1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---Leave was granted in the above appeal to consider the following contentions raised by the appellant:-- "Contention is that under the amended law, there is no provision for transfer of pending cases and the reliance on the precedents quoted in the impugned order are not quite apt. Question of statutory construction of public importance arises in this petition. Leave to appeal is, therefore, granted. Interim order dated 4-1-1993 shall continue in the meanwhile."
2. ' The appellant instituted a civil suit for recovery of Rs,12,02,092.50 against the respondents under the provisions of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Ordinance'), before the Lahore High Court. While the above suit was pending, Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992, (hereinafter to be called 'the Act') was enforced which substituted the words "ten million" in clause (I) of section 2 of the Ordinance in place of "one million", thereby enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court as a Special Court under the Ordinance from Rupees one million to 10 million in respect of suits relating to banks' loan. As a result of this change in the law, all suits pending in the High Court in which the subject-matter of the suit was less than Rs, 10 million were ordered to be transferred to the Special Courts having jurisdiction in the case. The appellant felt aggrieved with the above general order of the High Court and moved an application under section 151, C.P.C. Praying that the suit instituted by him may not be transferred to the Special Court and be continued to be tried by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction. This contention of the appellant was not accepted by the High Court and consequently application filed by him under section 151 C.P.C. Was dismissed against which leave to appeal was granted as aforesaid.
3. ' The appellant, who is appearing in person, contended before us that the suit instituted by him could not be transferred to the Special Court as on the relevant date when he filed the suit before the High Court it had the jurisdiction to try the same. It is further contended by the appellant that there being no provision in the Act for transfer of the pending suits on account of enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court, the order for transfer of the suit from the High Court to the Special Court was wholly without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment of the High Court and contended that the amendment brought-about in the Ordinance through the Act is purely procedural in nature and as such it applied to pending cases as well. The High Court, it is contended, therefore, rightly transferred the pending cases to the Special Court competent to try the suit in view of the amendment in the Ordinance. We have heard the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the respondent and are of the view that this appeal must fail.
4. ' The Ordinance was promulgated on 27-3-1979 which repealed the earlier Ordinance No, XXIII of 1978. Section 2 (f) of the Ordinance originally defined the "Special Court" as 'a Court established under section 5 of the Ordinance'. Section 5 of the Ordinance provided that the Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette establish as many Special Courts as is considered necessary and where it establishes more than one Special Court, it shall also specify in the notification the territorial limits within which each of them shall exercise its jurisdiction under the Ordinance. Subsection (2) of section 5 of the Ordinance provided that a Special Court shall be presided over by a District Judge. Subsection (2) of section 6 excluded the jurisdiction of the Special Court established under section 5 of the Ordinance in respect of the following classes of cases:--
(a) Where outstanding amount of loan did not exceed Rs, one lac;
(b) Where arbitration proceedings were pending before an arbitrator, and
(c) Where loans were covered by an agreement which provided for reference to arbitrator in case of disputes.
5. ' Subsection (4) of section 6 ibid conferred exclusive jurisdiction on a Special Court in respect of all other matters to which the jurisdiction of such Special Court extended under the Ordinance.
6. Notwithstanding conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on the Special Court, section 13 of the Ordinance provided that a case pending at the time of commencement of the Ordinance before the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction shall continue to be heard and decided by the High Court. Therefore, in spite of promulgation of the Ordinance and Constitution of Special Courts thereunder, the suits relating to recoveries of loans, where subject-matter was less than rupees hundred thousands, were continued to be tried by the ordinary Civil Court. The Ordinance was later amended by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance II of 1983 (hereinafter to be called as 'the Ordinance II of 1983), which omitted section 5 of the Ordinance and substituted section 2(f), which defined Special Court as follows:-- "Special Court" means-- ' in respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed one million rupees, or the trial of offence punishable under this Ordinance, a person who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge and is appointed by the Federal Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be a Special Court to exercise jurisdiction within such territorial limits as may be specified in the notification, and, in the absence of such appointment, the District Court; and
(ii) in respect of any other case, the High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction."
