' MUHAMMAD RAFIO TARAR, J---Aleem Jaffar petitioner, Ex-Line Superintendent in the WAPDA seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of the learned Federal Service Tribunal, dated 20-7-1992, whereby his appeal challenging his dismissal from service vide order dated 1-6-1989 passed under section 17 (1-A) of the WAPDA Act, was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was suspended from service vide order dated 10-1-1980 and subsequently dismissed on 22-10-1981 after having been convicted for an offence under section 161 of the P.P.C. Read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and consequential sentence of three months' R.I. And a fine of Rs,500. He challenged the order of his dismissal in the Labour Court No,II, Lahore and was reinstated by its order dated 1-8-1982. The respondents' appeal against the order of the Labour Court was dismissed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in limine.
3. The respondents challenged the aforesaid order before the High Court through writ petition which was allowed holding that the WAPDA employees were civil servants and the order impugned therein was without Jurisdiction. The petitioner then approached the Fedral Service Tribunal for the redress of his grievance. During the pendency of his appeal the order of his conviction and sentence was set aside by the High Court and he was acquitted. The learned Federal Service Tribunal held that the conviction having been set aside by the High Court the very basis of dismissal had disappeared. His appeal was allowed and he was reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. He was taken on duty on the basis of the order of the Tribunal but was again suspended and after service of show-cause notice he was removed from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAFDA Act.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the law laid down by %is Court in Ohulam Fetid and Usman Ghani's Cases viz, 1992 PLC (C.S,) 1199 and 1986 SCMR 1875, it is submitted that the respondent could not put the petitioner in double jeopardy by invoking the provisions of section 17(1-A) of the Act after having exonerated him of the charge. The contentions require consideration. Leave to appeal is, therefore, granted.