MUHAMMAD NASEEM CHAUDHRI, J.- Evidence through mutation No. 1903 sanctioned on 7-5-1991 the respondents-defendants ; purchased the disputed property comprising an area of 20 kanals of land fully | described in the plaint from Khalil Ahmad vendor. Claiming to be in acquisition of better right of pre-emption being the co-owner, Banna Sharik, water course Sharik and asserting that the respondents were the strangers thereof, Mst. Aisha Petitioner/plaintiff instituted her suit on 13-7-1991 to pre-empt the aforesaid sale. She contended that statutory notice was not, issued against her.
She averred that the moment she came to know about the sale under pre-emption her husband Muhammad Bakhsh as her representative proclaimed that the would exercise her right of pre- emption. She maintained that thereafter she offered the amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- in the presence of two truthful witnesses to the vendors and sent the notice through registered post to fulfil talb-e- ishhad. She asserted that her right was not admitted by the respondents and she could exercise talb-e-khusumat through the bringing of the suit. She further maintained that the sale price of Rs.
2,00,000/- as mentioned in the mutation was false and fictitious and that an amount of Rs.
1,50,000/- was find and paid which was also the market value of the suit land.
2. The suit was resisted by the respondents-defendants who contended in the written statement that the same was barred by time and that that was instituted for the benefit of Khalil Ahmad vendor. They contended that the conditions of talbs were not fulfilled by Mst. Aisha Petitioner/plaintiff. They maintained that the pre-emptor had no superior pre-emptive right who was estopped by her own words and conduct from filing the suit. They asserted that they paid an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- as the sale price to the vendor which was also its market value.
3. According to the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed for determination by the learned trial Court:-
(1) Whether the suit is time barred? OPD.
(2) Whether the suit has been instituted for the benefit of Khalil Ahmed vendor/seller? OPD
(3) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own words and conduct from filing the suit? OPD
(4) Whether requirements of talbs were fulfilled? OPD
(5) Whether suit is false and frivolous and the defendants are entitled to special costs? OPD
(6) Whether plaintiff has a superior right of pre-emption qua the vendee-defendant? OPP
(7) Whether ostensible sale price of Rs. 2,00,000/- was find in good faith or was actually paid by the vendee to the vendor? OPP.
(8) If the preceding issue is not proved then what was the market value of the suit land at the time of sale? OP Parties.
(9) Relief.
'4. The parties produced their evidence. Muhammad Bakhsh, husband of Mst. Aisha petitioner, appeared .As PW-1 on 9-4-1994 and produced special power of attorney, Ex. P-1, which according to him was executed 3-4 months earlier. He stated that he made talb-e-muwathibat on behalf of his wife Mst. Aisha pre-emptor who also deposed about talb-i- ishhad. He stated about her superior pre-emptive right. Allah Bakhsh PW-2 and Nazir Ahmad PW-3 stated about the alleged fact of talb-i-ishhad. The pre-emptor produced in evidence a copy of notice Ex. P-2 said to have been sent to the respondents-defendants about the despatch of notice pertaining to talb-i-ishhad. Ex. P-3 is the copy of Jamanbandi while Ex. P-4 is the copy of mutation No. 1903 attested on 7-5-1991.
Muhammad Bakhsh husband of. Mst. Aisha also appeared as PW-4 in rebuttal under order XVIH rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In rebuttal the respondents-defendants produced Khalil Ahmad Dw-1, Muhammad Ramazan DW-2 and Rahim Bakhsh defendant DW-3.
5. After hearing the parties, the learned trial Court held that Mst. Aisha herself did not exercise talb- i-muwathibat as she made the said demand through her husband which had no legal Effect.
About talb-i-ishhad it was held that the A/D Receipt was not produced in evidence and it was also held that this fact was also not established. Issue No. 4 in the matter was decided against the pre- emptor. Issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 were disposed of against the respondents-defendants. Issue No. 6 about the superior preemptive right of the petitioner was decided in her favour on the basis of copy of Jamabandi Ex. P-3. The sale price of Rs. 2,00,000/- was determined by the learned trial Court with respect to the transaction under pre-emption. Consequently the suit was dismissed. The appeal was also find which also met the same fate with the reasoning that Muhammad Bakhsh husband of Mst. Aisha was not competent to make talb-i-muwathibat and that even talb- i- ishhad had not been proved due to the fact that notice Ex. P-2 about talb-i- ishhad had not been proved. Now the petitioner has find this revision petition before this Court.
