1. GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, C. J.-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is meant to call in question the two orders of respondent 2 (who as Commissioner, Peshawar Division is also the Controlling Authority of Municipal Committee, Peshawar) by which he rejected the highest bid of petitioner in regard to the lease of octroi collection for the period 5-9- 1975 to 30-6-1976 and instead granted to respondents 4 and 5 the said lease by private negotiations.
2. The facts of the case, which are not in dispute, are that Administrator, Municipal Committee, Peshawar held on 21-7-1975 a public auction with a view to inviting bids to lease out the right to collect octroi of Municipality and the highest bid of Rs. 96,09,000.00 of respondents 4 and 5 was accepted. In due course, the Administrator sent to Controlling Authority the highest bid of these respondents for confirmation under sub-rule (4) of rule 225 of the Rules framed under the Repealed West Pakistan Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 (which in view of subsection (2) of section 4 of N.-W. F. P. People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972 are agreed to be still applicable) and it was confirmed. However, respondents 4 and 5 did not show any inclination to abide their offer, and consequently the Municipality forfeited their deposit of Rs. 90,000.00. Faced with this situation, the Municipal Committee, held after a public notice, another auction on 30-8- 1975 in which the highest bid of petitioner of Rs. 85,05,000.00 was accepted and his case then submitted by it to Controlling Authority for confirmation. It thus happened, however, that before Controlling Authority could apply his mind to the case, respondent 5 (who is the brother and business partner of respon--dent 4) filed an application before Minister, Local Self-Government, N: W.F.P. Offering therein an additional amount of Rs. 3 lacs over and above the highest bid of petitioner and prayed that he should be given the lease right. On receipt of this application the Minister is said to have made inquiries from Deputy Secretary of his Department and in view of his comments, that under sections 62 and 63 of N: W. F. P. People's Local Government Ordinance, 1972 4hereinafter called Ordinance) read with rule 31 of West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called Rules) he would be competent to accept the offer of respondent 5, he on 1-9-1975 passed the following order:- "It will be in the public interest to give the contract of octroi to the applicant if in fact he is ready to pay Rs. Three lakhs in excess in relaxation of the Octroi Rules."
3. In pursuance of this order of the Minister, the Controlling Authority on 1-9-1975 directed the Administrator of Municipality to do the needful with the result that the lease of octroi collection was awarded to respondents 4 and 5. And in due course, i.e., on 2-9-1975, the highest bid of petitioner was rejected.
4. The grievance of petitioner is that the said action of respondents 1, 2 and 3 is in breach of rule 225 of Rules, is mala fide and procured to his detriment as a result of collusion between respondents 4 and 5 and the Provincial Government, and that he has been condemned unheard inasmuch as, in all fairness, the Minister for Local Self-Government should have, before rejecting his highest bid, at least inquired from him if he too would be willing to offer a higher bid than the bid of respondent 5.
5. Mr. M. Sardar Khan, the learned counsel for respondents 4 and 5 raised a preliminary objection to the competency of this petition, He argued that the acceptance of his bid alone by Administrator, Municipal Committee, Peshawar (without its confirmation by Controlling Authority) would cause no grievance to petitioner within the meaning of Article 99 of the Constitution and thus he would have no locus stand! To invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. In order to appreciate his contention, the relevant provisions of rule 225 of Rules had better be reproduced:-- "225.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, Municipal Committee may, with the prior approval of Government, lease out by public auction for a period not exceeding one year, the collection of octroi on such terms and conditions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter, as may be specified by Government.
(2) The acceptance of any bid at an auction conducted under the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall be subject to confirmation by the Controlling Authority.
(3) The Municipal Committee shall, within seven days of the date of auction, submit the bid accepted at the auction to the Controlling Authority for its confirmation.
(4) The Controlling Authority shall, within thirty days after the bid has been submitted to it by the Municipal Committee for confirmation, either confirm the bid or declare that it withholds its confirmation to the bid, provided that if within the aforesaid period of thirty days tae Controlling Authority fails to do either of these things, it shall be deemed to have confirmed the bid.
(5) Where the Controlling Authority within the period specified in sub--rule (4), declares that it withholds its confirmation to the bid, the lease of the collection of octroi shall subject to any direction that may be given by the Government in this behalf under sub-rule (1) be again put to auction and the provisions of sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) shall apply to such reduction."
