1. ' This appeal has arisen out of the following facts.
2. ' Mst. Iqbal Begum used to live in Jacobabad in House No, 38/1, Ward No . VI. This property was evacuee. Sometime in 1952, appellant Baig Mohammad married Mst. Iqbal Begum. When settlement operations started Baig Mohammad, who is a local, filed LH form for the transfer of this house in his own name, but this was rejected. Subsequently, Mst. Iqbal Begum who is a non claimant displaced person, filed NCH form in her own name. This NCH form was also not granted.
3. But in appeal the form was restored and the property was ordered to be transferred for R s. 5,685 on evaluation basis. Part of the price of the house, was deposited by Mst. Iqbal Begum through various agreements of association. Consequently, on 19th November 1961, the P. T.
0. Of the house in dispute was issued in her favour.
4. ' Sometime later the relations between the spouses became estranged. Mst. Iqbal Begum wanted her husband appellant Baig Mohammad to vacate the house, but she was not successful in that.
5. Instead, she left the house.
6. ' Baig Mohammad being in possession of the property in dispute brought a suit for declaration and injunction, praying that he be declared the owner of the property and Mst. Iqbal Begum be restrained from claiming its ownership. His ground was that the price of the house had been paid by him and the transaction was benami in the name of Mst. Iqbal Begum. He also asserted that soon after his marriage with Mst. Iqbal Begum it was he who cleared the outstanding dues of the Custodian Department against the house in dispute. He further claimed that an amount of Rs, 5,000 was spent by him on the renovation and repairs of the house. The respondent, however, took an objection about the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the property in dispute was evacuee and section 25 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) placed a bar on suits regarding evacuee properties. The learned Civil Judge, Second Class. Who was seized of the suit at that stage, returned the plaint on the ground that Settlement Authorities were a necessary party to the dispute and, therefore, he had no jurisdiction to entertain it. An appeal under section 96, C. P. C. Was preferred, but later on it transpired that an appeal under that section did not lie. That memo. Was, however, treated as an appeal under Order XXXIII, C. P. C. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the Settlement Department was not the necessary party and, therefore, bar under section 25 of the Act did not operate. However, the learned District Judge proceeded further to decide the whole dispute on merits. He found it in favour of the appellant and decreed the suit. Such findings were challenged through a revision in the High Court, wherein it was held that the learned District Judge had acted beyond his jurisdiction when he considered the suit on merits because there was no decree passed by the lower Court and, therefore, an appeal under section 96, C. P. C. Was not before him. On these reasonings the finding of the learned District Judge regarding the merits of the case was set aside. However, the findings regarding the maintainability of the suit were affirmed. Result was that the suit was remanded back to the Civil Judge for trial.
7. ' The learned Civil Judge, came to the conclusion that the transaction was not benami in the name of Mst. Iqbal Begum, that it was she who had paid the price of the house through agreements of association, and that Baig Mohammad had not paid anything towards the price of the house. The learned Civil Judge, also found that in view of section 25 of the Act the suit was not maintainable because according to the facts brought on record the P. T. D. Had not been issued in favour of the respondent and, therefore, the property still vested in the Central Government. As such, the civil Courts had no jurisdiction. On these findings the suit was dismissed with costs. In appeal before the District Judge, Jacobabad, the findings of the trial Judge were confirmed.
8. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has fairly conceded that he has to mainly attack the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below. While conceding that in appeal under section 100, C.
9. P. C. The scope of interference by this Court would be limited to correct errors of legal nature and that findings of fact per se cannot be disturbed, he contended that this is a case of no evidence and, therefore, this Court has the jurisdiction to interfere. Unfortunately, the facts brought on record do not substantiate this contention of the learned counsel. Apart from Mst. Iqbal Begum herself she has examined two completely independent witnesses. Salimuddin is the Rent Inspector of the office of the Settlement Department, Jacobabad. He has spoken from record and he says that the NCH form was filed by Mst. Iqbal Begum, that P. T.
0. Was issued on 7th November 1951 in her favour, that it was she who had paid Rs, 4,928 out of the total price of Rs, 5,040 of the house in dispute to the department through three agreements of association. He has further stated that the records do not indicate if Baig Mohammad had ever made any payment in this connection. The next witness examined by Mst. Iqbal Begum was Nur Mohammad who prosecuted her case as an Advocate. He states that Mst. Iqbal Begum had brought Rs, 2,000 to him for arranging a compensation book for her and that he had returned the money to her and later on he was told by her that she had, of her own, arranged a ompensation book for the same. He states that Baig Mohammad never accompanied A Mst. Iqbal Begum whenever she came to him for the prosecution of the case in this behalf. In view of this clear evidence supporting the contention of Mst. Iqbal Begum it cannot be said that the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below are without any evidence. It is a case where there was enough material for the Courts below to arrive at the conclusions they did. The scope of the interference by the High Court in second appeal is very limited, where finding of fact is involved. In Abdul Majid v.
10. Khalil Ahmad (1) Federal Court held that even if the High Court did not agree with the appreciation of facts by the Courts below it did not warrant interference and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on erroneous findings of fact. This view has been further endorsed in Karamat Ali v. Mohammad Younus (2). The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Ghulam Fatima v. Mohammad Bashir (3), All Akbar v. Mohammad Razzak (4), Friends Cloth Store v. Amtul Aziz (5), Nazar Mohammad v. Shahzada Begum (6). The law laid down in the cases cited is that Court of first appeal would be entitled to review even where there is a misreading or misinterpretation of the evidence or where findings arrived at are in utter disregard of evidence.
11. Nothing of that sort has been brought out in this case. On the other hand, in view of the clear dicta of the Supreme Court and the Federal Court cited earlier there seems to be no reason to interfere with this finding of fact which is cogently based on the evidence brought on record. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1955 FC 38 (2) PLD 1963 SC 191
(3) PLD 1958 Lah. 596 (4) PLD 1959 Lah. 787
(5) PLD 1971 Kar. 739 (6) PLD 1974 SC 22 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' The learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the conclusion drawn by the Courts below that Mst. Iqbal Begum paid the price of the house is belied by the fact that she was a woman without any means. In this regard emphasis is laid upon the statement of Baig Mohammad that when he married her she was indebted to the extent of a thousand rupees and it was he who paid part of that loan and that it was he who carried out the repairs of the house. But on the other hand there is the statement of Mst. Iqbal Begum who says she used to keep buffalloes and used to maintain herself on the income of the milk she sold. In any case in the context of these words against words about the means of Mst. Iqbal Begum one has to give credence to independent statement of Nur Mohammad, her previous Advocate that she brought to him an amount of Rs, 2,000 for the purchase of compensation book. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it would be presumed that the amount was arranged by her through her own means.
12. ' The second contention of the learned counsel is that the bar contained in section 25 of the Act does not operate against him. His argument is that because the transaction is benami and because this matter does not fall under the Act, and the Central Government or any officer appointed under the Act is not empowered to determine such a matter, therefore, the civil Courts would have jurisdiction. But the contention that the transaction is benami not having been accepted, this argument would not be available to the learned counsel.
13. ' In view of the above discussion I find no merit in the appeal and dismiss it with costs.