7. ' As a result of the above amendment in the definition of "Special Court", the High Court also became a 'Special Court' in exercise of its original jurisdiction in respect of all cases under the Ordinance where the subject-matter exceeded rupees one million. The above amendment in the Ordinance rendered the cases pending before the Civil Court, at the time of promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983, in which the subject matter was less than rupees one hundred thousand, also triable by the Special Court. Section 8 of the Ordinance II of 1983, further provided for transfer of cases pending before a Special Court constituted under section 5 of the Ordinance to the Special Court which became entitled to try that case on account of the amendment introduced by the Ordinance II of 1983. However, Ordinance II of 1983 contained no provision for transfer of cases pending before the Civil Court on the date of promulgation of the said Ordinance to the Special Court. The effect of promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983, on the cases which were pending before the Civil Court at that time, was considered by this Court in the case of Mst. Yasmeen Nighat and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1988 SC 391) and after reviewing various provisions of the Ordinance in juxtaposition with the provisions of Ordinance II of 1983, it was observed as follows:-- "It may be added that an examination of the provisions of Ordinance XIX of 1979, in juxtaposition with those of Ordinance II of 1983, shows that the legislature by enacting section 6(4) of Ordinance XIX of 1979, intended to oust the jurisdiction of all other Courts in the matter of banking loans and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on Special Courts in respect of the matters which were made triable by the said Courts, under the terms of the said Ordinance and all such proceedings pending in any Court immediately before the commencing day of Ordinance XIX of 1979, stood transferred to the Special Court concerned. Under the provisions of the said Ordinance XIX of 1979 (under section 6(2)
(a) the jurisdiction of the Special Court was expressly excluded in relation to cases involving a sum of Rs, one lac or less. But by Ordinance II of 1983, the definition of the Special Court having been amended and subsection (2)(a) of section 6 of Ordinance XIX of 1979, having been omitted, the Special Court established under section 5(1) of the Ordinance became vested with the jurisdiction to try those cases which were specially excluded from its jurisdiction under section 6(2)(a) of Ordinance XIX of 1979. As a result of this extension, the Special Court was conferred the sole jurisdiction in such matters (the jurisdiction of all other Courts having been ousted in respect of such cases). The intendment of the lawmaker which appears from the changes made by him, is that he intended that even such cases which under section 60) of the Ordinance were to be tried by the Civil Courts earlier- were also to become triable by the Special Courts. This intention is also decipherable from the circumstance that witlythe omission of clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 6 of dinance XIX of 1979, the forum of the Civil Courts for the of such cases ceased altogether. Hence, it will not be reasonable to infer that the suits pending in the Civil Courts can continue to be tried by them, when their jurisdiction in respect of these cases has been completely taken away.
8. ' The upshot is that in our opinion the view taken by the Peshawar High Court and the High Court of Sindh that the suits pending in the Civil Courts before the promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983, also stood transferred to the Special Courts, is correct while the view expressed by the Lahore High Court in National Bank of Pakistan v. Taj Muhammad PLD 1984 Lah. 417 and United Bank Ltd. v. Mian Abdul Khaliq PLD 1988 Lah. 225 is erroneous."
9. ' From the above-quoted observations, it is quite clear that in spite of absence of a specific provision in Ordinance II of 1983, providing for transfer of pending cases, wherein the value of subject-matter was less than rupees one lac, from the Civil Court to a Special Court, this Court held that such cases stood transferred to the Special Court on promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983, on account of omission of sub-clause 2(a) of section 6 of the Ordinance and the expression of the clear intention of the legislature to confer exclusive jurisdiction on Special Courts to try all suits relating to banks' loans, by enacting section 6(4) ibid. The above rule laid down in Mst. Yasmeen Nighat's case (supra) equally applied to the present case. The clear effect of the promulgation of the Act was that all pending suits, involving claim by or against a bank, in which the amount of claim was below rupees ten millions became exclusively triable by the Special Court mentioned in section 2(f)(i) of the Ordinance. The High Court, therefore, rightly reached the conclusion that all such suits stood transferred to the Special Court competent to try the suits under the Ordinance.
10. The change of forum for the trial of suits was a mere matter of procedure which applied to all pending cases in the absence of any prejudice to the parties. The appellant has not been able to show that he suffered any prejudice on account of transfer of his suit from the High Court to the Special Court. No vested right of the appellant was, therefore, affected on account of transfer of his pending suit from the High Court to a Special Court of competent jurisdiction. The impugned order passed by the learned Judge in Chambers is therefore, unexceptionable. The appeal has no merit which is, accordingly, dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we will make no order as to costs.