6. The cumulative effect of the provisions of this rule seems to be that person, whose highest bid has been accepted at a public auction, would have the right to insist that Controlling Authority shall apply his own mind to his case under sub-rule (4) thereof before confirming or rejecting his bid However, if the Controlling Authority can be shown to have violated or disregarded the requirement of this sub-rule, a person, who has been pre--judiced by his consequent order, would be an aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution. In support of this conclusion, reference may be made to two judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan: Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (PLD 1969 SC 223) and Ikram Bus Service v. Board of Revenue (PLD 1963 SC 564). But it would suffice in order to under--stand the ratio decidendi laid down therein, to refer to the facts of first men--mentioned case in which Fazal Din was driven to knock at the door of Supreme Court. A perusal of the judgment would show that Fazal Din was induced to purchase from Lahore Improvement Trust a residential plot in Gulberg Scheme III on the representation made to public that on the opposite plot a market was to be constructed. After acquiring the plot, Fazal Din con--structed on it a house at considerable cost. But after some time he discovered that a part of the commercial plot had been sold by Improvement 'rust to a charitable institution for the purpose of erecting on it a mosque for its members. Feeling aggrieved, Fazal Din and some 275 residents of Gulberg III Scheme immediately protested to Chairman of Improvement Trust and Provincial Government objecting not only to the illegal alteration of the Scheme but also to the setting up a sectarian institution in the locality where the said majority of the residents belonged to a different sect. Having found no response to their representation, however, Fazal Din filed a writ petition in High Court, which was dismissed. Against the order of High Court he filed in Supreme Court petition for special leave to appeal and the same was granted to consider the question of his locus standi respecting which no finding had been given by High Court as also the interpretation of the provisions of Punjab Town Improvement Act; 1922. In regard to the question whether Fazal Din had the locus standi to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of Court, their Lordships reviewed the previous case-law on the subject, including the case of 1kram Bus Service v. Board of Revenue and finally laid down the following principle: "It is clear from the above that the right considered sufficient for main--taining a proceeding of this nature is not necessarily a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the applicant discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtail--ment of a privilege or liberty or franchise"
7. It seems to us that the case of petitioner is fully covered by this principle. Having succeeded to tender the highest bid at public auction which was accepted on the spot by Administrator, Peshawar Municipality, he had every right to expect the Controlling Authority to apply his own mind to the case under sub-rule (4) of rule 225 (ibid). But regretably, he failed to do any such thing. In point of fact, he was driven to pass the impugned order on the directions of a Minister of Provincial Government. And thus the petitioner had no option but to come to this Court grieving that the require--ment of sub-rule (4) of rule 225 (ibid) had been violated to his prejudice. In this view, therefore, the preliminary objection of Mr. M. Sardar Khan is evidently baseless and is rejected.
8. As to the merit of their stand, the Provincial Government have, in support of the impugned order, relied on sections 62 and 63 of Ordinance read with rule 31 of rules which better be reproduced:--- "62. Control over the activities of People's Local Councils. (1) If, in the opinion of Government anything done or intended to be done by or on behalf of a People's Local Council is not in conformity with law, or is in any way against public interest, Government may, by order-----
(a) quash the proceedings;
(b) suspend the execution of any resolution passed or order made by the Council;
(c) prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done; and
(d) require the Council to take such action as may be specified.
(2) Where an order under subsection (1) has been made, the People's Local Council concerned may, within thirty days of the passing of the order, apply to Government for review of the same and any order passed in review shall be final.
63. Powers of Government to give directions to People's Local Councils.--(1) Government may direct any People's Local Council or any person or authority responsible thereto to take, within such period as may be specified, such action as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance.
(2) Where after the enquiry Government is satisfied that a People's Local Council or person or authority has failed to comply with any direction made under subsection (1), it may appoint a person or persons, to give effect to such direction and may further direct that the expenses incurred in connection therewith shall be borne by the said Council.
(3) Should the expenses be not so paid, Government may make an order directing the person having the custody of the balance of the local fund of the Council to pay the expenses or so much thereof as may from time to time be possible.
9. Rule 31.----Government may relax any of the provisions of these rules with reference to all Municipal Committees or any specified Municipal Committee."
