1. ' Abdul Hannan Pasha along with his sisters, Mst. Razia Begum, Mst. Tahira and Mst. Zubeda Begum inherited the disputed property from their mother, Mst. Shamsunnisa Begum, who expired on 19-9- 1975. At the time the tenant-hold involved here was in the tenancy of the appellant No,1, Bank.
2. Admittedly, on 19-1-1976, upon demise of the landlady notice under section 13-A of the then Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was addressed to the tenant. At such time, however, according to the appellants advance rent up to 31-10-1977 already stood paid. Subsequently, it would appear that the tenant started depositing monthly rents in the name of the deceased ladlandy only and such transpired through M.R.C. No,2347 of 1982. Because these deposits were claimed to be invalid at law respondent, Abdul Hannan Pasha, filed Rent Case No,511 of 1983 for eviction on the ground of default on 7-12-1985. The rent case was dismissed by the Controller because, in his view, the default in payment was only technical. F.R.A. No,43 of 1986, filed by Abdul Hannan Pasha, failed on 15-12-1988 and so did his C.P.S.LA. No,83-K of 1989 on 9-1-1990. It was on 23-8-1990 that respondent, Abdul Hannan Pasha, filed the instant rent proceedings, this time on the ground of default as well as bona fide personal requirement. This matter was registered as Rent Case No, 185/90 on 8-8-1991, the Controller passed an order, under section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, directing tentative deposit of rent by recalling the relevant deposited moneys from the referred M.R.C., adjusting the same towards past arrears and directing accruing deposits from month to month. In course of time the matter was heard on merits. The ground of default failed but on the ground of personal requirement respondent, Abdul Hannan Pasha, succeeded. The Bank has appealed.
3. ' Mr. Inamul Haq for the appellants, has urged that the deposits of rents in M.R.C. No,2347 of 1982 stand condoned in the previous round of litigation and the issue cannot be reopened. He has also urged that the default on the part of the tenant-bank, if any, is only technical. On evidence it is not denied that due notice, as to devolution of ownership under section 13-A of the then Sindh Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, was served and yet deposit was made not in the name of the successor landlords but in the name of the deceased landlady. It could be an accidental or unintentional position and was rightly condoned in the previous rent proceedings. However, the condonation could have lasted only till the decision of the previous rent case or, if we take a more indulgent view, while F.RA in relation to the old case was pending or, at best, till such time the Supreme Court matter was decided. All the ended on 9-1-1990. There was no further scope for complacence on the part of the tenant-Bank. It ought to have corrected the wrong course charted by it at the outset by depositing rents in a wrong name with full knowledge of the new title-holders.
4. It is not denied that the names of the successors of the deceased landlady were all the time known to the tenant. In fact they are part of the record. The respondent, manifestly, waited between 9-1- 1990 and 23-8-1990, showing all possible grace to the tenant-Bank to make proper tenders or payments. The bank failed yet again. It was then that Rent Case No,185 of 1990 was filed. Learned counsel for the two appellants has urged that the bank is rendering public service. It is a tenant of the premises since 1972, which has generated public convenience. The error, if any, is totally unintentional. It is because of frequent changes of personnel in the bank that the state of affairs has come about. Such circumstances, according to him, can be favourably considered on the authority of Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Aslam 1987 CLC 686. There is little doubt that the bank here will have to suffer on account of the inapt conduct of its officers. However, in this country, we have been for a long time prone to take indulgent view of matters and it is this, which has brought the society to its present pass. Everyone whoever he is and wherever he is must recognize his duties, obligations and responsibility and discharge them in a proper and befitting manner.
5. Condonation, if occasioned, has to be merited and is not to be resorted to in routine or in blatant disregard of other people's rights. This distinguishes Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Aslam ibid. As already observed, there was ample time and opportunity to correct the error even if it was accidental or unintentional. Courts cannot keep condoning defaults indefinitely. There is a time and place for and there has to be an end to everything. I think the circumstance of the case do not warrant any further indulgence. In the result, order of the learned Controller, refusing ejectment on the ground of default is reversed inasmuch as eviction is ordered on that ground as well.
6. Taking up now the question of personal need, of that all that need be stated is that the respondent is a co-owner of the property. He is the only brother in the family of co-owners. He is a practising Advocate, having more than 10 years standing at the bar. He has no office of his own and, for obvious reasons, requires to be accommodated. In answer, Mr. Inamul Haq has urged that there are also other tenements in the property of which some are in the possession of the owners and others are rented out. On my query, respondent, Abdul Hannan Pasha, has stated that there is no portion of the property abutting the main road, which is in possession of the owners. All tenement at the frontage have been let out and the best, according to him, is in occupancy of the appellant No,1 tenant. No element of mala fides is shown. In such circumstances, eviction on the ground of personal requirement is upheld.
7. ' In the result, the tenant's appeal namely, F.RA. No,123 of 1992 fails but the corresponding appeal of the landlord, regarding default, viz. F.RA. No,205 of 1992 succeeds, though I have reservations about the necessity of filing of the last-mentioned appeal, having expressed a duly considered opinion on the point in another case.
8. ' The tenant would have another three months' time to vacate, provided always that it continues to deposit the rents as ordered by the Controller and upon expiry of such period or default in payment would be whichever is earlier, writ of possession would he issued at the instance of the landlord, without further notice to the tenant and simultaneously police aid and other assistance would be provided to effect execution.