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1995 PLC (C.S.) 945

ASGHAR ALI vs COMMANDANT SHAHBAZ RANGERS, SUKKUR and 2 others

Citation1995 PLC (C.S.) 945
CourtFederal Service Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No, 300-L of 1994
Date1995-04-12
Judge(s)Abdul Razzaq A. Thaim, Noor Muhammad Magsi
ResultAppeal dismissed

' NOOR MUHAMMAD MAGSI (MEMBER).-The Appellant while serving as a Sepoy (Batman) in 41 Wing, Shahbaz Rangers, is alleged to have scuffled with a Senior Si. Clerk Muhammad Hanif and slapped on his face on 6-9-1993. Consequently he was arrested and confined in the Quarter Guard. As a resuk of his trial he was awarded one year's imprisonment in Civil Jail and was also dismissed from service by order dated 28th September, 1993.

2. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid punishment of one year's R.I. And that of dismissal, the appellant submitted a departmental appeal to the Director-General, Pakistan Rangers, Ghazi Road, Lahore on 10-10-1993. But vide order dated 7th November, 1993, the same was considered and rejected by the competent Authority. Instead of agitating his grievance before the Service Tribunal, he filed yet another appeal on 20-11-1993 to the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. Since he did not receive any reply to his second appeal from the Interior Division, therefore he filed Writ Petition No,10754/94 in the Lahore High Court for issuance of direction to the respondent for earlier disposal of his second appeal. When notice of the writ petition was sent to the Ministry of Interior, they issued letter dated 6th October, 1994 mentioning therein that there was no right of second appeal under the provisions of Pakistan Rangers (E and D) Rules, 1966 read with Pakistan Rangers Administrative Rules, nor the Secretary Interior is the appellate authority in the case of a sepoy i.e, Asghar Ali, appellant. Under the Rules, Commandant is Authorised Officer and the Director-General, Pakistan Rangers is appellate authority. However, complying with the orders of the High Court, the Interior Division, considered the appeal received by them with the High Court's Order and rejected the same on 6-10-1994.

3. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondents alongwith departmental representative, we are of the view that the appeal must fail on the simple ground of limitation. The appellant was dismissed from service by order dated 28-9-1993 against which he filed departmental appeal on 10-10-1993 which was dismissed by the competent appellate Authority on 7-11-1993. Instead of coming to the Tribunal against the order dated 7-11- 1993, the appellant started wasting his time by making further appeal to the Interior Division, which was not the appellate authority in his case. As such the appeal filed by him before the Tribunal on 8-11-1994 against the order dated 7-11-1993 is hopelessly time-barred, and in the absence of any application for condonation of delay, we have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal on the ground of limitation.

' Even otherwise, from perusal of the record we find that the Court of inquiry was conducted and the appellant was found guilty. He was provided every opportunity of defence and by Letter HQ PR No,5153/Legal/1646, dated 28-10-1993, he was informed to attend hearing personally or through his counsel and in reply, the appellant has informed that he was unable to engage counsel and requested for mercy. Further, since the appellant has also been awarded punishment of one year's R.I. In civil imprisonment which he has actually served out and he has not been acquitted from one year's R.I. By any competent forum, therefore, in the presence of one year's rigorous imprisonment awarded to the appellant, which he has actually served out, he has no case of his reinstatement.

As such his appeal was rightly rejected by the competent Authority.

4. As a result of the above discussion, we find no merits in this appeal, which is dismissed. No order as to costs.

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