10. The plain language of section 62 of Ordinance would show that Government has the right to quash proceedings of a Local Council, suspend the execution of any of its resolution or order, prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be done by it and require it to take such action as may be specified provided it is found to have conducted itself in violation of the law or against public interest. To put it somewhat differently, the power in question is not an un--regulated power but conditional; in that it casts on the Government duty to oversee the functions of Municipality in order to contain its pursuits within the confines of law. And to this extent, there can be no quarrel with the con--trolling power of Government. The difficulty, however, is that the Minister of Provincial Government in this case seemingly endeavoured to shore up his impugned action on the strength of this section (and section 63 with which we would presently deal) not realizing that it had no relevancy to the case before him. He should have realized that at the public auction conducted strictly under rule 225 (ibid), the highest bid of petitioner had been accepted by Administrator, Peshawar Municipal Committee on the spot and thereafter under sub-rule (4) of that rule, it was left to the Controlling Authority to confirm or not to confirm that bid. It is not the case of Government that the auction in question had been conducted in violation of rules or the Provisions of Ordinance. And thus reliance on section 62 (ibid) was misconceived.
11. Section 63 of the Ordinance also does not support the impugned action. It is true that under subsection (1) of that section, Government has been empowered to issue directions to a Local Council to take such action as may be necessary. But then the power in question must be exercised with a view to "carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance". Now the purposes of the Ordinance seem to be to provide, amongst others, for the constitution of Local Councils, Municipal Committees and Town Committees throughout N.-W. F. P. In order to enable them to cater to the better well being of citizens. A perusal of the Provisions of Ordinance would show that in-there the duties and functions of a Municipal Committee, which are multifarious in nature, have been delineated with care and precision. And in order to be able to discharge these functions effectively, it has been empowered by section 39 to form a local fund, to augment which it has been authorised to levy taxes, tolls, rates, fees etc. Without which evidently it would be unable to carry out "the purposes of Ordinance". The Ordinance is, however, silent in regard to the procedure under which a Committee may lease out the right of collecting octroi (which is one such purpose). But then statutory rules have been framed on the subject which appear in Chapter IV of the rules under the heading "Octroi Schedule and Octroi Rules" and read as under:- "Chapter IV.- Octroi Schedule and Octroi Rules:-
(28) In levying octroi, a Municipal Committee shall be guided by the Model Octroi Schedule in Appendix `A'. A Municipal Committee may adopt the Model Octroi Schedule without any modifications, or with such modifications as it may deem necessary.
(29) Copies, in English, Urdu and such other languages as may be necessary, of the Octroi Schedule in force in the municipality, shall be hung at a conspicuous place at every octroi post, octroi office and octroi branch office and copies thereof shall also be made available for sale at the octroi office.
(30) Copies of these rules, in English, Urdu and such other languages as may be necessary, shall be provided at every octroi branch office and copies thereof shall also be made available for sale at the octroi office.
(31) Government may relax any of the provisions of these rules with reference to all Municipal Committees or any specified Municipal Committee.
(32) Subject to the provisions of the Ordinance and these rules, Government and the Controlling Authority may, from time to time, issue such instructions for the administration of octroi, as may be necessary and the Municipal Committee shall take such steps as may be necessary to enforce such instructions."
12. Now the stand of the Government is that it had, in exercise of the power conferred on it by rule 31 of these rules, relaxed in favour of respondent 4 the requirement of sub-rule (4) of rule: 225 (ibid). But this is a misconception. A perusal of the rules would show that they consist of XXX Chapters each deal--ing with specified subjects: Chapter I deals with "Preliminary", Chapter II with "Octroi Limits, Octroi Barriers, Octroi Posts and Octroi Offices", Chapter III with "Octroi Staff", Chapter IV with "Octroi Schedule and Octroi Rules", Chapter V with "Presentation of Goods at Octroi Posts" and so on. It is interesting to note, however, that the expression "Rules" has been mentioned for the second time only in Chapter IV dealing with "Octroi Schedule and Octroi Rules" which is not without significance.
