' MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.---The facts of this case in brief are that the appellant brought an ejectment petition against the respondent for his eviction from the house in dispute inter alia on the ground of default and bona fide personal need. According to the appellant the house was purchased by him from Mst. Munni Begum vide agreement dated 13-5-1976; the respondent occupied the property under her, as a tenant in pursuance of a rent deed, and after the sale he attorned to the appellant, but subsequently committed default 'in payment of rent. It may be observed that in the agreement aforesaid the house is described as bearing No,34/A, Main Bazar, Nai Basti, Dharampura, Lahore. The respondent resisted the ejectment petition; denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, and pleaded that the house obtained by him on rent from Mst..
Munni Begum was vacated by him in the year 1973; the house in his possession, bearing No,89, situate in Tarranum Street No,1, Rehmat Colony, Mustafabad, was his personal property, which was constructed by one Abdul Basit on the vacant side belonging to Pakistan Railways; from whom he purchased the superstructure in the year 1965.
2. The Rent Controller on appraisal of the evidence of the parties, by his order; dated 26-10-1981, held that the appellant failed to prove that the rent deed pertained to the house in possession of the respondent and that his possession thereof has been as tenant under Mst. Munni Begum.
Consequently, he dismissed the ejectment petition on the ground that relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties. The appellant preferred an appeal. It was accepted by the Additional District Judge on 1-7-1982. He reversed the findings of the Rent Controller; maintained that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties; and as no rent was paid, the respondent was a defaulter. Resultantly, the orders were passed for his eviction. The Appellate Court's decision was largely influenced by the fact that in the ejectment petition the respondent's address was mentioned as 34-S-43, Tarranum Street, Main Bazar, Mustafa Abad, Lahore; he was served at the same address and never took the position that he was living in a property bearing different number and that his address given in the ejectment petition was incorrect. The respondent challenged the Appellate judgment through a Constitutional writ petition, which was accepted by a learned Single Judge by his judgment dated 11-6-1984; the Additional District Judge's order was set aside and the matter left open for the appellant-landlord to establish his title to the property before a Court of competent jurisdiction. The operative part of this judgment is as under:-- "The houses built in the locality appear to be of encroachments as the land underneath belongs to the railways. The numbering of the property, the streets and even the names of the locality have not been fixed by any competent authority and presumably had undergone changes from time to time. Plot No,89 said to have been purchased by the petitioner in 1965, may or may not have retained its number. Similarly Nai Basti and Rehmat Colony may or may not be the same colony. Of course judicial notice can be taken of the change of name of Dharampura to Mustafabad but the remaining questions relating to the identity of the property are such which have a direct bearing on the title to the property. The Special Tribunal is entitled to hold an inquiry into the question of title because that determines his jurisdiction but when the question of title becomes as complex, as in my view is the present case, the Special Tribunal should stay his hands and refer the matter to the competent Court. In the present case it is the question of title precisely which was the core question in the litigation before the Rent Controller. The kind of evidence produced has resulted only in confusion. It was proper, therefore, for the Rent Controller to have left the question to the Civil Court".
3. At the leave granting stage it was contended that in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction the High Court should not have interfered with a finding of fact recorded by the Appellate forum in the hierarchy of the Rent Restriction Ordinance. The same argument has been repeated before us in support of this appeal. It is argued that the Additional District Judge, as an Appellate Court, had the jurisdiction to differ with the Rent Controller. He decided the question of identity of the property and the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties; second appeal having been abolished by the legislature; it was not within the competence of the High Court to have entertained the writ petition against final order passed by the Appellate Court. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. (PLD 1981 SC 246), wherein this Court made an observation that after the abolition of the remedy by way of second appeal the invocation of writ jurisdiction of the High Court against the orders of the District Judge is more often a device to circumvent the amendment incorporated by the legislature in the Rent Restriction Ordinance; relying on Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974, SC 139) it was further observed:- "It has been repeatedly held that a tribunal having jurisdiction to decide the matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that another it could be arrived at from the evidence does not make it a case for interference in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction."
4. In order to evaluate the reasoning which weighed with the High Court in differing with the finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Court, with the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, we have examined the record including their evidence. Apart from oral evidence, there are certain documents on the record embodying the description of the house. It needs to be seen that how far that evidence is helpful in resolving the controversy before us. Admittedly, the property was purchased by Mst. Munni Begum from one Mst. Noor Jahan on the basis of an unregistered deed dated 9-1-1971; its number mentioned therein is 34/A, Main Bazar, Nai Basti, Dharampura, Lahore.
