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PLD 1995 Lahore 250

AMJAD HUSSAIN vs THE STATE

CitationPLD 1995 Lahore 250
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Criminal Miscellaneous No,5020/B of 1994
Date1995-02-08
Judge(s)Muhammad Zubair, Talat Yaqub
ResultBail allowed

' SH. MUHAMMAD ZUBAIR, J.---The petitioner, who is involved in a case under section 420/467/468/471/109, P.P.C. Arising out of F.I.R. No,C/45/93, SBC (45/93 CBC), dated 26-10-1993, registered at Police Station FIA (CBC Lahore), seeks to be released on bail.

2. In this case, the complaint was lodged by Ashfaq Ahnad, Manager, A.B.L., Qila Gujjar Singh Branch, alleging therein that Muhammad Arshad, obtained from the Bank Letter of Credit Facility under IBS in his name as Sole Proprietor of M/s. S.A. Corporation, Lahore, on 5-8-1992. The L.C. Was opened for import of 20 M. Tons Chemicals (Harmless) Titanium Dioxide of German Origin, Valuing US$ 38,000 as per pro forma dated 20-7-1992 of M/s. United (H.K), a sole Proprietorship concern owned by Muhammad Yaqoob Rana. The imported consignment arrived at Karachi in October 1992. Muhammad Arshad L.C. Holder was asked to retire the documents by the Bank but he showed no interest. The Bank in order to secure its interests as also of the customer created a forced E.I.M.

And to make arrangements for the railment of the imported consignment to Lahore from Karachi Port where it was incurring heavy demurrage., but Muhammad Arshed was not agreeable to this arrangement: It is alleged that at present the consignment is lying with M/s. Anvir & Co. At Lahore, but Muhammad Arshad did not show any interest in retiring the documents. The informant stated that Muhammad Arshad in collaboration of guarantor Muhammad Amjad Hussain petitioner, had cheated the Bank of a sum of US$ 38,000 and also Muhammad Yaqoob Rana, Sole Proprietor United, Hong Kong by sending substandard chemicals. It was further doubted by the complainant that Rana Muhammad Yaqoob was a fake name. On the said complaint of the Manager of the Bank, the instant case was registered against the petitioner and Muhammad Arshad.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner vigorously contended that there is no evidence to cannect the petitioner with the alleged offences, especially offences under section 467/468/471/109, P.P.C., at the most the case may fall under section 420, P.P.C., which is a bailable offence. According to the allegations tontained in the F.I.R., the petitioner stood surety for Muhammad Arshad and others, who opened the L.C. For the import of Chemicals (Harmless) Tatanium Dioxide for the payment of amount in case the L.C. Fail to clear their liability and at the relevant time, the Bank officials did not take this position that the security furnished by the petitioner is insufficient, there is no evidence worth the name to prove that the documents furnished by the petitioner were forged one, hence the application of sections 467, 468, 471/109, P.P.C., alongwith section 420, P.P.C. Is not proved. The offences under section 467/468/471/109, P.P.C. Are non-cognizable as per Schedule attached to the Code of Criminal Procedure; hence the F.I.A. Peoples were not competent to investigate the case, in the absence of the orders from a competent Magistrate, as envisaged under section 155(2), Cr.P.C.

In addition to that, in view of section 5(3) of the F.1.A. Act, even the F.I.A. Member is not competent to investigate the case, unless he is a Sub-Inspector and is authorized by the Director-General or his delegatee, to investigate the case. The learned counsel submitted that there is no order on the the authorising Muhammad Ihsanul Hay, SI, F.I. A. To investigate the case or to make the arrest, of the accused, hence the arrest of the petitioner in non-cognizable offences is illegal and that section 420, P.P.C. Is bailable offence and does not fall within the prohibitory clause. Placed reliance on Muhammad Yaqoob v. The State (1978 PCr.LJ 812).

' On the merits, the learned counsel contended that bare reading of the F.I.R. Would show that no offence under section 420, P.P.C. Or under sections 467, 468 and 471, P.P.C. Is made out, neither the prosecution has collected any evidence of forgery not there is any evidence on the record that the petitioner practised fraud on the Bank while becoming guarantor for Muhammad Arshad; hence the case against the petitioner is one of further inquiry and he is entitled to the grant of bail.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the bank submitted that the F.I.A. Was competent to investigate even non-cognizable offence without the permission of the Magistrate, as the offences are scheduled ones, as shown in the Schedule in view of subsection (3) of section 5 of the F.I.A. Act.