13. It is a settled principle of interpretation that each word of a statutory instrument has to be given a meaning unless, of course, it would lead to absurdity or cause manifest injustice. The fact that in rule 1 of rules appearing under Chapter I, the rule-making authority has styled the rules as "West Pakistan Municipal Committee Octroi Rules; 1964", it would follow that to use the same expres--sion again only in Chapter IV, in which rule 31 would be found, would have been entirely unnecessary unless, of course, it has a purpose behind it. To us, this purpose is evident: just as in the case of various chapters of rules in which specified and distinct subjects have been dealt with, Chapter IV deals with Octroi Schedule and Octroi Rules". In this view, therefore, rule 31 will have to be construed in the context of rules 28, 29, 30 and 32 but certainly not of rule 225, which appears under Chapter XXX and deals with the subject of "Lease of Octroi". Construed in this context, therefore, all that rule 31 would appear to empower the Government is to relax in the case of a Municipal Committee its (Committee) obligations mentioned in rules 28, 29, 30 and under rule 32 it may, subject to the provisions of Ordinance and the rules issue such instructions for the administration of octroi as may be necessary and the Municipal Committee shall then carry out these instructions. The words "subject to the provisions of the Ordinance and these rules" appearing in rule 32 would appear to signify the intention of rule-making authority that any instructions intended to be given by Government to a Municipal Committee must have, as their object, the advancement of the "purposes of the Ordinance". It would therefore, follow if any such instructions would appear to run counter to that purpose, the action of Government would be in excess of its jurisdiction and consequently must be viewed with disfavour.
14. Seen in this context, the impugned action of Government seems to us to be repugnant to the purposes of the Ordinance and the rules. Sub-rule (1) of rule 225 (ibid) would show that public auction is not meant to be the only medium through which the right to collect octroi can be leased out by a Municipal Committee. It is true that the rule is silent in regard to other mediums. But then whatever medium is chosen in that behalf, it must be shown to be fair, unobjectional and designed to secure maximum revenues to the committee. It is a common knowledge that Government, Governmental institutions, private and public corporations invariably invite sealed tenders from public for letting out contracts of various nature. A look at rule 225(1) would show that resort to this method is conceivably permissible in the case of a Municipal Committee as thereunder all bidders would have a fair chance to offer their bids without there being the slightest chance of over- reaching each other by unfair means. However, if a Municipal Committee is of the view that it might, at a public auction, secure more revenue, it may, with the prior approval of Government, convene an auction for that purpose, keeping in view, of course, that the terms and conditions of the lease are not, as envisaged by rule 225(1), inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XXX.
15. Now the impugned action of respondents is not only repugnant to the provisions of Chapter XXX, it is manifestly unjust and designed to undermine public confidence. It is evident that under sub-rule
(1) of rule 225 ((bid) Government is not obliged to approve the request of a Municipal Committee to enable it to lease out the collection of octroi at a public auction. But once it grants that approval, it would be impermissible for it to reject the highest bid of a person on his back and lease out the said right to another person by private negotiations. The reason for this is evident. Any such action would not only tantamount to condemning the successful highest bidder unheard, it would be rightly construed to smack of nepotism which impression in public affairs must be avoided. For instance, let us take the example of a case in which Government has, in response to inviting sealed tenders for letting out a contract, discovered that the tender of A was the highest. Will it be open to Government in such a situation to contend with any propriety that it would be open to it to disclose the said highest bid to another person in order to enable him to top that bid and then award him the proposed contract? Surely, even to contemplate any such thing would be not only manifestly unjust but would be violative of the principles of natural justice.
16. We are also of the view that the impugned action of respondents is without jurisdiction for being opposed to the well-known principles of audi alteram partem. After the acceptance of his highest bid at the public auction, petitioner had every right to expect that Controlling Authority alone would, under sub-rule (4) of rule 225 (ibid), apply his own mind to his case anti not the Minister of Provincial Government who bad no jurisdiction whatever in the matter. Assuming, however, that he had any such jurisdic--tion, even then he should have, keeping in view the scheme of sections 62 and 63 of Ordinance, afforded an opportunity to petitioner if he would be willing to top the offer of respondent 4. In this respect, it would be useful to refer to an analogous case entitled Abdul Majid v.
17. Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar and D.I. Khan Divisions and others. In that case also, Additional Settlement Commissioner had, when the case of petitioner came before him for the confirmation of his highest bid, directed the transfer of the property to another person in view of his private application filed before him. But his order was struck down. It was held in that case that the order of Additional Settle--ment Commissioner had condemned the petitioner unheard.
18. This petition is, in view of all this discussion, therefore allowed with costs. And we hold that the impugned order of respondents being without jurisdic--tion is of no effect whatever. The result would be that the highest bid of petitioner would be deemed to be pending before Controlling Authority for consideration within the meaning of sub-rule (4) of rule 225 (ibid). And it is expected that he would apply his own mind to the case without any influence from any quarter whatever.
19. S.Q.