JUDGMENT MUHAMMAD NASEEM CHAUDHRI, J.- Evidenced through mutation No. 237 dated 9-8-1989 Ahmad Saeed, Hamid Saeed, Muhammad Saeed, Mahmood Saeed and Khalid Saeed defendants purchased the suit properly' fully described in the plaint for an amount of Rs. 8,00,000/- (rupees eight lac). Expressing .That she had the superior right of pre-emption being a co-sharer in the Khewat, co-owner in,the village, contiguity of her owned land and joint source of irrigation, Mst.
Shahmim Akhtar respondent- plaintiff instituted her suit to pre-empt the said sale. According to her before the institution of the suit she had complied with the legal conditions. The suit was initially resisted by the aforesaid defendants. Mahmood Saeed defendant was the general attorney of the remaining defendants who also appeared on his on. Behalf. The joint written statement was submitted wherein the superior pre-emptive right of the pre-emptor was. Denied. Some other objections were also raised which need not be incorporated in view of the present nature of the dispute.
2. On 30-11-1993 the parties submitted an application before the learned trial Court for recording the compromise. According to the same the sale price was settled at Rs. 10,00,000/- including the sale price of Rs. 8,00,000/- and the cost of the improvements. This application was signed by Malik Muhammad Bakhsh Shakir, Advocate and Malik Naseem Muhammad, Advocate for Mst. Shahmim Akhtar pre-emptor. This application was signed by Mahmood Saeed defendant/general attorney of the remaining defendants as well as by Mr. Muhammad Umar Cheema, Advocate for the defendants. However, on 12-12-1993 both Mahmood Saeed and Khalid Saeed defendants made sale of their share in the property in favour of Mst. Shahmim Akhtar pre-emptor through sale deed registered on 12-12-1993. The aforesaid application dated 30-11-1993 was resisted by the three appellants-defendants namely Ahmad Saeed, Hamid Saeed and Muhammad Saeed who contended in the written reply that Mahmood Saeed was not authorised to compromise the suit who made the collusion with the pre-emptor and that they had not engaged the learned Advocate who had signed the application for recording the compromise mentioned therein. The said application was accepted by the learned trial Court and keeping in view the sale price of Rs.
10,00,000/- mentioned in the application the pre-emption money to the extent of the share of the appellants-contesting defendants was determined at Rs. 5,12,238/- which was to be deposited till 21-3-1995 by the pre-emptor after deduction of the l/3rd of the pre-emption money. It is proper to express that the pre-emption money as directed by the trial Court had been deposited by Mst.
Shahmim Akhtar pre-emptor.
3. Feeling aggrieved the appellants/defendants have filed this Regular First Appeal which has been resisted by the pre-emptor Mst. Shahmim Akhtar.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record before me. Learned counsel for the appellants referred to the general power-of-attorney got attested by Ahmad Saeed, Hamid Saeed and Muhammad Saeed (appellants) as well as by Khalid Saeed defendant in favour of their brother Mahmood Saeed who was also the defendant in the suit and argued that Mahmood Saeed was not authorised to effect the compromise. It would be an error to agree with him. During the arguments it was admitted by the parties that the disputed property was the only land owned by the aforesaid five brothers which was situated in Chak No. 31/10- R, District Khanewal. A perusal of the general power-of-attorney has made out that the four brothers had authorised Mahmood Saeed general attorney to present the written compromise during the proceedings before the Court.
This general power-of-attorney was entered at Serial No. 376, dated 16-12- 1989 in the office of the concerned Sub-Registrar, on 6-12-1993 Ahmad Saeed, Hamid Saeed and Muhammad Saeed got attested the Revocation Deed of the aforesaid general power-of-attorney. The Revocation Deed contains that the general power-of-attorney entered at serial No. 376 daied 16-12-1989 in the relevant Register of the Sub-Registrar, Khanewal was being revoked. It means that the appellants had constituted Mahmood Saeed defendant as their general attorney on 16-12-1989 and they had authorised him to effect the compromise in any proceeding(s). Mahmood Saeed had engaged Mr. Muhammad Umar Cheema as the Advocate on behalf of all the defendants including himself.
Under rule l of Older 3 CPC any party can appear personally or by his recognized agent or by an Advocate. According to rule 2 of Order 3 CPC the recognized agents of parties by whom such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are the persons holding power-of- attorneys authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties. According to rule 4 of Order 3 CPC no pleader shall act for any person in any Court unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. A perusal of the Vakalat Nama in favour of Mr. Muhammad Umar Cheema, Advocate has made out that he was engaged by Mahmood Saeed general attorney of the remaining defendants of the civil suit who was authorised to compromise the suit. This being the factual position the appellants are bound by the compromise effected on 30-11-1993 brought into black and white on the basis of which the suit was decreed. According to the dictum enunciated in Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Ishaque and others (1992 M LD 741 Lahore) a counsel is fully authorised to act on behalf of high clients and can enter-'into a compromise which would be binding on his clients. In this ruling the decision of the case Dr. Nisar Hussain Rizvi v.
Mazahir Hussain Zaidi and three others (1971 SCM R 634) was also relied upon. It has been held in Siraj Din v. Muhammad Yousaf and others (1982 SCM R 539) that the compromise effected by an Advocate on behalf of his client is binding on him and such a decree was to be determined as a*consent decree against which no appeal is competent. We, therefore, can safely hold that the compromise deed dated 30-11-1993 is binding on the appellants who are liable in the matter through their general attorney Mahmood Saeed as well as through their counsel Mr. Muhammad Umar Cheema, Advocate, Khanewal. The recitals of compromise-dated 30-11-1993 have not been denied or objected to by Mahmood Saeed General Attorney and/or by Mr. Muhammad Umar Cheema, Advocate which, as such, is binding on the parties without recording their statements. Legally the judgment and decree shall he considered to have been passed with the consent of the parties and on this score this appeal is not maintainable.
5. The appellants-defendants filed an application under Order 7 rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the same was barred by time. This application was resisted by the pre- emptor who filed the written reply. The same was'dismissed on the same d*te (1-3-1995). Even though there is a reference of this application in para 2 of the Memorandum of the Appeal the same was not argued by the learned counsel for the appellants. Even otherwise in view of the fact that compromise deed dated 30-11-1993 has been given the weight, this objection of the suit being hit by limitation which was also incorporated in Issue No. 6 stands waived by the appellants- defendants and to this extent as well the impugned judgment is sustained in consequence.
6. -For what has been said above, we see not merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with costs.