The vendor Mst. Noor Jahan hired the same house from Mst. Munni Begum and executed a rent deed in her favour on 10-1-1971, in which the house is described by the same number and other particulars as given in the deed dated 9-1-1971. During the course of his submissions, the learned Counsel for the appellant heavily relied upon the rent deed executed by the respondent in favour of Mst. Munni Begum. The execution of this document is not denied by the respondent, but as already stated his claim is that he vacated the hired premises and shifted to his own house. This deed does not make mention of the number of the house and the only description given in it is that the house consists of 2 rooms and a courtyard, situate in Rehmat Colony, Mustafabad. This is still another document before us. It is an agreement dated 13-5-1976 evidencing alienation of the house by Mst. Munni Begum to the appellant. The particulars of the property disclosed in it tally with the description thereof entered in the first two documents. Our attention has also been drawn to the copy of the PT-I Register of the Excise and Taxation Department in which the house owned by the appellant is numbered as SEXIV-34-S. It is also on the record that the respondent moved an application before the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, alleging that the respondent was attempting to get the house transferred to him as part of the Katchi Abadi, which was disposed of under the Chairman's order dated 2-8-1977. He did not intervene in the matter on the ground that the house was not included in the Katchi Abadi. This order demonstrates that the appellant's claim before the Chairman was that the house comprising 2 rooms was constructed by him over Plot No,275 in Rehmat Colony, Tarranum Street, Dharampura-Mustafabad, and given to the respondent on the promise that he would vacate the same as soon as he procured some other accommodation. Reference may here also be made to the particulars of the house given in the ejectment petition, in which it is described only by boundaries and not by property number.
However, in the title of the petition the respondent is shown as resident of House No,34-A/SEX.15- 34-S-43, Tarranum Street, Mustafabad, Lahore.
5. It will thus be seen that a confusion richly abounded as to the description and identity of the property. During the course of his submissions the learned Counsel for the respondent brought to our notice that the house owned by him, and in which he is residing, is located at the back of the property purchased by the appellant. The appellant's claim to the house in possession of the respondent reflected by the order of the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, is altogether different from his stand in the ejectment petition. The conflicting oral evidence of the parties has added much to this confusion. It is clear to us that the question of title lies at the root of the dispute between the parties. In such a situation, the course to be followed by the Courts below as laid down by this Court in Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another (1983 SCM R. 1064) is:-- "It has already been held that when the decision of the issue regarding relationship of landlord and tenant depends solely and not only incidentally on the question of the ownership and title to the property and it will not be possible for the Controller to decide the case without deciding the basic question involved regarding title, then in such like cases it would not be appropriate to evaluate the situation by observing that the decision on question of title was only tentative. It has also been observed that the requirement of the relevant law contained in the Rent Restriction Ordinance is that the Rent Controller cannot decide the question of relationship of landlord and tenant against the tenant when the landlord has not been able to establish his position as landlord beyond reasonable doubt. In that situation the proper course for the Rent Controller would be to decide the issue against the landlord and advise him to first get his title established before seeking ejectment."
' The impugned order is thus; in line with law on the subject enunciated by this Court.
6. As regards the appellant's reliance on Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail, it is correct that in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, the High Court usually does not decide disputed questions of fact, particularly when a finding in this behalf has been rendered by a Tribunal of a exclusive jurisdiction, but such a finding is not immune from judicial review when it is visited upon by a patent illegality; suffers from non-consideration of important material on the record or is in violation of law pronounced by the superior Courts. In this respect, indeed the Additional District Judge failed to examine the case in correct perspective and his decision is contrary to the well-established principle of law. The respondent unequivocally asserted that the house from which he was sought to be evicted was owned by him and different from the one purchased by the appellant from Mst. Munni Begum. Prima facie his claim is not ill-founded. In the circumstances of the case, the issue regarding existence of relationship of landlord and tenant could not have been properly adjudicated upon without resolution of the controversy as to the ownership of the house to be got vacated from the respondent. The Civil Court is the appropriate forum for determination of such a dispute. The High Court, therefore, justifiably set aside the order of the Appellate Court and left a choice for the appellant-landlord to have a recourse to the Civil Court to establish his title.
' There is no defect in law or on merits in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This appeal having been found without merit is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.