1. ' MUNAWAR ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).---This appeal has been filed by appellant Abdul Qayoom Soomro, the Excise and Taxation Inspector with prayer that the two orders one dated 31-7-1988 issued over the signature of the Secretary to Government of Sindh, Excise and Taxation Department and the other dated 21-3-1994 also issued from the same Department be set aside. The appellant's case is that while he was working as Assistant Traffic Manager (BPS-16) in the Sindh Road Transport Corporation, he, in wake of retrenchment in the said Corporation, was rendered surplus like some other employees including one Agha Rafiq Ahmed also a 16-Grade Officer. Instead of accommodating him in the equivalent Grade (BPS-16), he was absorbed in BPS-6 but on the other hand Agha Rafiq Ahmed, who like the appellant was also appointed in Grade-16 post, took his case upto the Supreme Court which in the judgment, dated 15th January, 1994 held that in view of rule 5- A(II) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974, hereinafter referred as the said rules, the said Agha Rafiq Ahmed could only be appointed in Grade-16 post.
2. Resting his case on the said judgment, the appellant served the Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department with prayer that he too be provided Grade-16 post. However by order dated 31st July, 1990 passed under section 24 of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 the appellant was accommodated in the Grade-8 post which was subsequently upgraded to Grade-11. Presently it is said to be in BPS-14.
3. Unsatisfied with said order, he preferred Departmental appeal which was allegedly rejected by the order dated 21-3-1994. It is the latter order which has been targeted in the present appeal filed on 20-4-1994.
4. ' We heard the arguments of Mr. Nishat Warsi for the appellant and of Mr. Abdul Latif Ansari, AA.-G.
5. On behalf of the official respondents. With the assistance of the said learned counsel, we also perused the relevant record.
6. ' Before we go into the merits of the case, we would like to dispose the learned AA.-G.'s objection with regard to limitation. His contention was that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred.
7. According to the cause of action accrued to the appellant as far back as 1977 when he was absorbed in the post of clerk (BPS-6). The learned AA.-G. Submitted that instead of questioning his absorption in such a lower post, he silently accepted the said appointment and the so-called impugned order dated 31-7-1990 was intended only to by the appellant seniority in the cadre of Excise Sub-Inspectors, not even remotely hinting about his absorption and as such he was of the opinion that the said order could not be treated as original order, for the purpose of enabling the appellant for starting the present litigation. It was true that as soon as the appellant was declared surplus in the Sindh Road Transport Corporation he was first obsorbed as Senior Clerk (BPS-6) in the Excise and Taxation Department, but it was vehemently denied by his learned counsel that he quietly accepted that appointment. According to him he went on making representations for his absorption in higher post. In support of his assertion he invites our attention to his so-called appeal made to the Chief Minister on 30-1-1994. The perusal of this appeal should at least remove the impression strongly advanced by the learned AA.-G. That the appellant did not agitate against his absorption in the lower post of senior clerk (BPS-6) but rather silently accepted the said appointment. In any case his efforts led to the passing of the impugned order dated 31-7-1990 which obviously changed his absorption from the post of senior clerk (BPS-6) to that of Excise Sub- Inspector (NPS-11) with effect from 1st April, 1980. We are unable to agree with the learned AA.-G.
8. That the said order was only aimed at giving the appellant seniority in the cadre of Excise Sub- Inspectors. If we accept the impugned order on the starting point for the present case, the appellant was supposed to file departmental appeal within 30 days of the said order. But the review petition allegedly filed against the said order did not bear any date nor did it make a mention of the order against which it was directed. Consequently the error of rejection of the review petition did not make sure if it was the order covering the review petition in question. Since no other department appeal or review petition was shown to us to be covered by the order of rejection, we cannot but believe that the said order referred to the review petition the appellant had claimed to file. Accordingly the present appeal which has been filed within 30 days of the aforesaid rejection order was within time, and the learned AA.-G's. Objection with regard to limitation could not hold ground.
9. ' Coming to the merits of the case, the appellant's case was undoubtedly indentical to the case of Agha Rafiq Ahmed. Both of them were holding the posts of 16-Grade when they were declared surplus. Again both were absorbed in the lower posts of Grade-6. Although Agha Rafiq Ahmed showed usual vigilance in pursuing his case until he succeeded in Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 15-1-1994, yet the appellant took it easy so much so that his slow movement created the impression of his acceptance of the lower post without any objection. Had he not got the fresh cause of action with passing of the impugned order, his case would have been closed on the point of limitation. Now the question arose if the appellant was entitled to the relief prayed for by him at this belated stage after nearly two decades are about to be completed since his retrenchment for the Sindh Road Transport Corporation. The learned AA.-G. Tried to distinguish the appellant's case from that of Agha Rafiq Ahmed. In this regard plea taken in para. 2 of the written statement filed by the learned AA.-G. On behalf of the official respondents, is pertinent and may be reproduced with advantage. It reads as under:- "That the contents of para. 2 of the case of appeal has no concern with the appeal of the appellant on the sole ground that neither appellant was a party to the said proceedings in Supreme Court nor appellant challenged his absorption in lower grade at the relevant time as did Mr. Agha Rafiq Ahmed and case of the appellant cannot be treated at par with Agha Rafiq Ahmed and neither he can be granted relief in view of Agha Rafiq's case as alleged in the para under reply hence denied.".
10. ' It would appear that the learned AA.-G. At least did not controvert that the factual background of the appellant's case was identical to that of Agha Rafiq Ahmed inasmuch as that both of them held in grade posts in the defunct Corporation and were in view of rule 8-A(ii) of the said rules entitled to be absorbed in the prevalent posts in the first instance and in case such posts were not immediately available then in the posts of lower grade. Although the appellant was not party to the judgment of the. Supreme Court delivered in Agha Rafiq Ahmed's case, yet he was certainly entitled to the benefit of that judgment. Because the judgment of the Supreme Court was a law binding on all concerned in the identical cases. However, the judgments of lower Courts (other than High Court and Supreme Court) do not enjoy such authority, as they bind only the parties in whose cases they are delivered.
11. ' As regards the learned AA.-G's. Next objection that unlike Agha Rafiq Ahmed, the appellant did not object to his absorption in lower post but rather quietly accepted such absorption, it was pointed earlier that he too did not let his absorption in lower grade lie down though his protest was not so louder and speedier as that of Agha Rafiq Ahmed. The impugned order which was passed after 15 years of appellant's being declared surplus was proof enough to indicate that it was the result of the appellant's constant efforts for the change of his absorption from lower grade post to that of higher grade.
12. ' In view of above discussion we are of the view that the Supreme Court authority given in the case of Agha Rafiq Ahmed was fully applicable in the appellant's case. But we are told that the post presently held by the appellant was of Grade-14. This shows that he was still to be moved two steps upwards. As a result we allow the appeal with no order as to costs directing that if 16-Grade post was vacant and available he would have to be absorbed in that post with immediate effect but in case no such post was available he would have to be recommended in the next vacancy in 18- Grade post subject to the condition that he was otherwise eligible for appointment in that post. In other words he possessed the prescribed qualifications for the appointment in such posts.