' Petitioner in this petition under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, seeks quashment of F.I.R.
No,45, dated 25-4-1994, got registered by Zaheer Ahmad Qureshi complainant at Police Station Kohsaar, Islamabad, under sections 420, 468, 471 and 406, P.P.C.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the F.I.R. In this case has been registered mala fide for purposes of harassm ent of the petitioner who is a tenant of the first informant/complainant. The dispute is of a civil nature. Civil proceedings in this regard are already pending between the parties before the Civil Court at Islamabad, and since the subject-matter of the F.I.R. Is the same dispute which is pending in the Civil Court, this F.1.R. Has been lodged with mala fide intention in order to pressurise the petitioner. The criminal proceedings initiated through the F.I.R. Do not contain any definite accusation of criminal nature and the F.I.R. Should be quashed as being abuse of the process of Court. He has also presented the following cases: Ghulam Ali v.
Javid 1989 P Cr. L J 507, Mirajuddin v. State 1989 P Cr. L J R 441(2) and Taj Muhammad v. State 1989 P Cr. L J 1833 in support of his contention that when the dispute is of a civil nature and proceedings are already pending in a Civil Court in respect of the dispute, the criminal proceedings should either be stayed till the disposal of the civil proceedings or if the criminal proceedings are found to be mala fide and intended to pressurise and harass the petitioner, these should be quashed.
' Learned counsel for the State assisted by counsel for the complainant in F.I.R. No,45 of 1994 has vehemently opposed this petition. He submits that admittedly there is a suit pending before the Civil Court at Islamabad. This suit is for possession of property rented out to the present petitioner by the complainant in F.I.R. No,45 of 1994. However, he contends that the F.I.R. Does not pertain strictly to the said dispute. It pertains to presentation of certain cheques of the petitioner which were not honoured by the bank and also allegation to the effect that the petitioner had unauthorisedly handed over to a stranger the possession of the property entrusted to him by the complainant. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments: Haq Nawaz v.
Muhammad Afzal PLD 1967 SC 354, Abdul Karim v. Abdul Qayyum 1972 P Cr. L J 1182 and Tahir-ul- Islam v. State 1984 P Cr. L 274 in support of his contention that mere simultaneous pendency of civil suit is no bar to initiation or progress of criminal proceedings.
3. The Station House Officer, Police Station Kohsaar, is also present. He has stated that the petitioner has obtained bail before arrest and has not fully co-operated in the investigation of this case, therefore, incomplete challan has been submitted.
4. The principle has been laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in case cited at Mirza Naseem Baig v. Muhammad Iqbal 1981 SC MR 315, that the Court should examine the F.I.R. To see as to whether it makes out an offence and in doing this exercise it should not be influenced by the extraneous material which is not germane to the issue.
5. On perusal of the F.I.R., I find that it has been registered under sections 420/468 and 471/406, P.P.C. The allegations against the petitioner, inter alia, are that he has issued certain cheques which have been dishonoured on presentation. Furthermore, there is an allegation to the effect that the petitioner has wrongfully put a stranger in possession of property which was entrusted to him by the complainant. The present F.I.R. Prima facie discloses a case against the petitioner, therefore, the prosecution cannot be stifled by quashment simply on the basis that civil proceedings between the parties are also pending. There is no bar in law to the simultaneous initiation or progress of civil and criminal proceedings.
6. I refrain from expressing any opinion on allegations contained in the F.I.R. So as not to prejudice the trial Court regarding respective contentions of the parties. The petitioner shall appear before the trial Court and if in the course of evidence recorded during the proceedings it transpires that the matter raises a question of civil liability simpliciter and the proceedings before the criminal Court are abuse of the process of Court, the petitioner shall be at liberty to approach the trial Court afresh for the quashment of the proceedings under section 249-A, Cr.P.C.
7. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this petition, which is hereby dismissed.