He further contended that as the offence under section 420, P.P.C. Is cognizable, whereas the other offences, if for the sake of arguments be deemed to be non-cognizable, still the investigation can be carried out by the F.I.A. Without the permission of the learned Magistrate. Placed reliance on AIR 1965 SC (India) 1189 and AIR 1961 Andhra Pradesh 448.

' The learned counsel also contended that in view of section 3 of the F.I.A. Act (Act VIII of 1975) read with section 12 of Ordinance IX of 1984, all the scheduled offences have become cognizable and non-bailable by implication of law, as is apparent from sections 5(6) and 12 of Ordinance IX of 1984, which prohibit the grant of bail to an accused persons, unless his case falls within the category of further inquiry.

5. On merit, the learned counsel contended that the petitioner is the sole moving figure being this sordid affair whereby the bank was defrauded to the tune of lacs of rupees, so it being a serious offence, the petitioner be not released on bail.

6. The learned D.A.-G. Has supported the contentions of the learned counsel for the Bank.

7. We have gone through the record of the case and have considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel tir the parties.

' From the bare reading of the F.I.A. Act, it is evident that it was promulgated only to empower the Federal Police to investigate certain offences, which formerly only the Provincial Police had powers of investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under this Act, it has been provided that in respect of the offences enumerated under the Schedule, the Federal Investigation Agency will exercise the same powers as the Provincial Police under the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is nowhere mentioned in the F.I.A. Act, that the offences specified in the Schedule to the Act would be regarded cognizable offences and the F.I.A. Could send up a charge-sheet in respect of those offences. Even at present, not all the offences mentioned in the Schedule are being regarded as cognizable offences. Under serial No,1 of the Schedule, offences punishable under certain sections of the P.P.C., such as 465 to 468 and 471 to 477-A continue to be non-cognizable because they are mentioned as non-cognizable offences in the Schedule attached to the Cr.P.C. It is thus clear that offences otherwise non-cognizable do not become cognizable merely because the Federal Investigation Agency can enquire into or investigate such offences.

' A perusal of section 5(3) of the F.I.A. Act would show that only a member of the Agency who is not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector and is duly authorised by the Director-General or his delegatee in this behalf, may arrest without warrant any person who has committed or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed, any of the offences referred to in section 3(1) of the F.I.A.

Act.

8. The salutary principle for the interpretation of Penal Law, as is evident from "Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) by P.St.J. Langan, page 239" is reproduced below:-- "The principle applied in construing a Penal Act is that if, in construing the relevant provisions, there appears any reasonable doubt or ambiguity', it will be resolved in favour of the persons who would be liable to the penalty. "(1953) 1 W.L.R. 312)).

' Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of this case, we find that the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank that by implication the aforesaid offences become cognizable is untenable, as the plain reading of the Statute does not provide in unequivocal terms that the offences which are otherwise non-cognizable would become cognizable by implication, due to the fact that they are part of the Schedule attached to the Statute. Had the legislature intended so, it would have made its intention very clear for removing the ambiguity.

' However, as there are two interpretations possible, we are persuaded to accept that interpretation which is more lenient and favour an accused person, so we hold that the offences which are shown as nonAcognizable in the Schedule attached to the Cr.P.C. Continue to remain as such, as laid down in Muhammad Yaqoob's case.

9. In view of the above discussion, it is concluded that the initial arrest of the petitioner by the F.I.A.

For the non-cognizable offences was void ab initio and was beyond the province of the officer concerned, hence on this legal plane, the case against the petitioner is one of further inquiry.

' Even on merit, we find that the contention of the learned counsel that the case against the petitioner is one of further inquiry has got substantial force. The bare reading of the F.LR., without any supporting evidence so far collected, would show that the petitioner was simply guarantor of Muhammad Arshed co-accused and did not forge any document.

10. For the foregoing reasons, we direct that the petitioner shall be released on bail, provided he furnishes bail bond in the sum of Rs,20,00,000. (twenty lac only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court.

Cited by 2 cases

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