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K.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 488

(Mst.) MARYAM vs DISTRICT Magistrate/CONTROLLING AUTHORITY,

CitationK.L.R. 1997 Civil Cases 488
CourtLahore High Court
Judge(s)Khalid Paul Khawaja
ResultN/A

JUDGMENT KHALID PAUL KHAWAJA, J. - The relevant facts which gave rise to the present writ petition are that Mst. Maryam petitioner and Muhammad Iqbal respondent No. 3, hereinafter called the respondent, were living as spouses, when he statedly pronounced 'Talaq' on her and sent a notice of 'Talaq' dated 10.4.1995 to the Chairman, Arbitration Council, Union Council ultra Sandela District Muzaffargarh, respondent No. 2 herein informing him that he has divorced his wife. After receiving the said notice the Chairman called the parties, constituted an Arbitration Council, recorded their statements and on 20.7.1990 issued a certificate (copy Annexure-A) declaring 'Talaq' to have become effective. On 15.4.1991 the respondent filed a revision petition before the District Magistrate Muzaffargarh, respondent No. 1 herein, against the afore-mentioned order dated 20.7.1990 alleging that he had neither divorced his wife nor had he sent any notice either to the petitioner or the Chairman. The said revision petition was resisted by the petitioner. The learned District Magistrate however, vide order dated 9.12.1991 (annexure-X) allowed the revision petition and set aside the order/certificate dated 20.7.1990 holding that the respondent had never divorced the petitioner and had also not sent any notice to the Chairman for the issuance of a certificate to declare the said divorce effective.

2. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner has through the instant writ petition invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this court to get a declaration to the effect that the impugned order of the learned District ^Magistrate dated 9.12.1991 was illegal, void, without lawful authority and of .10 legal effect.

3. Muhammad Iqbal respondent contested the writ petition and has filed formal reply to it which forms part of the record.

4. I have heard the parties' learned counsel and have also gone through the material available on record.

5. The main, other the only contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that under the law the District Magistrate had no revisional jurisdiction in exercise of which he could set aside or interfere with the order of a Chairman whereby a 'Talaq' is certified to have become effective.

Perusal of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 shows that notice of 'Talaq' is sent to the Chairman and the wife under section 7(2) of the Ordinance, an Arbitration Council is constituted for bringing about a reconciliation between the parties under sub-section 4 and 'Talaq' is certified to be effect by the Chairman under sub-section (3) of the Ordinance after the expiry of 90 days if there is no reconciliation. Nowhere it is declared in the Ordinance that any order made by the Chairman under section 7 is revisable. Revision is a creation of statute and therefore it can neither be presumed nor inferred. It the statute specifically and expressly declares an order, decision or judgment amenable to revision the same would be revisable and pot otherwise. The only revisable orders/decisions in the Ordinance are those which are made under sub-section 4 of the section 6 and sub-section 2 of the section 9 of the Ordinance The fernier relates to the decision .Of an Arbitration, Council with regard to the grant or refusal of permission, to contract another marriage While the latter relates to a certificate by the Arbitration Council specifying the amount which is to be paid as maintenance by the husband tot he wife. It is thus clear that against the issuance of a certificate declaring a 'Talaq' to- have become effective, remedy of revision is not provided under the law. In this view of the matter the learned District Magistrate had no power or jurisdiction to entertain and decide the respondent's revision petition and make the impugned order. Learned counsel for the respondent did not find himself in a position to controvert this very simple legal proposition. I, therefore, allow this writ petition and declare the impugned order dated 9.10.1991 passed by respondent No. 1 to be illegal, without lawful authority and of ne legal effect. Consequently, the same is set aside with no order as to costs.

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