' RIAZ HUSSAIN, J.---This is defendants' regular first appeal against the judgment and decree of learned Civil Judge, Multan dated 3-11-1984 decreeing the respondents' suit for specific performance in respect of sale agreement dated 18-7-1974.
2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that the respondents filed a suit for specific performance against the appellants wherein it was alleged that Ghulam Sarwar predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had agreed to sell the suit property to the respondents for a consideration of Rs,2,25,000 and an agreement of sale was executed on 18-7-1974. An amount of Rs,75,000 was received by Ghulam Sarwar as an earnest money. The balance of the price amounting to Rs,1,50,000 was to be paid at the time of execution of the proper sale-deed. However, Ghulam Sarwar died about 9 months after the execution of the agreement. It was further averred that the notices were sent to the appellants on .18-11-1975 whereby they were asked to appear before the Sub-Registrar on 15-11-1975 to transfer the suit property in their name and receive the balance of amount. The appellants appeared before the Sub-Registrar on the aforesaid date but none of the respondents entered the appearance.
3. The appellants filed written statement wherein they denied the averments of the plaint and pleaded that the agreement of sale relied by the respondents was a forged document. They also denied that they accepted the advance payment of Rs,75,000. On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:--
(1) Whether Ghulam Sarwar entered into an agreement on 18-7-1974 to sell the suit land to the plaintiffs for Rs,2,25,000? (OPD)
(2) If issue No,1 is found in the affirmative, whether Ghulam Sarwar received Rs,75,000 from the plaintiffs as earnest money ? (OPP)
(3) Whether the agreement in dispute is based upon fraud ? (OPD)
(4) Whether description of the suit land is incorrect ? (OPD)
(5) Whether the agreement in dispute is unconscionable, if so, its effect? (OPD)
(6) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to perform their part of contract of the agreement in dispute?
(OPP)
(7) Whether defendants are entitled to special costs? (OPD)
(8) Relief.
4. In support of their case respondents examined Asghar Ali Shah, NaibTehsildar, P.W.1, Imam Din, petition-writer P.W.2, Qadir Bakhsh, P.W.3, Channan Khan P.W.4, Azadar, Clerk of Kanwar Akhtar Ali, Advocate, P.W.5, Muhammad Akram Postal Clerk, P.W.6, Abdur Razzaq, Postman, P.W.7, Khadim Hussain, Record-keeper, P.W.8, Niaz Muhammad P.W.9, Hassan Baksh, one of the plaintiff appeared as P.W.10. Documents Exhs.P.1 to P.9 were also produced by the plaintiffs.
5. The evidence of the appellants comprises of the statement of Mr. Ihsan Ali, Advocate, D.W 1.
Dilawar Malik D.W.2, Mr. Sultan Ali, Advocate, D.W 3, Akhtar All D.W.4, Abdul Majeed D.W.5, Muhammad Akram D.W.6, Munawar Ahmed D.W.7 and one of the appellant Abdul Hameed appeared as D.W.8. The documents Exhs.D 1 to D 7 were also produced by the appellants. The suit was, however, decreed by the trial Court in favour of the respondents on 3-11-1984.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that Ghulam Sarwar never agreed to sell the suit property and purported agreement of sale Exh. Dl was a fabricated document which was prepared by Imam Din P.W.2 at the instance of the appellants. It was he who went to Mr. Ihsan Ali, Advocate, D.W.1, to get it attested deceitfully but Mr. Ihsan All refused to do so as he was not legally authorised to attest the same. It was further contended that the alleged signature of Ghulam Sarwar on the document Exh.D1 was quite different from the Kabeen Nama Exh.D4. It was also argued that Imam Din was involved in many criminal cases of fabricating the documents and was convicted in a case for the offence under section 468, P.P.C. On 19-12-1983 by the learned Magistrate Section 30, Multan, and, therefore, no implicit reliance could be placed upon him.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, defended the impugned judgment of the learned trial Court and submitted that the respondents successfully proved the execution of the document Exh.P2.
8. Imam Din P.W.2, scribe of the document, Exh.P2, appeared in the witness-box alongwith the relevant register and stated that said document was scribed by him and that the marginal witnesses Qadir Bakhsh P.W.3 and Chanan Khan P.W.4 signed the same document. He further deposed that the appellants received an amount of Rs,75,000 as advance from the respondents in his presence. The attesting witnesses Qadir Bakhsh and Chanan Khan were examined by the respondents who fully supported their case. It was not suggested to Imam Din that he had fabricated the agreement of sale. It is correct that he was convicted on 19-12-1983 by a learned Magistrate Section 30, Multan, but he challenged this conviction and sentence by filing a revision petition in the Lahore High Court. His sentence was suspended and he was admitted to bail. It was pertinent to note that aforesaid Qadir Bakhsh had been the personal servant of Ghulam Sarwar for a very long period. There was nothing on record to suggest that they had any ill-will either with Ghulam Sarwar or with the appellants. Kabeen Nama Exh.D4 was not helpful to the appellants because it was not an admitted document. Therefore, the question of comparison of his signatures on the said documents did not arise under these circumstances. There was no explanation worth its name of the file as to why Ghulam Sarwar opted to sign in English when he had already affixed his signature in Urdu on Kabeen Nama. admittedly the respondents also sent the notice Exhs.P3 and P4 to the defendants calling upon the appellants to perform their part of contract.
9. We are of the opinion that the respondents succeeded in proving the execution of the document by producing the best evidence. Reference can be made to Mst. Razia Begum v. Muhammad Rafique (1986 SCM R 309), and Balawal and another v. Abdur Razzaq (1990 SCM R 1336). No documentary evidence was produced to prove that the value of the suit property was about 7 to 8 lacs. Even otherwise it was settled that mere inadequacy of consideration was no ground for refusing the specific performance of contract.
10. For the foregoing reasons we found no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.