1. ' This first rent appeal is directed against the order dated 30-3-1986 passed by the IIIrd Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi East, whereby the Eviction Application No,693 of 1985 filed by the respondent was allowed and the appellant was directed to hand over the vacant possession of the premises in question within sixty days from the date of the order.
2. ' The facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the respondent is the landlord of the Bungalow No,124/L, Block No,2, Tariq Road, P.E.C.H. Society, Karachi and the appellant is tenant in respect of one room above the garage at the monthly rental of Rs,100. The respondent filed eviction application on the ground of default for the period 1-9-1981 to January, 1982, amounting to Rs,5,000.
3. The appellant resisted the eviction application.
4. ' The respondent filed affidavit-in-evidence of his attorney Zikar-urRehman Siddiqui. The appellant filed his own affidavit. They were cross-examined by the respective counsel of the parties.
5. ' The learned Rent Controller after taking into consideration the evidence adduced by the parties and taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties allowed the eviction application vide order, dated 30-3-1986.
6. ' The appellant being aggrieved against the order, dated 30-3-1986 of the Bird Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi East, has preferred this First Rent Appeal on the ground disclosed in the memo. Of appeal.
7. ' The only point for consideration in this first appeal is whether the general power of attorney granted by the respondent to Zikar-ur-Rehman Siddiqui included a power to give evidence before the Controller.
8. ' The important words in the document with which I am concerned are those which authorised the agent to appear and act in all the Courts, revenue, civil, criminal, either in original, appellate or revisional side or in any other office with regard to the said Rent cases and to sign, verify, file plaints, petitions and also to present appeal in any Court regarding the said Rent cases. It is true that the powers of attorney have to be considered strictly. A Single Judge of Dacca High Court in the case of Abdul Wadud v. State PLD 1964 Dacca 543 held that the words "appearance" and "act" under Rule 1, Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, do not include "pleading", and a recognised agent, who is entitled to appear and act for a party, is not entitled to a right of audience. In the case of Messrs Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Sons Ltd. And others PLD 1969 Kar. 123, Mr. Noorul Arfin, J., held as follows:--- "Such an instrument is a written authorisation by which the principal appoints another person as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform specified acts on behalf of the principal.
9. The primary purpose of an instrument of this nature is to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agents deal. The rule is well-established that the power of attorney must be strictly construed and strictly pursued. A power of attorney is held to confer only those powers which are specified therein, and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the terms of this instrument, that is, the act done should be legally identical with what is authorised to be done by the instrument."
10. ' In the case of Gul Taj Begum v. Lal Hussain and another PLD 1980 SC (AJ&K) 60 the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir held as follows:--- "A power of attorney under Order III, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code should be construed strictly. It gives only such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication and it cannot empower beyond what it really conveys. One of the most important rules for the construction of power of attorney is that regard must be had to the recitals which, as showing the scope and object of the power, will control all general terms in the operative part of the instrument. Where authority is given to do a particular act followed or preceded by the general words, general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular act and general words in no way confer general powers but a limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for the purpose. It, therefore, follows that where special powers are followed by general words and vice versa, the general words are to be construed as limited to what is necessary for the proper exercise of the special powers. This view is also expressed in AIR 1947 Nag. 17 (Full Bench case) wherein at page 19 is observed:--- "The ordinary rule is that powers of attorney must be strictly construed as given only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication."
11. 'I am of the humble view that the power of attorney (Exh. A/2) does not confer any express powers on the attorney to file affidavit-in-evidence and to give evidence on behalf of the respondent nor such a power can be inferred from this power. Mr. Muhammad Saleh G. Memon, the learned counsel for the respondent has conceded that the power of attorney does not confer any express power on the attorney to give evidence. He submitted that the case be remanded to the Controller for disposal in accordance with law. By consent of the parties the Rent Case No,693 of 1985 is remanded to the IIIrd Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi East for disposal of the case on merits after affording opportunities to both the parties.
12. ' The respondent filed affidavit-in-evidence of the respondent himself and A.F. Obaidur Rehman attorney and supplied copies thereof to the learned counsel for the parties. The office is directed to send the original affidavit-in-evidence along with the R. & P. To the IIIrd Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Karachi East. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent and his witnesses will appear before the learned Rent Controller on 10-8-1986 and the learned counsel for the appellant stated at the Bar that he will cross-examine the witnesses on 30-8-1986. I further direct the learned Controller to decide the case on merits within two months from receipt of the R. & P.
13. ' The appeal is disposed of in the above terms but in the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs.