' The main contention raised in this petition for quashment is that after closing the prosecution evidence on 9-6-1973, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to give any other opportunity to the prosecution to produce evidence, therefore, his order to that effect passed on 14-6-1973, is without jurisdiction. That being so the statement that has already been recorded namely; that of Inayat Ullah (the complainant) not having connected the petitioner with the crime, this is a fit case for quashment.
2. The statement of Inayat Ullah (P. W.), shows that the fact of acid having been thrown on the injured (daughter of P. W. 1) is admitted. The defence plea of accident appears to have been raised in cross-examination.
3. Inayat Ullah was cross-examined at sonic length. It transpires from his statement in cross- examination that his daughter who is the main eye-witness in the case and who suffered the injury allegedly at the hands of the petitioner, was admitted in the hospital but the petitioner started visiting the hospital and he put the injured under fear as a result of which the injured and her mother ran away from the hospital.
4. Copies of the orders passed by the learned Magistrate whereby the so-called last opportunity for production of witnesses was given, have not been produced. It is not certain whether in the above circumstances even if the witnesses were served, the learned Magistrate passed proper order of giving "last" opportunity to the prosecution. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner was on bail. It is also not certain whether the learned Magistrate made any inquiry as to why the prosecution witnesses had not appeared before him. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the order passed by the learned Magistrate closing the prosecution evidence was at all justified. That being so he does not appear to have committed any illegality by permitting the prosecution to produce the remaining evidence by his impugned order dated 14-6-1973.
5. There is another aspect of the matter. The learned Magistrate has given specific reasons in the impugned order for permitting the prosecution to produce the remaining evidence namely; that it was "necessary in the interest of justice" to permit the prosecution to complete the evidence. The learned Magistrate, it appears, has mentioned this reason in the back, ground of the case mentioned above. When a learned Magistrate comes t such a conclusion that it is necessary in the interest of justice or otherwise essential for the decision of the case, he has ample power under section 540, Cr. P. C. To admit even additional evidence.
5. Looked at from every angle, there is no justification for quashing the proceedings. The impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate, I agree with him, is in the interest of justice. This petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine.