' Wahid Bakhsh plaintiff's suit for specific performance of the alleged contract of sale was dismissed in default on 22-10-1991, and the application made for its restoration was also dismissed by the learned trial Judge, Ch. Shabbir Hussain, on 11-2-1992. The order was affirmed in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh, Mr. Muhammad Aslam Khan, on 15-6-1993. The unsuccessful plaintiff has preferred the present revision petition.
2. According to the plaintiff-petitioner, 27-7-1991 was the date of hearing in his suit, that was pending before Mr. Muhammad Masud Umar Khan, Civil Judge. It was adjourned to 18-9-1991, on which date he did appear in the Court, but was informed by the 'reader' that his case would be transferred to the Court of Ch. Muhammad Akbar, Civil Judge, and he was given 31-10-1991 as the next date. When he appeared on 31-10-1991, in the transferee Court, he came to know that his case had not been transferred, as it did not find mention in the cause list. He contacted the Ahlmad of the Court of Mr. Masud Umar, who told him to wait for a few days. He later came to know that his suit had been dismissed in default on 17-9-1991. In his application dated 2-4-1992 he states that the official of the Court had actually kept him in dark and had been giving him fictitious dates.
3. It is interested to find that the plaintiff remained out of touch for so long and claims to have become aware of dismissal of the suit on 2-4-1992. This is not plausible, for he had also engaged a counsel, who himself or his clerk could have made enquiries respecting progress in the proceedings. The learned Additional District. Judge has rightly observed that he was so disinterested in his own case that he did not bother to keep himself abreast of the proceedings and did not care even to mention the correct date of dismissal of his suit in his petition dated 2-4-1992.
The suit had been dismissed in default on 22-10-1991 and not on 17-9-1991. The application submitted on 2-4-1992 for restoration of the-suit was palpably time-barred. There is no force in the argument that dismissal of the suit could not be ordered on a date when it was fixed for hearing of the application for temporary injunction, submitted with the suit. When there was nobody present before the Court to prosecute his cause, petition for ad interim injunction being a very important part of it, the Court had no option but to proceed against him. Proceedings in the suit were in progress and the application for temporary injunction used to be put- up, alongwith the main case. The plaintiff-petitioner had not given up pursuit of the petition, nor does he say that he was no longer interested in issuance of a stay order pendente lite in his favour. Again, as already observed, there should have been some body present before the Court to pursue the case, and when there was none on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner, the only order that could validly be passed was the one dismissing the suit in default.
4. In passing the impugned orders, both the Courts below have not committed any material irregularity. The orders are sustainable on legal plane. The revision petition has no merit and is dismissed.