1. MUKHTAR AHMED JUNEJO, J----Petitioners have invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court against the decision dated 22-2-1990 given by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (hereafter to be mentioned as the Tribunal) in Appeal No. SUK-334/89. Said appeal was directed against an order dated 19-6-1989 passed by the Labour Court, Sukkur in grievance application No. 2 of 1988.
2. Grievance Application No. 2 of 1988 was moved in the Labour Court by the respondents 2 to 5 and 8 with the following prayers: "(1)The policy issued in super-session of Prime Minister's directive by the incompetent authority, through which control of FHG Drivers BPS-II, has been transferred to the Headquarters Office, Lahore, w.e.f. 19-10-1987, may not be implemented and seniority, position assigned to the applicants by the Division be kept in intact.
3. (2)The seniority list issued by the respondent No. 2, may also be cancelled being illegal and against the existing rules, and respondents Nos. 5 and 6 who have been posted in pursuance of the same from Lahore and Multan Divisions, be returned back to their parent Divisions.
4. (3)The booking of respondents Nos. 5 and 6 on Mail and Express link be stopped forthwith being illegal and against the decided policy.
5. (4)Any suitable relief which the Honourable Court deems fit along with costs of the application."
6. The grievance application was opposed by the appellants who filed written reply statement. After recording evidence of the parties, the Labour Court under an order dated 19-6-1989 directed the appellants to dispose of the grievances of the respondents 1 to 5 and 8 keeping in view the provisions of section 113 of Pakistan Railway Personnel Manual Volume-1 as well as the directions issued by the Prime Minister notified through official Gazette of Pakistan Railway dated 12-1-1974 and 15-5-1976. Aggrieved by such order the petitioners filed Appeal No.SUK-334/89. Under the impugned decision the appeal was dismissed on a technical ground of its not having been properly presented. Hence this Constitution petition.
7. We have heard Mr. Shabbir Ahmad Awan, Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Muhammad Siddique Kharal, Advocate for respondents 1 to 5 and 8.
8. The main point to be considered in this case is, as to, whether Appeal No.SUK-334/1989 was properly filed. Such appeal is filed, under subsection (3) of section 37 of IRO which reads as below: "Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) or a decision given under section 25- A or section 34 or a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 35 may prefer an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the delivery or passing thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final."
9. The opening words of subsection (3) are "any party". These words have nexus with the words "may prefer an appeal". The plain meaning of the said words picked up from subsection (3) would be, that only the aggrieved party can file appeal. These provisions can be compared with the provisions dealing with filing of grievance application contained in subsection (4) of section 25-A of IRO, which reads as below "If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or, as the case may be, subsection (3), or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or Shop Steward may take the matter to his Collective Bargaining Agent or the Labour Court, or, as the case may be, the Collective Bargaining Agent may take the matter to the Labour Court, and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute:"
10. The provisions contained in section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain v.
11. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. And another (PLD 1980 SC 80). Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan observed that the word `himself appearing in section 25-A(1) of IRO, does not involve concept of agency. Said word was interpreted to mean "the emphatic form of he, him in his real character".
12. Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the cited case, did not accept, that the concept of agency is to be regarded as inherent in the word "himself'.
13. It would be profitable as well as convenient to interpret the provisions contained in section 37(3) of I.R.O. In light of the observations made in the case of Syed Muhammad Hussain (PID 1980 SC 80).
14. Said case has also been relied on by the learned Tribunal for taking the view that Appeal No.SUK- -334/89 having been presented by an advocate without seeking permission under section 49(3) of I.R.O. Was not properly presented. In the said case it has been observed in relation to the Industrial Relations Ordinance that legislature intent seems to be to avoid interference by any other outside agency and that it appears from the scheme of the legislation that appearance through legal practitioners is restricted and wherever he is eligible to appear it has been so enacted. It was further observed that it would be anomalous to introduce the concept of agency in the word "himself' for in that eventuality the object of the law can easily be defeated. It would also be inapt to introduce the consideration of illiteracy or the existence or non-existence of the alternatives while construing the word "himself' as it is the principle of interpretation to give to the word its ordinary meaning for that is the only way to find out the intent of the legislature. Although all these observations were made in respect of the language used in section 25-A of I.R.O. But such weighty observations equally apply to the provisions contained in section 37(3) of I.R.O.
15. Consequently there does not appear to be any defect in the impugned order, warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Constitution petition is therefore dismissed with no orders as to costs.