DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order, dated 30-10-1985, passed by the Sindh Labour Court No, IV, Karachi, who had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
2. The brief facts of the case were that the appellant claimed to be a permanent employee of the respondent establishment in Grade-6 and was performing his duties efficiently and deligently to the entire satisfaction of his superiors and that he was a senior-most employee having put in service for about 14 years and was fully entitled to be promoted to Grade-9. Further, according to the appellant there were a number of Departments in the establishment and every Department has its Manager. That as one, Mr. Asif Jah, the Manager of his Department had incurred displeasure, therefore, due to malice, he mala fidely stopped promotion, spoiled the record and also declared him surplus though he was senior-most employee. The appellant further claimed that the said Manager without any just or reasonable cause, had also issued a number of warnings to him and that though the declaration of surplus dated 3-9-1985 came to an end and he was re-called to join the duties, the respondent establishment, in violation of the settlements between the union had withheld the promotion and also re-designated him against his entitlement to be posted in Fettling Section as Fettler Grade-9. Therefore, being aggrieved, he submitted his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
3. The respondent establishment resisted the petition on the different grounds. It was the case of the respondent establishment that the appellant had no right secured or guaranteed to him for promotion and that as his service record was poor and unsatisfactory from the very beginning and was also proceeded in domestic enquiry and was let off after issuance of warnings, therefore, after 1978 he was not promoted as he was not fit for the same. As regards the employment, it was the case of the respondent establishment that the appellant was transferred to Fettling Section and was redesignated as Assembly Fitter without affecting his pay scale and that like other 70 workers, he was also declared surplus and recommended for training, but, due to this lack of interest, he was sent back from training. Therefore, the respondent establishment claimed that the grievance petition of the appellant was not legally maintainable and it was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined.
Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard Messrs Shafiq Qureshi, the learned Advocate for the appellant and Muhammad Humayoon, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent establishment and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment has very efficiently and convincingly argued his case as he has relied upon a number of Authorities in support of his pleadings. As regards to the point of the right of the promotion of the appellant, Mr. Humayoon has vehemently argued that it is the prerogative of an employer to judge whether an employee was a fit person to be promoted to any suitable post and it was not a vested right of an employee to claim his entitlement as a right guaranteed or secured to him and to challenge such right through a grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969. In support of his contention, Mr. Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment has referred to me to a number of cases reported in 1984 PLC 1081; 1981 PLC 545 and 1983 PLC 206. All these authorities are directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to claim any promotion, as a right guaranteed or secured to him. As regards to the allegation of any malice or mala fide either on the part of one Asif Jah, the Manager of the appellant's Department or by the respondent establishment, the appellant has miserably failed to establish anything illegal or wrong. In his examination-in-chief and also cross-examination, the appellant has clearly admitted that on a number of occasion, he was issued charge-sheets followed by warnings and also the adverse entries in his Service Record for which he was also properly communicated. Mr. Muhammad Humauyoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment has also very correctly argued that if the appellant was at all not satisfied with the adverse entries in his service record, then, he should have immediately approached to the Labour Court for the expungement of the remarks, but, at this belated stage, the appellant cannot be allowed to agitate his grievance, if any, in the present case. I see much force in the contentions of Mr. Humayoon. As regards to the point of posting of the appellant in the Fettling Section, it was argued by Mr. Humayoon that it is the right of the employer to assign any duty and the employee has no choice in respect of the duty assignment and that vide clause (3) of the appointment order of the appellant, the designation, duties and responsibilities can be changed at any time. On the point of the appellant being surplus, it was submitted by Mr. Humayoon that the appellant was not only picked up but alongwith 70 other workers were also declared surplus and were sent for training course and on coming back from the said training, the appellant was rightly posted in the department as per his merits. Mr. Humayoon has pointed out that it was the policy of the respondent management to put the appellant on training and his basic scale was not changed nor altered the conditions of service as his services were to be governed by the appropriate rules and regulations of the establishment. In view of all the above legal and factual submissions, I am of the view that the appellant has no case whatsoever and the learned Labour Court has rightly passed the impugned order, therefore, it is to be maintained.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and I would maintain the same. Therefore, the present appeal is dismissed, but, with the remarks