretariat Offices for the purpose of this Allowance. In the absence of any reason forthcoming on the record after the enforcement of the Unified Pay Scales to all categories of employees; such a reversiou to old categories would appear to be discriminatory.
20. The legal question that in the matter of pension and pay no such discrimination can take place has been answered by this Court in. LA. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and others (1991 SCMR 1041). The factual question of equivalence of the duties, responsibilities, confidentialities etc. Is ordinarily not a fit subject for adjudication by the High Court but has to be determined initially by a full-fledged exercise to be undertaken by the National Pay Commission, as such. For the employees of the High Court the position is far better. The employees of the Federal Shariat Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan have been allowed such an allowance. The High Court employees perform almost identical functions as do the employees of these two other Courts perform. The employees of all the three Courts have been dealt with constitutionally by the same provision reproduced above. In the circumstances, the High Court's employees cannot be discriminated against. The necessary provision of Secretariat/Personal Allowance had to be made in respect of such employees as was made in the case of the Federal Shariat Court and the Supreme Court employees."
32. IA. Sharwani's case contains an exhaustive survey of the case-law on the subject of equality before law and it was held that in the matter of pension and pay no discrimination can take place. In our view the principles laid down in these judgments are fully applicable to the present case and we follow them.
33. ' In the light of what has been stated above, we are of the considered opinion that there is no force in this appeal. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed. In view of the circumstances of the case we make no order as to the costs.