' Since the four appeals captioned above involve same questions of fact and law, they are being disposed of together through this single judgement. The appeals captioned above challenge the decision dated 19-5-1986 recorded by learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan, whereby the grievance petitions of the appellants were dismissed as time-barred.
2. The facts of the cases are that the services of the appellants were dispensed with somewhere in 1977 and they challenged the order before the N.I.R.C. The said forum was selected inasmuch as Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 had been made applicable to MESCO. The grievance petitions were accepted and the respondent went to the High Court in writ petitions on 23-8-1978 which were accepted on 10-12-1979 and the order of reinstatement of the appellants were set aside. The appellants challenged the said order of the High Court in Intra-Court Appeal in January, 1980. The said appeals remained pending up to 8-3-1986 when they were withdrawn.
Thereafter, grievance notices were served on the respondent which were followed by the institution of the grievance petitions on 29-5-1986. The grievance petitions were made to the learned lower Court on the ground that the said Court had started entertaining such petitions. As the grievance petitions were very much delayed, the applications for condonation of delay were made on the ground that erroneously Intra-Court appeal had been preferred instead of making applications under section 25-A to the Labour Court. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants not being party to PLD 1982 SC 113, wherein it was held that the N.I.R.C. Had no jurisdiction, therefore, they had a good ground for the exclusion of the period of four years spent in pursuing the Intra-Court Appeal in the High Court. The learned counsel for the respondent on the contrary has cited 1974 SCMR 128 wherein it has been held that the party was ignorant of the authoritative judgement delivered by the Supreme Court. The ruling is distinguishable from the facts of the present cases, in as much as the provision of getting permission to appeal to the Supreme Court had been amended and without getting such permission from the High Court, the unsuccessful party could go to the Supreme Court directly and make application there for such permission. Since the very provision made in the Constitution had been changed in the Constitution of 1962, therefore, it was held that it was not a good case for condonation of delay. Nobody can plead ignorance of the provisions of Constitution or any other codified law, because after such law is notified in the Official Gazette, it is presumed that every person living in the country has come to know of it. But so far as the case-law is concerned, knowledge can be imputed only to those who are party to it and not to others. So, the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
3. However, there is force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Section 14(2) applies where a party has prosecuted the proceedings in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to entertain the same. It cannot be said that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Intra-Court Appeal, nor for this reason the Intra Court Appeal was withdrawn on 8-3- 1986 after a long period of four years. The said appeal was withdrawn as the Labour Court had started entertaining the grievance petitions in such cases. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to successfully meet the point raised by the learned counsel for the respondent.
4. The next point argued by the learned counsel for the respondent is that where a trial Court has exercised discretion by allowing or refusing to allow condonation of delay, such a discretion cannot be interfered with. Reliance has been placed upon. 1981 SCM R 239. The ruling is not helpful, inasmuch as the appeal brought to the Supreme Court was against an order passed by the High Court in a writ petition. Where discretion has been exercised rightly or wrongly the same cannot be challenged in a writ petition, which is a right given by the Constitution. But the appellate Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the discretion to allow or refuse to allow condonation of delay was properly exercised or not. So, the Appellate Court is not debarred from disagreeing with the order of the trial Court. Needless to say that where a party asks for the condonation of delay, the delay of each day is to be explained. Since section 14 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, no question of exclusion of time spent in pursuing the Intra-Court Appeal in the High Court arises and the appellants were bound to satisfy the learned lower Court explaining each day's delay. The mere fact that the Intra-Court Appeal was pursued for four long years cannot be a good ground for the condonation of delay. If the appellants wanted to bring the grievance petitions under section 25-A in the Labour Court, they could do so instead of going to the N.I.R.C.. Or at least after the order of the N.I.R.C. Had been set aside by the High Court in the writ petition. I, therefore, do not find any reasonable ground to interfere with the impugned decision of the learned lower Court.
5. As a result, all the four appeals are dismissed.