1. ' The appellant's trade mark Application No, 85205 in class 7 was advertised in the Trade Mark Journal for acceptance, in response whereof respondent No, 1 filed opposition No, 48/88 which was accepted by order dated 27-1-1990, which has been assailed in this appeal. Ms. Navin Merchant appearing for respondent No, 1 has raised main objection with regard to maintainability of her appeal in this Court on the ground that all the opposition proceedings had taken place at Lahore and the impugned order was passed at Lahore. In this regard she has pointed out to the record of respondent No, 2 which shows that the notices for hearing of opposition No, 48/88 had taken place at Lahore on 20-2-1989, 4-6-1989, 23-7-1989, 8-10-1989 and 27-12-1989. Mr. Sultan Ahmed Sheikh appearing for the appellant has not been able to point out any material to show that the hearing of the aforesaid opposition had taken place at Karachi. He has, however, relied on letter dated 5-4- 1990, whereby the then Advocate of the appellant was informed by the Registrar of Trade Marks at Karachi that the hearing on the aforesaid opposition had taken place on 27-12-1989 and the Registrar of Trade Marks by his order dated 27-1-1990 had allowed the opposition and that accordingly his trade mark application would not proceed for registration. His submission is that the aforesaid letter informing him about the impugned order having been written by the Registry from Karachi Head Office, the inference would be that the judgment had been announced at Karachi. He has also relied on letter dated 3-11-1990 written by the main Registry at Karachi to the then Advocate of the appellant at Lahore supplying him the certified copy of the impugned order.
2. ' The above submission is without any substance. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 142 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1963 provides that where the hearing has taken place at the Branch Registry, the decision in respect thereof shall be pronounced at the Branch Registry. The aforementioned notices communicating dates for hearing of opposition clearly indicate that the opposition was being heard at Lahore and not at Karachi. The impugned order was also signed at Lahore, which leads to the inference that it was pronounced at Lahore in consonance with the above statutory provisions.
3. ' The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on Reckit & Colman (UK) P.I.C. v. Sheikh Soap Factory and others PLD 1993 SC 129 where their Lordships have approved the view expressed in the case of Abdul Ghani Ahmed v. Registrar, Trade Marks AIR 1947 Lah. 171 and held that the proceedings have taken place at Karachi and the impugned order having been passed at Karachi, the appeal was competent before the High Court of Sindh at Karachi. In the instant case the proceedings having taken place at Lahore and the impugned order having been passed at Lahore, the appeal against the same would be competent before the Lahore High Court. The appeal filed in the High Court of Sindh at Karachi is not competent.
4. ' Under the above circumstances the learned Advocates jointly request that the memo of appeal be returned to the appellant alongwith the annexures for presentation before the competent Court, subject to all just exceptions. The above may be done by the office after receiving certified copies of all such pleadings and documents as are requested to be returned to the appellant. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.