1. JUDGMBNT ' This revision by Bahadur Khan the order of the District Magistrate Mianwali dated 26-1-1973, whereby he upheld the order of Mr. A. R. Sharif, M. I. C., Mianwali dated 16-11-1972, forfeiting the surety bond of the petitioner but, at the same time reduced the amount of penalty from Rs, 5,000 to Rs, 3,000.
2. The facts of the case briefly are that a case under section 301-A, P. P. C. Was pending against Ghulam Muhammad the son of the present petitioner, in the Court of Rana Bashir Ahmed, M. I. C., Mianwali. The trial Magistrate granted bail to Ghulam Muhammad by his order dated 10-12-1970, on his furnishing a surety bond in the sum of Rs, 5.030 Bahadur Khan petitioner stood surety for him and duly filled up the bond on that very day, which was- accepted. Consequently, Ghulam Muhammad was released on bail. Sometime later the case was transferred to the Court of Mr. A. R.
2. Sherif, M. I. C., Mianwali. Ghulam Muhammad accused failed to appear in that Court on 27-6-1972 when the case was fixed for hearing and remained absent till 5.9-1972. This led to proceedings under section 514, Cr. P. C. Against Bahadur Khan petitioner and it was ordered that the amount of bond, i,e, Rs, 5,000 be recovered from him as penalty. Bahadur Khan petitioner went up in against this order to the District Magistrate, Mianwali. As already mentioned, the District Magistrate upheld the order of the learned Magistrate but reduced the amount of penalty from Rs, 5,000 to Rs, 3,0)J.
3. Hence the present revision petition.
3. The only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the order of the learned trial Magistrate was without, jurisdiction because he had not specified the time at which, and the place where the petitioner had to produce the accused, as required by section 499, Cr. P.
4. C. In support of this contention he relied on :
(1) Abdul Ghani v. State 1970 P Cr. L J 511.
(2) Lakhi Narayan v. Crown PLD 1955 Docca 81.
(3) Mon Mohan Chakravarti and another v. King Emperor A 1 R 1928 Cal.
5. 261.
6. ' To understand the contention properly it will be useful to reproduce section 499, Cr. P. C. In extenso : "Section 499.-(1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his o am bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and; when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the Police Officer or Court, as the case may be.
(2) If the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person Released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge."
7. ' It will be noticed that this section requires the time and, the place of production of the surety should be mentioned in the bond. In Abdul Ghani's case (1) the bail bond executed by the surety only stated that he would produce the accused "before the Court of Session, Hyderabad "The case was subsequently transferred to District & Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas where the accused did not appear. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, forfeited the surety bond and notice was issued to the surety to show cause why the amount of bail bond should not be recovered from him. In the High Court the provisions of section 499, Cr. P. C. Came under consideration and it was held that since it was not specified that there was also an obligation on the surety to produce the accused in any Court other than the Sessions Court at Hyderabad, the surety could not be penalized for the failure of the accused to appear in or being produced in the Court to which the case was transferred.
8. ' There is no dispute about the principle laid down in this authority but a reading of the bail bond in the present case, would show that such a condition has been specified in the bail bond executed by the petitioner. This is clear from the wording of the bail bond itself which may be reproduced here for facility of reference t {{URDU TEXT}} ' Lakhi Narayan's case (2) relates to a different point. In that case the District Magistrate, Mangpur granted bail to Lakhi Narayan on the condition that he would live within the limits of Rangpur Municipality. Lakhi Narayan moved the Sessions Judge for the removal of this restriction but did not succeed. He then went up to the High Court where it was held on the basis of a commentary in Chitley's Criminal Procedure Code, that the condition could be imposed on the grant of bail to the petitioner other than the one mentioned in the bond itself namely that he would appear in the relevant Court at a particular time and place. The provisions of section 499, Cr. P. C. Were referred to, by the Court, {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1970 P Cr. L 1511 (2) PLD 1955 Dacca 84 {{FOOT NOTE}} in support of the above noted finding. Lakhi Narayan's case is therefore, not applicable to the present case specially, in view of the fact that our Supreme Court has hold in Humra's case (Cr.
9. Appeal No, 77/1972 lit P. S. L. A. No, 239/1972) that a condition can be imposed while granting bail to an accused person. This question was also considered in AIR 1928 Cal. 261). The facts of that case were that the bail Nand did not specify time and it was stated only that the surety should produce the accused in the Sessions Court at Dacca whenever called upon to do so. It was contended that the bond was not in accordance with the provisions of section 499, Cr. P. C. The learned Court held that it was not prepared to hold that the prescribed form was illegal but it was observed that:- " it is desirable to follow the words of the section and to prescribe in the bond not only the place but also the time at which the accused is to attend. This will obviate the necessity of giving further notice to the sureties to procure the attendance of the accused; and even if the case cannot be tried or taken up on the day specified in the bond and has to be adjourned, the bail can be renewed so as to make it available until the day of the adjourned hearing."
10. ' It would be noticed from a reading of the bail bond in the present case (which has been reproduced in paragraph No, 3 above) that time as well as place have been specified therein, for it has been mentioned that the accused would appear on every date of hearing before the Court where the case is pending or the Court to which it may subsequently be transferred. I do not agree with the content ma raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that not only the date by exact time of appearance (e g., 8-00 or 9-00 am. Etc.) must also be specified. I am of the view that the specification of the date of hearing or the general requirement that shall appear on every date of hearing, before the relevant Court, is sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 49), Cr. P.
11. C. Because once an accused person is released on bail on his own bond or that a surety, he is supposed to keep a track of the dates fired for hearing of the case. That is not a difficult requirement because on every date of hearing, the next one is generally given in the presence of the accused or his representative and it is presumed that on each date the accused is to be present in the Court at the beginning of the Court hours, whatever those might be during any given period and would be available whenever the case is called out during Court hours It will be noticed that even when a case is adjourned in the High Court, only the next date of hearing is specified and not the time of attendance, because it presumed that the parties (or their counsel) should be present whenever the case is called out during Court hours.
12. ' I am therefore of the view that the wording 'bail bond' is in consonance with the requirements of section 49), Cr. P. C. Both time and place have been sufficiently specified therein and provision has also made for the contingency of transfer of the case from one Court to another. The learned District Magistrate. Mianwali was therefore, justified in upholding the order of the trial Magistrate dated 16th November 1972.
13. ' I am however, inclined to agree with the petitioner's prayer that a lenient view of the matter should be taken because he (Bahadur Khan petitioner had stood surety for his real son and that he is only a peon in the tehsil with a nominal salary. It has been held in Dildar v. State (1) {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1963 SC 49 {{FOOT NOTE}} that in such cases a balance be kept between undue leniericy and undue severity and assessing as to what extent the bond should be forfeited. Court should have regarded in such matters as to whether the surety is acting through mere benevolence on behalf of the accused and where they have shown their best to secure his attendance. In the present case the petitioner had stood surety for his own/real son. There is nothing on the B record' to show that he had himself connived at his absence from the Court. As a matter of fact he tried his best to produce his son.
14. ' Considering these facts together with the fact that he is a poor man with a nominal salary, I reduce the amount to be forfeited from Rs, 3,000 to Rs, 1,000. The petition is thus partially accepted.