1. This is an appeal preferred against an order of the Junior Labour Court II, Lyallpur dated 23-7-1973.
2. By which order of retirement of the respondent was found illegal and in consequence he was re- instated.
3. I have heard the learned counsel of the appellant and representative of the Union at length. I have perused the record thoroughly and gone through the order of Junior Labour Court II, Lyallpur.
4. Brief facts of the case are that respondent was appointed as a Van Man in the appellant concern with effect from 15-2-1950. Respondent attained the age of 55 years in February 1.973 and the appellant, vide their letter dated 15 2-1.975 intimated him that he would stand retired from service with effect from 1-4-1973. Respondent filed a petition on 30-4-1973, under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Junior Labour Court-II, Lyallpur which has been accepted.
5. Appellant has assailed through this appeal that order of Junior Labour Court on the following grounds:-
(1) That under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 an individual can only agitate for the enforcement of any rights guaranteed or secured to an individual by or under any law. And as age of retirement is not secured to the respondent under any law, on award or settlement, petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 is not maintainable,
(2) That rules regarding the retirement of the employees were framed by the Management in 1954 and at that tierce there was no Collective Bargaining Agent and therefore the findings of the Junior Labour Court that tale C.B A. Was not consulted at the the of enforcement of these rules of the Management is not. Sustainable. And there was no C.B.A., Management was well within their rights to frame the rules regarding retirement etc. And signatures of the employees were secured on these rules which tentamounts to the acceptance of those rules.
6. On the other hand respondent's representative has urged that no doubt there was no Collective Bargaining Agent in 1954 and there was no provision in law to that effect, the union of the employees of this industry did exist at that the. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders 1946 le. XX of 1946) was inforce in 1954. Under that Act it was required that if Management wanted to modify the terms and conditions of employment of any category of workers they had to take into confidence the union concerned and had to exhibit that notification and get it certified from the Government. In the instant case provisions of above Act were not complied with and mere getting signatures of the employees as is done in this case on RAI is not enough. This does not amount to agreement and acknowledgment of the employees. This should have been in the form of Exh. RD I e. There should have been a e certificate, signed by the employee to the effect that I have gone through the additional conditions to my appointment letter and I understand the same, and hereby signify my acceptance thereto.
7. The learned counsel of the appellant fully agreed to the fact that in appointment letter of the respondent there was no condition as to when he is to retire. He further agreed that these terms and conditions, modified in 1954 regarding employees of the company were not legal as no provision of Act XX of 1946 were complied with and acknowledgment of the respon--dent by getting signatures on RAI were not according to the law. But he urges that as the illegal conditions were imposed o7 the employees in 1954 and after that some of the employees have retired peacefully according to these terms and conditions. This amounts to acceptance by the employees. Secondly cause of action to the employees arose when these conditions were imposed. Cause of action to the respondent also arose in 1954 and he should have agitated at that the. He kept quiet since then, thorefore, he is estopped to agitate this matter at this stage. To remain silent throughout amounts to acceptance of these terms and conditions. Plea of the learned representative of the respondent is that cause of action arose to the respondent from the date of his retirement and he was not bound to agitate against an at, of the appellant company which was ipso facto null and void and inoperative against the rights of the petitioner. I fully agree with the contention of the respondent and for the reason see no basis to interfere with the order of Junior Labour Court. So I uphold it and dismiss the appeal.