6. I have heard the preliminary arguments addressed by the learned counsel for Mst. Aisha petitioner who mainly canvassed that Muhammad Bakhsh being her husband was her representative and in an Islamic State it could not be expected that she would jump upon with respect to the making of talb-i-muwathibat and thus her husband could fulfill the said condition/talab. According to him Mst. Aisha was a Pardan Nashin lady and it could not be expected that she would make the talb-i-muwathibat in the Majlis. He added that in view of the production of Ex. P-2, talb-i-ishhad stands established. He maintained that the dispute has not been disposed of by the learned lower Courts in its true perspective. I do not agree with him. The admitted position is that Muhammad^Bakhsh husband of Mst. Aisha pre-emptor as examined as PW-1 for the first time on 9-4-1994 who produced in evidence-special power of attorney Ex. P-f which according to him was got executed by his wife about for months before. It means that after the sanction of the mutation under pre-emption on 7-5-1991. Muhammad Bakhsh was not the special attorney of his wife Mst. Aisha. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the husband of a wife is her representative in every matter has failed to impress me. If .This contention is accepted, given the weight and affirmed then a husband would also, as a representative, be entitled to alienate the property of the wife which would lead the society to administrative chaos. Any person legally authorised in black and white can make liable the maker of the power of attorney. My view is that in a case of the instant nature where a right of pre- emption has to be acquired in future even the power of attorney cannot be executed by the wife in favour of the husband about fulfillment of talb-i-muwathibat. In any case Muhammad Bakhsh was not the attorney of Mst. Aisha at the time of the sanction of the mutation under pre-emption and at the time of the making of the aforesaid first talb. I have previously expressed the view in Mst. Salma and another versus Manzoor Hussain and. 2 others ('PLD 1996 Lahore 66) that talbs made by husband who was not the attorney has no legal weight. There is no law that at the time of making of talb-i-muwathibat as well as talb-i-ishhad a husband of a female prospective pre-emptor is entitled to proceed as her representative. In the eyes of law "person" includes' a male and a female.
No distinction has been made between male and female in the matter of exercise of right of pre- emption starting from talb-i- muwathibat to talb-i-khusumat even though the suit can be instituted by the Attorney of the pre-emptor for talb-i-khusumat (i.e. Institution of the relevant suit).
It shall not be out of place to express that in our country the women are demanding equal rights on merit and no distinction can be granted towards the enforcement of any statutory right. An analysis of the talb-i-muwathibat would make out that the said type of talb has not to be made in the presence of the vendee(s) or the strangers and that also outside the home of the prospective pre-emptor. Talb-i-muwathibat can be made by a male or a female pre-emptor. Talb-i- muwathibat, can be made by a male or a female pre-emptor at the place he or she is sitting alongwith some other person(s) commonly known as Majlis as. Expressed in the statutory law and the female being a Pardah Nashin lady cannot derive any legal benefit in case the said type of talb is not made by her personally. It is not necessary1 that the Majlis consists of strangers sitting out of the house. Majlis may be that of nears and dears inside the house. Admittedly Mst. Aisha has herself not made talb-i-muwathibat in any Majlis and it can safely be expressed that the next stage which was that of talb-i-ishhad could not be reached by her. Even otherwise the production of copy of notice Ex. P-2 said to have been sent to the respondents-defendants is not enough to establish about the fulfilment of the statutory requirements. Had the postal receipt been produced in this regard that would have been sufficient in view of section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as it would have been established that the envelop containing the Notice was handed over to the Postal Clerk and the presumption could be drawn that it reached its addressee. Due to the non- production of the postal receipt and postal record in the matter, it can safely be held that even the talb-i-ishhad has also not been proved. The only irresistible conclusion which can be drawn from the aforesaid state of affairs, analysis of evidence and discussion would be that Mst. Aisha did not make talb-i-muwathibat herself which is the admitted fact and thus the same has not been established by her so as to further look into talb-i-ishhad which even otherwise, as expressed above, has also not been established. In the circumstances I hold that the superior preemptive right of Mst. Aisha Petitioner/plaintiff stood extinguished due to the said negligence on her part who herself is responsible for the creation of the present situation and thus is not entitled to obtain the proposed relief. No irregularity has been committed by both the learned lower Courts and I hold that the impugned judgments and decrees are unexceptionable.
For what has been stated above, I see no merit in this revision petition and dismiss the same in limine.